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“Politics is arbitrary. Law is not. With the rule of law, the law is certain, not arbitrary. With the rule of 
law, the law is written beforehand, and the rules are defined and known in advance. With the rule of 
law, the law is written to apply to all equally, and all, in practice and in reality, are equal before the 
law.” 




 “We view law as deeply embedded in politics: affected by political interests, power, and institutions. 
As generations of international lawyers and political scientists have observed, international law cannot 
be understood in isolation from politics. Conversely, law and legalization affect political processes and 
political outcomes. The relationship between law and politics is reciprocal, mediated by institutions.” 







ABSTRACT: Considering the effectiveness of the WTO and global governance in general as 
insufficient to overcome growing problems in governing a globalizing world, I pursue four objectives. 
By shedding light on the changes in the environment of the WTO and their implications for the 
working of the WTO, I first want to underpin the case for structural reforms. My second, and central, 
aim is to recommend a more effective structure for the WTO. Thirdly, I draw general lessons for 
global governance from the example of the WTO. And finally, I assess the adequacy of my innovative 
research design. 
The research design is characterized by a broad analytical framework that traces how regional 
integration among nation states and legalization of international institutions affect bargaining and 
enforcement of international agreements; additionally, it considers trends that affect the WTO. The 
interdisciplinary theoretical framework combines insights from the fields of international relations, 
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PART I: FOUNDATIONS 
1 Introduction 
In 1929, the world economic system tumbled into crisis. With demand plummeting, countries 
attempted to reserve domestic markets to domestic suppliers. In the ensuing spiral of protectionism, 
the economic system based on the division of labor and capital mobility was utterly demolished. The 
socio-political repercussions of the economic break-down paved the way for domestic political 
radicalization and international conflict which eventually led up to World War II. 
To prevent such disastrous dynamics in the future and to harness trade for prosperity and peace, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was formulated and signed in 1947. Although the 
Cold War disappointed the hopes for worldwide cooperation, several multilateral trade rounds 
conducted under the GATT contributed to far-reaching trade liberalization. In the Uruguay 
negotiations finalized in 1994, the GATT was transformed into the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The WTO Agreement broadened the scope of international obligations, disciplined exemptions from 
international law, and strengthened the dispute settlement system. 
Already during its first decade, however, the WTO faltered. In 1999, street protesters flocked to a 
WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, massively criticizing the WTO’s external intransparency and 
unaccountability. In the meantime, developing countries militated against the WTO’s internal 
decision-making procedure for favoring powerful countries. Prospects brightened in 2001 when WTO 
member states agreed in Doha on a new trade round, separating their negotiators from civil society 
protests and focusing on the needs of developing countries. Yet, disputes over agriculture derailed the 
negotiations on the Doha Agenda that began in 2003 in Cancun. 
There is reason to suspect that these recent failings have systemic roots. The institutional structure of 
the WTO appears to be incapable of dealing with as many as 145 member states with heterogeneous 
backgrounds, who attempt to negotiate complex regulatory policies under vocal pressure from civil 
society. Against this background, fears arise that the WTO will not cope with the pace of growing 
economic interdependence. The experience with the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 has created 
additional breeding ground for concerns. The crisis has demonstrated how even disruptions in the 
management of global interdependence that are limited in depth, space, and time, can cause substantial 
damages.  
Furthermore, the Asian financial crisis has discredited the faith that self-regulating markets will 
substitute for governance. Keohane and Nye (2000, 1) express the consensus that, “Complete laissez-
faire was not a viable option during earlier periods of globalization and is not likely to be viable now. 
The question is not – will globalization be governed? – but rather, how will globalization be 
governed?”  
Critically, globalization reduces the capabilities of nation states, which are traditionally the main 
source of governance, to autonomously reach their ends. More and more problems become global 
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phenomena that withstand efforts of national authorities with a territorially limited reach. No 
promising alternative is available yet to replace the existing system of territorial governance. 
Companies and civil society may assume certain functions that nation states cannot fulfill to 
satisfaction. For instance, companies may develop codes for self-regulation if they hold essential 
information which governments lack. Civil society may contribute together with nation states to the 
fulfillment of other tasks. For instance, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may monitor 
compliance with environmental agreements passed by nation states. Yet, civil society and alternative 
(functional) concepts of governance are no panacea. Global governance arising from cooperation 
between state actors is, therefore, a prerequisite to solving the global challenges ahead and reaping the 
benefits of integration.1 
1.1 Effectiveness of the WTO 
What exactly is at stake in the WTO? What are the objectives which the WTO should promote and 
which could serve as criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of the WTO? In the first place, members 
of the WTO strive for economic benefits that can be attained by the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers to trade, integrating the markets for goods and services. Such economic benefits are manifold 
pertaining to trade, productivity, capital allocation, and internal costs of protectionism. 
Apparently, a reduction in tariffs creates additional trade. If a tariff on one and the same good differs 
depending on the country of origin, this tariff diverts trade if the price of relatively efficient suppliers 
is artificially raised. Thus, a reduction of tariffs levied on more efficient suppliers will allow them to 
increase their market share at the cost of less efficient suppliers who have been favored by lower 
taxation in the past. As tariff reductions create trade and to the extent that they diminish trade 
diversion, global welfare increases. 
Larger markets also allow exploiting internal and external economies of scale and scope and they 
enable more rapid learning to improve production processes. Furthermore, market integration 
stimulates increased competition, particularly just after integration but to a lesser degree in the long 
run as well, depending on the specific sector. Since knowledge flows along with goods, integration 
further contributes to global welfare by spreading efficient production processes. 
Integration of the markets for goods and services also affects the allocation of capital. Tariffs set 
incentives for companies to invest inefficiently from a global welfare perspective. For instance, 
companies move production sites into the country where the products are sold to avoid tariffs or to 
make provisions for sudden, sharp increases in the level of protectionism. Finally, increasing 
integration lowers the internal costs associated with protectionism, like the administration of barriers 
and rent-seeking by protected private agents. 
Considering the interdependencies between trade and other issue areas, the WTO cannot be evaluated 
solely based on its performance in governing trade. Widespread poverty in developing countries, the 
erosion of social welfare systems in industrialized countries, corruption, environmental destruction, 
and violent threats to human rights, such as torture, terrorism, and warfare, show that today’s 
                                                     
1 See section 2.1.1. 
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international institutions do not meet the world’s need for global governance in many issue areas.2 The 
severity of these problems and the ability of other international institutions to cope with them are 
affected by trade-related global governance. A reduction of the scope of the WTO, in order to deal 
more efficiently with limited core responsibilities, does not automatically improve global governance 
effectiveness because the discarded responsibilities would have to be shouldered by other international 
institutions. Rather than ignoring linkages and jettisoning responsibilities, the contributions of the 
WTO to the governance of these other issue areas have to be accounted for. 
Beyond direct contributions to the governance of other issue areas, the WTO is a testing ground for 
future global governance.3 Legalization has well progressed with relatively high precision of 
obligations, sophisticated disciplining of exemptions, an advanced dispute settlement system, and 
relatively powerful enforcement mechanisms.4 Regional cooperation among nation states, as well, has 
made the greatest advances in the area of trade. In addition, many trends that will shape global 
governance in the future can be observed particularly well in the context of the WTO. Against this 
background, experience with reformed WTO structures should benefit global governance in other 
issue areas. 
Finally, the WTO holds a symbolic promise for global governance in general. Bacchus (2003, 541) 
praises that “the WTO is offering persuasive evidence to the world for the very first time that there 
truly can be something deserving of being called international law, and, thus, that there truly can be 
the international rule of law.”  
In summary, no self-organizing force could justify a sanguine prospect on the future without 
governance, while globalization obstructs autonomous governance by state actors. To avoid the costs 
of failure in managing interdependence in a globalized world, global governance, therefore, cannot 
afford set-backs, and even standstill may rapidly turn towards protectionism and fragmentation.5 The 
WTO fulfills an outstanding role within the global governance architecture based on the economic 
benefits it creates and its direct, laboratory, and symbolic contribution to global governance at whole. 
Yet, recent experiences in and trends surrounding WTO negotiations indicate fundamental problems. 
This calls for improving the performance of the WTO. 
                                                     
2 See Hauchler, Messner and Nuscheler (2001). 
3 Zürn (2002) ascertains that today’s governance of trade comes closest to the emerging ‘postnational 
constellation.’ Landau (2000) views economic negotiations as reflecting developments in the international 
political system, such as globalization and increasing complexity, particularly well. 
4 See Abbott and Snidal (2000), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), Jackson (1997), Kahler (2000), Keohane, 
Moravcsik and Slaughter (2000) and Reich (1996). 
5 Ostry (2003, 145) warns that, „A growing fragmentation in a world of ever-deepening integration represents 
more than a threat to trade. The Cold War involved a spillover from ‘high’ to ‘low’ policy. The opposite may 
well be the case in the future.” 
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1.2 Global governance structures 
Institutional structures have two important characteristics that make them suitable levers for improving 
global governance. Firstly, structures strongly influence the effectiveness of global governance; 
secondly, structures can be designed. This sets structures apart from other influential determinants of 
global governance effectiveness that are part of larger developments, like technological progress, or 
hinge on situational happenstance, such as individual leadership. Leadership can make a difference,6 
but the suggestion to “leave the formal decisionmaking structure alone and put in place people of 
talent and wisdom who know how to make it work” cannot warrant lasting success.7  
If we aspire to design structures, we first need to identify those aspects of structure that are particularly 
appropriate for reform. Regionalization and legalization are two aspects of structure that seem to be of 
fundamental significance and appear to be susceptible to political influence. Regionalization concerns 
the identity of the constitutive actors of global governance. Either nation states or integrated regions 
like the European Union (EU) can be the main pillars of global governance. The move from nation 
states to integrated regions as constitutive actors of global governance is labeled regionalization.8  
Legalization addresses the design of international institutions and, thus, the relationship between the 
constitutive actors. Legalization signifies the move towards institutional design that vests substantive 
authority in international institutions and adopts the form of law for international institutions. This 
means that legalized international institutions resemble domestic institutions in liberal democracies. I 
construct legalization by five determinants: decision-making process, delegation of authority to the 
judiciary, precision of rules of global governance, exemptions from rules of global governance, and 
punishment to enforce the rules. 
The significance of regionalization on the effectiveness of global governance is apparent.9 In 
particular, regionalization lowers the number of actors involved in global governance, thus reducing 
complexity in the international sphere. Furthermore, regionalization provides an intermediate level 
between the nation state and global institutions to which authority can be delegated. This promotes 
effectiveness, subsidiarity, and legitimacy of governance. Today, most scholars also agree on the 
importance of international institutions and international law and they have moved from the question 
whether international institutions matter to the question how they matter.10  
At question is if scientific knowledge and discourse can influence regionalization and legalization by 
                                                     
6 See Young (1991). 
7 Yerxa (2001, 384).  
8 When I speak of actors, I refer to nation states and integrated regions which are members of the international 
institutions under consideration. All actors together form the international society, the collective of actors who 
are recognized as subjects of international law and who are connected through a web of social relationships 
governed by a set of shared norms. See Brown (2001) and Bull (1977). Occasionally, I single out agents on the 
domestic level of actors, such as governments, domestic societies, and bureaucracies. 
9 See Cho (2001) and Hauchler, Messner and Nuscheler (2001). 
10 See Haas, Keohane and Levy (1994), Mitchell (1994), Reich (1996) and Young (1999b). 
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informing decision-makers. To demonstrate the impact scientific knowledge can have, I first sketch 
how deeply regionalization and legalization have changed in the past. Acknowledging that structures 
are not immutable facts, but subject to considerable dynamics, places us in a position where we can 
consider changing structures actively. I back this idea by arguing that the future development of 
structures is not fixed. Then, I suggest that knowledge about the effectiveness of structures can direct 
their future route. 
In the 1930s, a wave of protectionist ‘destructive regionalism’ deepened the Great Depression and 
formed the basis for imperial blocs. After World War II, European integration opened a new, singular 
chapter in regional integration. This move was followed in the 1960s by an up-swell of regional 
integration activity, which came to be known as ‘first regionalism.’ The Latin American Free Trade 
Association (LAFTA), guided by anti-colonialist sentiments and dependency theory, is characteristic 
for this wave that neglected the economic incentives behind regionalization, created little trade, and 
collapsed eventually.11  
Since the late 1980s, the ‘second regionalism’ thrives focusing on economic benefits.12 Existing 
integrated regions deepen their scope of integration and widen to include additional members. 
Dormant integration agreements are reinvigorated and new integrated regions are created. Whether the 
trend of regionalization is currently abating is not clear. On the one hand, existing integrated regions 
like the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum (APEC) and the EU, with its failure in 2003 to agree on a 
constitution, encounter difficulties in living up to their aspirations. On the other hand, ambitious 
projects do exist. Diverse plans for extending existing regional integration agreements are being 
discussed in America. In East Asia, the net of regional integration agreements is growing. The 
paradigm shift towards a multiple-track approach in East Asia, viewing regionalization as compatible 
with multilateralism, is accompanied by a developing sense of interdependency and common identity 
together with plans for deeper integration.13 The vibrant, albeit poorly coordinated, regionalization 
movement in Africa may also be turning towards deeper and better structured integration.14 
The history of legalization reveals comparable fluctuations. With the establishment of the League of 
Nations and the conclusion of numerous bilateral and minilateral treaties, institutionalization of 
international relations expanded in the interwar period, and then collapsed in the conflicts preceding 
and during World War II.15 Splendid plans for postwar international organizations did not materialize 
as the Cold War came to dictate politics. Nevertheless, legalization of GATT/WTO and other 
international institutions advanced in the following decades and accelerated in the recent past.16 As a 
result, Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane and Slaughter (2000, 386) observe, “The discourse and institutions 
                                                     
11 See Cho (2001). 
12 See Cho (2001), Fernández (1997), Fawcett and Hurrell (1995), OECD (2003), Sbraiga (2002) and World 
Bank (2000). 
13 See Choi (2003). 
14 See Rocha (2003). 
15 Minilateralism refers to cooperation among a limited number of powerful actors. See section 5.4.2.  
16 See supra note 4. 
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normally associated with domestic legal systems have become common in world politics.”  
This development is uneven over issue areas and regions, however, with particularly Asian and Latin 
American nations being cautious.17 All over the world, politicians and domestic societies are 
concerned with the risk they incur by (gradually and selectively) abandoning their sovereignty. The 
interests of powerful actors may increasingly conflict with legal obligations. Current United States 
(U.S.) policies, in particular, might lead to a considerable retreat of legalization. Therefore, we cannot 
be certain whether the tendency towards legalization will persist.18 
Although we witness important developments in regionalization and legalization, no political master 
plan concerning a desirable direction for these developments exists on the global level. The EU gladly 
promotes regionalization to sell its own experience as a model for success to the world. The U.S. used 
to be skeptical about and tended to impede regionalization; however, in the last decade, it changed its 
stance to become an active player in regionalization.19 In Asia, an ‘open’ model of regionalization is 
promoted which grants outsiders all of the benefits that are negotiated intraregionally.20  
Given the absence of clear political direction, better understanding of effective global governance 
structures can change the stance which actors adopt towards regionalization and legalization. This 
affects how they individually participate in regionalization, how they bilaterally influence 
regionalization efforts of other actors, and how they attempt to enable or restrain regionalization 
multilaterally. Better institutional design knowledge also influences what kind of international 
institutions actors create and how actors and international organizations interact in modifying existing 
international institutions. 
1.3 Designing effective global governance structures 
We have seen that structures are important determinants of effectiveness which lend themselves to 
rational design. Still, the question remains whether structures should be designed rationally in a 
centralized process or left to evolutionary forces.21 
Rational design ideally implies a single, intentional agreement on the institutional setup with expected 
institutional working and performance in mind. Evolution can either arise from many spontaneous, 
decentralized, though rational decisions or through manifold enactments and incremental changes 
without intentionality and awareness of consequences concerning institutional design. Institutional 
evolution can take place within institutions – like the development of GATT and, in particular, its 
                                                     
17 See Goldstein et al. (2000). 
18 See Brock (2003), Goldstein et al. (2000), Kahler (2000) and Keohane and Nye (2000). List and Zangl (2003) 
expect legalization to proceed as long as globalization continues. By contrast, Hufbauer (2003, 265) expects 
future economic global governance to be “conducted by shifting clubs rather than permanent organizations.” 
19 See Jackson (1997). 
20 See Choi (2003). 
21 Fukuyama (1999) develops a matrix of norm evolution according to whether norms are spontaneously or 
hierarchically and whether they are rationally or arationally generated. With rational design I refer to 
hierarchical, rational creation, whereas I consider hierarchical creation that is arational – e.g. by religion – as 
irrelevant. Evolution comprises rational and arational spontaneous creation. 
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dispute settlement procedure22 – or through selection among institutions, like the shift of intellectual 
property right issues from the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to the agreement on 
Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) under the umbrella of the WTO.23  
Hayek (1988) believed that long-term evolution creates valuable institutions which rational design 
threatens to destroy. According to Hayek, rational design theories erroneously assume that designers 
can improve welfare by rationally constructing objectives and by discarding norms which they cannot 
rationally justify. Moreover, institutional designers could not handle the causal effects of institutions 
that work through complex channels by which many actors jointly produce outcomes without aiming 
at the collective outcome. For this lack of understanding, and because of subsequent disrespect for 
micro-processes that do not aim at macro-objectives, rational design failed to effectively employ 
institutional design to achieve its objectives. Evolution, by contrast, successfully adjusted to 
uncertainty as it utilized the experience which many actors, connected through flows of information, 
such as prices on markets, acquire over time. 
While Hayek voices an important caveat against hubris, design knowledge is necessary for three 
reasons. First, for developing global governance structures in the current context, rational design is 
better than laissez-faire. Whatever might eventually develop without rational design by representatives 
of global society will be the result of many egoistic and incoherent design efforts of particularistic 
interests. Coherent, democratically accountable design committed to global social welfare is preferable 
to a fragmented process of institutional evolution arising from particularistic design efforts.24 
Particularly in the face of path dependency, when current structures influence the future development 
of structures, evolution does not necessarily lead to effective outcomes even in the long run.25 
Institutions shaped by evolution may, thus, be functional – but only in serving the needs of the 
powerful or in tackling historical problems.  
Secondly, the complex institutions we need in order to solve contemporary global problems are 
unlikely to evolve on their own within reasonable time. Globalization is progressing, weakening the 
capacity of state actors for autonomous governance. As a consequence, global problems harden while 
frustrated individuals and societies turn to ethnic or religious movements. Swift improvements of 
global governance are, thus, direly wanted, yet the history of the GATT shows that institutional 
evolution proceeds incrementally.  
Thirdly, one can purposefully combine design and evolution. Some aspects of institutions can be 
designed, while others can be left to evolution. Concerning the content of global governance, actors 
                                                     
22 See Petersmann (2003). 
23 See Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001a). 
24 Miller (2000, 535) warns that “rational choice by actors with conflicting preferences for institutions may result 
in institutions that are suboptimal.”  
25 See North (1990) on circumstances, such as incomplete competition, friction in the flow of information, and 
high transaction costs of institutional change that are conducive to inefficient, path-dependent institutional 
development. These conditions suggest that the likelihood for inefficient, path-dependent development in global 
governance is substantial. 
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could, for instance, favor mutual recognition agreements over common standards and wait whether 
standards evolve via competition and learning. Concerning global governance structures, one might 
think of creating overlapping authority between and within institutions and letting allocation of 
authority evolve over time. Another way to combine design and evolution is to accelerate evolution by 
intelligent experimenting. These softer forms of institutional design – less susceptible to Hayek’s 
perils – also depend on design knowledge. 
Initial formation and continuance at reshaping of real-world institutions always involves a 
combination of design and evolution. Young (1999a, 48) cautions that, “It would be a mistake, 
therefore, to exaggerate the role of institutional design in the processes involved in the creation of 
international regimes. Even so, opportunities exist to steer these processes, and much can be said for 
thinking carefully about such opportunities in advance in order to make the most of them when they 
do arise.” 
Indeed, global governance has attracted outstanding scientific attention subjecting virtually all 
international institutions to scientific discourse and covering diverse topics, such as security, 
economics, environment, democracy, and human rights. However, as most research focused on 
explaining institutional creation and demonstrating that institutional effects exist, understanding the 
link between institutional design and “the effectiveness of institutions in solving regulatory problems 
associated with globalization” has long been neglected.26 Only recently, the effectiveness of global 
governance has moved to the center of political and scientific debate.27 Accordingly, our contemporary 
understanding of what constitutes effective structures is insufficient to best exploit the occasional 
windows of opportunity for design. 
Practitioners and scholars both disagree even on the basic issue whether legalization is a good or a bad 
thing and whether more or less legalization is needed. Frequently, legalization is lauded for its 
improvement in bargaining and enforcement of international agreements.28 On the contrary, Goldstein 
and Martin (2000, 604) utter doubts whether legalization can improve effectiveness, “The weakly 
legalized General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime was remarkably successful at 
liberalizing trade; it is not apparent that the benefits of further legalization will outweigh its costs.” 
Barfield (2001) even calls for partial reversal of legalization in order to strengthen nation states. 
Scientific evidence on the effects of regionalization – submitted in the following chapter – is equally 
contradictory. 
                                                     
26 Coglianese (2000, 298). 
27 See Helm and Sprinz (2000), Martin and Simmons (1998), Sprinz (2003), Young (1999a) and Zürn (1998). 
Sprinz (2003) points out that especially research about effective global governance structures is in an early stage. 
Furthermore, Young (1999a, 119) observes that “much remains to be learned about the role of regime attributes 
as determinants of effectiveness. While many see the widespread use of consensus rules at the international level 
as a source of weakness, for example, the links between decision rules and regime effectiveness are poorly 
understood.” 
28 See Bacchus (2003), Franck (1990), Kahler (2000) and Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter (2000). 
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At this point, we have established that quickly improving global governance – and in particular the 
effectiveness of the WTO – is indispensable, that structures are a key factor for effective global 
governance, that purposeful design can play a constructive role in improving structures, and that we 
currently lack adequate understanding in order to design structures when windows of opportunity 
open. 
I aspire to help mending this lack of knowledge through findings on four counts. My central aim is to 
recommend a more effective global governance structure for the WTO. In addition, I consider three 
ancillary objectives. One objective is to shed light on the changes in the environment of the WTO and 
on their implications for the working of the WTO; this underpins the case for reforms.29 A further 
objective is to draw general conclusions for global governance from the example of the WTO.30 
Finally, I intend to reflect on the adequacy of my own research design. 
1.4 Analytical framework 
Above, we have seen that actors pursue diverse economic objectives in the WTO. These objectives are 
primarily attained through falling barriers to trade, reduced discrimination among trading partners (i.e. 
less trade diversion), and reduced discrimination among goods (i.e. less tariff escalation). I do not 
distinguish which economic objectives the WTO aims to achieve and by which means. Instead, I focus 
on the scope of global governance as the potential to achieve objectives. This scope of global 
governance increases with the number of issue areas that are regulated and with the intensity of global 
governance within these issue areas. The intensity of global governance grows with more rules in a 
given issue area and with rules that require greater changes in the behavior of the rule addressees.  
The assumption is common that the benefits of scope extension outweigh its costs, so that scope 
extension enhances global social welfare.31 This is not to say that any advancement in integration 
promotes global social welfare. In particular, spill-overs on linked objectives have to be taken into 
account, like the social and ecological effects of free trade. Nevertheless, a consensus exists that more, 
well-designed global governance enhances global social welfare.32  
                                                     
29 The majority of scholars perceives a need for institutional reform of the WTO. See Esty (2002), Hoekman and 
Kostecki (2001), Jackson (2000b), Ostry (2003) and Petersmann (2001). But there are also dissenting voices like 
Zutshi (2001, 387), who believes that, “The institutional design of the World Trade Organization is basically 
sound.” A strong scientific case for institutional reform is especially needed because the Doha Agenda gives 
short shrift to institutional reform. See Horlick (2002) and Schott (2002). 
30 In order to facilitate generalization, I usually speak of international institutions and global governance instead 
of the WTO whenever my argument pertains to global governance in general. 
31 This implies that actual scope, witnessed in current international institutions, is less than optimal scope, which 
maximizes global social welfare. What constitutes optimal scope depends partly on the social welfare function 
that is used to aggregate actors’ utility. It is useful employ pareto-efficiency with costly side-payments between 
actors as criterion for determining optimal scope. 
32 See Frankel (2000), Frankel (2001), Helm and Sprinz (2000) and Young (1991). In addition to assuming that 
the content of global governance is chosen wisely, employing scope as objective implies that scope is chosen 
optimally for given structures. Thus, the point is not simply to widen scope but to develop structures that allow 
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If actors faced no obstacles, they would immediately agree on optimal scope. However, bargaining and 
compliance problems, as well as risks of global governance, cause actual scope to fall short of optimal 
scope.33 To visualize how negotiations move from optimal scope to actual scope, assume firstly that 
actors reject all proposals that cannot be enforced. Among this set of enforceable proposals, actors 
then exclude all proposals that are overly risky. Due to bargaining problems, actors finally fail to agree 
on a proposal which is on the efficiency frontier of all proposals that are enforceable and entail an 
acceptable level of risk, so that they end up with the inefficient, actual scope. 
The better structures cope with global governance problems and risks, the greater scope of global 
governance can be attained and the more corresponding benefits can be reaped. This means that I 
consider this structure which allows most scope of global governance to be negotiated and enforced to 
be most effective. In the following, I sketch my line of analysis for the bargaining and the compliance 
problem. I then turn to my definition of exogenous determinants and my treatment of linked 
objectives. 
1.4.1   Bargaining 
According to Fearon (1998, 274), “a bargaining problem refers to a situation where there are multiple 
self-enforcing agreements or outcomes that two or more parties would all prefer to no agreement, but 
the parties disagree in their ranking of the mutually preferable agreements.” In other words, actors 
have a common interest to co-operate, but disagree how exactly to co-operate.34 Disagreements can 
originate from many sources. Actors can argue about the distribution of benefits. Normative divides 
can hinder agreement. Furthermore, different perceptions of the state of the world and different causal 
beliefs can disrupt negotiations. 
Chapter 5, dedicated to bargaining, begins with a review of possible bargaining strategies that actors 
may employ. This is an essential groundwork for my further analysis because the reasons for 
bargaining inefficiencies and the effectiveness of structures differ depending on the bargaining 
strategy.  
The number and nature of veto players, the toughness of their bargaining strategies, and the internal 
complexity of negotiating issues are all discussed as factors that determine bargaining effectiveness. 
While the trends suggest that more actors will be involved in negotiations, that they will choose 
tougher bargaining strategies, and that the negotiating issues will become more complex, appropriate 
global governance structures can ease the bargaining problem. However, certain structures detract 
from the influence powerful actors have over decision-making, whereas other structures forcefully 
expose weak actors to the intentions of the powerful. These risks need to be heeded if structures are to 
be acceptable to all actors. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
for beneficial scope extension. Note also that optimal scope falls short of complete integration. Keohane and Nye 
(2001, 269) speak of “useful inefficiency” as a “buffer for domestic political differences”.  
33 I use the terms compliance and enforcement interchangeably. Fearon (1998) suggests that bargaining and 
enforcement problems exist independently of the issue area concerned. See also Hauchler, Messner and 
Nuscheler (2001) and Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001a) for typologies of obstacles to global governance.  
34 See Muthoo (1999). 
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Finally, I address the possibility of delegating authority to the judiciary. Judicial delegation provides 
diverse benefits. For instance, judicial delegation can improve bargaining if courts create focal points, 
and judicial delegation can substitute for bargaining if courts assume legislative functions. Yet, 
judicial delegation involves a principal-agent risk and it harms the interest of those actors who would 
have fared better if disputes had been resolved in diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, the question 
arises how judicial delegation can be designed in a way that actors consent to the transfer of authority. 
1.4.2   Compliance 
Compliance (or enforcement) problems exist if governments face an incentive to defect from 
agreements. Chapter 6 presents several compliance mechanisms which counteract the incentive to 
defect. If governments deem the WTO legitimate, they feel normatively obliged to comply. Domestic 
societies, bureaucracies, and courts can impose domestic audience costs on governments if they violate 
agreements. Furthermore, defecting actors incur reputational costs on the international level. Actors 
also abstain from defection because protectionism is often costly in economic terms. Additionally, 
defecting actors may be exposed to sanctions by other actors. Finally, actors desire to prevent systemic 
damage to the WTO which arises from defections. By comparing the strength of the compliance 
mechanisms with the incentives to defect, we can then develop structures which approximately 
achieve a desirable level of compliance. 
1.4.3   Exogenous determinants 
Chapter 3 deals with exogenous determinants and trends in these exogenous determinants. The 
exogenous determinants are factors that influence the impact of endogenous determinants on 
effectiveness, although they themselves are not affected by the choice of structures. Since changing 
the fundamental global governance structures is likely to require a long period of time, proposals for 
fundamental governance reform have to ground in the problems dominant within the next decade. 
Hence, major trends in the ambit of global governance relevant to future problems are dissected and 
their effects are integrated into the analysis. The primary trends concern: relative effectiveness of 
global governance, linkages within global governance, depth of global governance, actor participation, 
and involvement of civil society.  
Secondary trends that are driven by these primary trends include, among others, the number of actors, 
the heterogeneity of actors, and the uncertainty about efficiency and distributional effects of 
agreements. Defining trends in advance allows proceeding economically in the analysis with an 
abstract line of argument while being strongly rooted in real-world developments. 
In addition, I reason in Chapter 3 that the trends incorporate the requirements to attain linked 
objectives. If global governance structures deal effectively with the cooperation problems in the face 
of linked and deep global governance and with involvement of developing country actors’ and civil 
society, then the global governance structures are capable of contributing to linked objectives. 
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1.5 Theoretical framework 
In this section, I firstly explain why I see the need to employ an interdisciplinary theoretical 
framework for recommending global governance structures. I then outline which theories I integrate 
into my theoretical framework and I sketch which stances I take on particularly important issues of 
theorizing. 
Two arguments can be brought to bear against integrating (especially rationalist and constructivist) 
theories in the analysis of international institutions. One argument aims at promoting scientific 
progress. Its adherents prefer studies to focus on one theoretical approach to stimulate competition 
among theories.35 The opposing thought propounds that eclectic middle range theories are the best way 
to the creation of long-term general knowledge.36 In any case, my aim is not to judge on scientific 
disputes but to combine existing scientific insights for recommendation of governance structures.  
The other argument is brought forward by scholars who want to combine insights from different 
scientific approaches but not integrate the different approaches into one argument. Convergent results 
are deemed particularly reliable, whereas contradictions demand further efforts.37 From my own 
perspective, such an analysis can never lead to reliable results because essential aspects are excluded. 
Firstly, separate analysis either fails to include mechanisms that work through a combination of 
rationalist and constructivist channels or it perceives these mechanisms overly narrowly.38  
Secondly, separate analysis ignores interaction effects between mechanisms that fall into different 
approaches. In a setting with low compliance, for instance, a severe punishment of norm violations 
may improve the legitimacy of the norm as actors observe improved compliance. If compliance is 
already high because actors feel a normative obligation to comply, a severe punishment of norm 
violations that occur in outstanding situations is likely to weaken the norm’s legitimacy and possibly 
compliance. Neither a purely rationalist nor an exclusively constructivist account can capture such 
interactions.  
Thirdly, even in the absence of mechanisms that reach across scientific approaches and of interaction 
effects among mechanisms belonging to different approaches, separate analysis cannot reveal the best 
instrument mix. This is because separate analysis is not equipped to select from substitutive 
mechanisms that belong to different approaches. Hence, I employ an integrated framework to analyze 
how endogenous and exogenous determinants interact in the cooperation problems and risks.39 
                                                     
35 See Wendt (2001).  
36 See Odell (2000, Ch. 1). 
37 See Young (1999a, Ch. 8). 
38 See section 6.2.1 about rhetorical action, the rational and strategic use of normative statements, for an example 
of such a mechanism that can only be fully understood with an interdisciplinary approach. 
39 This is in accordance with many scholars calling for more integrated research on global governance. See 
Dunoff (1999), Hemmer and Katzenstein (2002), Jönsson (2002), March and Olsen (1998), Onuma (2003) and 
Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood (1998). See, in particular, Fearon and Wendt (2002) on the potential for 
‘conversation’ between rationalism and constructivism. 
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My own framework draws on resources from the three main sciences occupied with international 
institutions: international relations, international law, and international economics. Each of these 
sciences contains different schools of thought with diverging epistemological, ontological, and 
methodological commitments. Due to this diversity, most strands share some assumptions while they 
differ on other dimensions. I avoid the intricacies of presenting the different approaches in the 
introduction, and throughout the analysis, I generally evade tracing arguments back to particular 
schools of thought.  
Instead, I briefly summarize from which schools of thought I borrow arguments in my own analysis. 
Within international relations theory, I engage (Neo-/Liberal-) Institutionalism, Liberalism, and 
Constructivism.40 While I address the concerns of realism, this theory assumes minor importance in 
the present study. Within international law theory, I focus on international legal process as a causal 
mechanism and on the role of law for the social construction of the international system, whereas I 
generally sidestep the significance of domestic and transnational law for the international system.41 
Economic scholarship serves as basis for international relations and international law theory about the 
WTO. In addition, international economists conduct studies of international institutions and they 
provide insights for the assessment of regionalization.42 
In particular, my theoretical framework integrates stances taken along five salient dimensions in the 
study of global governance. The first dimension is the level where explanation is sought. On the one 
hand, I take structural considerations into account. These can be shared knowledge that establishes 
focal points or interaction dynamics following from structure, for instance, in the context of the risk 
for actors associated with voting rules. On the other hand, I also look at the unit-level of actors. For 
instance, I ask how structures affect the domestic audience costs of non-compliance and, thus, the 
behavior of actors in the international sphere. Beyond this dichotomy, many observers point to the 
blurring between the national and international realm. Accordingly, I consider the direct impact of 
                                                     
40 For overviews of international relations theories, see Carlsnaes, Risse and Simmons (2002), Eichengreen 
(1998), March and Olsen (1998), Martin and Simmons (1998) and Wendt (1999). 
41 See Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood (1998) for a review of international-relations oriented, international law 
theory along these three schools of thought. In terms of the methods of law as categorized by Ratner and 
Slaughter (1999), my analysis builds primarily on different strands of legal process, international law and 
international relations, as well as law and economics. Positivism and critical legal studies are of secondary 
importance, while I am not concerned with feminist jurisprudence. See Haas (2000), Koh (1997), Guzman 
(2002) and Raustiala and Slaughter (2002) for reviews of legal and international relations scholarship 
specifically about compliance with international institutions. 
42 Bagwell and Staiger (2000) are a good example of advanced economic thinking about the WTO, which is at 
the same time governance-oriented and characteristically economic. Bhagwati, Greenway and Panagariya 
(1998), Cho (2001), OECD (2003), Panagariya (1999), Winters (1999), World Bank (2000) and Zimmermann 
(1999) provide overviews on economic research about regionalism and multilateralism. Important studies on the 
dynamics of regionalization include Andriamananjara (1999), Baldwin (1993), Bond and Syropoulos (1996), 
Conconi (2001), Frankel, Stein and Wei (1997), Freund (1998), Freund (2000), Goto and Hamada (1995), 
Kubota (1999), McLaren (2002), Nordström (1995) and Perroni and Whalley (2000). 
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civil society on the international level. 
The second dimension relates to the factors that determine actors’ behavior. Materialist theories infer 
all behavior from material conditions reducing ideas to intervening variables at best. Radical idealist 
theories, on the contrary, deny a causal influence of material factors. They explain the world solely 
with reference to the human mind, language, and discourse that gives meaning to material objects. In 
the present study, material factors play a role, as do ideational factors, such as norms.43 The ideational 
factors open the door for learning so that actors’ ideational properties change in the course of 
negotiations.44 
Thirdly, one can discern two main approaches that explain how individuals make decisions. Under a 
‘logic of consequences,’ “human actors choose among alternatives by evaluating their likely 
consequences for personal or collective objectives, conscious that other actors are doing likewise.”45  
In addition to this traditional view of the ‘rational man,’ I work with bounded-rational actors who face 
limitations in their ability to store and process information. Contrary to the logic of consequences, 
actors can pursue a ‘logic of appropriateness,’ attempting to comply with norms.46 
Fourth, approaches to international relations differ in their treatment of law and power. International 
relations theory traditionally focuses on power and assigns no independent causal role to law. The 
theory of international law traditionally takes sovereign equality among states serious and ignores the 
impact of power disparities on the creation and application of law.47 Perceiving actors as considering 
material and ideational factors while following the logic of consequences, as well as the logic of 
appropriateness, suggests taking law and power serious and provides ample opportunities to closely 
link these two concepts in the analysis. 
Finally, I adopt a principal-agent perspective to mediate between two opposing views on the role of 
international institutions. One side argues that international institutions reflect state preferences. To the 
degree institutions affect outcomes, they change the constraints which states face in terms of 
transaction cost in accordance with states’ preferences. The other side locates all causal power with 
international institutions and diminishes states into powerless spectators of supranational processes 
beyond their control. This controversy is most pronounced in the dispute between 
intergovernmentalists and functionalists/supranationalists on the subject of European integration. 
Principal-agent theory opens intermediate ground in granting agency to states and international 
institutions and by explaining outcomes by their interplay.48 
                                                     
43 Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 891) define a norm as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a 
given identity”. 
44 See Chapter 4 on ideational properties and learning. I generally speak of ideational properties instead of 
ideational factors or simply ideas. I do so firstly in order to emphasize that ideas have to be internalized to 
influence behavior. Secondly, I thus highlight that ideas generally display stability or develop only gradually 
over many situations in which actors make decisions. 
45 March and Olsen (1998, 949). 
46 See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and March and Olsen (1998). 
47 See Byers (1999). 
48 See Barnett and Finnemore (1999) and Pollack (1997). 
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Hence, I consider states and international institutions as actors behaving with regard to consequences 
and appropriateness in response to material and ideational factors stemming from the international and 
domestic sphere. This prepares the stage for an encompassing set of effects that global governance 
structures can exert on actors’ behavior. By necessity, I have to select the most important effects; in 
addition, preference is given to (more) direct effects that can be established with (more) stringency.  
Since ideational properties shape actors’ behavior and because ideational properties are influenced by 
interactions at the international level, we have to consider how interaction constitutes actors by 
changing their ideational properties. Chapter 4 considers the logics according to which actors make 
decisions and it presents the fundamental ideational properties that shape behavioral decisions 
regarding bargaining and compliance. These ideational properties comprise values, norms, 
perceptions, causal beliefs, the perspective on relative versus absolute gains, and collective identity. 
Among the effects of global governance structures and trends on learning, particular attention is paid 
to the question of how structures stimulate deliberative negotiating processes, in which actors 
collectively search for the best solution to a problem. Examination of all constitutive effects on actors 
in Chapter 4 allows treating actors as exogenous in the analysis of bargaining and compliance. 
Consideration of ideational properties and learning through constructivist theories confronts my 
theoretical approach with a further challenge in addition to complexity. Constructivism is still 
developing from a magnitude of partly unrelated, partly competitive proposals into one or several 
coherent theories.49 Even more recent and dynamic are efforts to combine constructivist and rationalist 
insights.50 Working with this theoretical tool-kit necessarily gives my account an idiosyncratic touch. 
                                                     
49 See Jachtenfuchs (2002) and Zehfuss (2002). See also Schimmelpfennig (2000), who observes a profusion of 
micro-economic foundations and lacking theoretical and terminological coherence in constructivism. 
50 See Jupille, Caporaso and Checkel (2003). 
 27
1.6 Procedure 
Now we have established all important elements of the analysis, which can therefore formally be 
















Figure 1: Analytical framework 
This study is divided into three parts. The first part contains the foundations. In this Introductory 
Chapter, I have argued for the relevance of the research question and research design in a political and 
a scientific context. Furthermore, I have outlined the study and I have brought forward my 
understanding of effectiveness in relation to the cooperation problems and risks in global governance. 
Chapter 2 about the structures of global governance provides more detailed discussion of the 
endogenous determinants. Chapter 3 then delves into the trends affecting global governance in order to 
develop the exogenous determinants. 
The second part of the study is dedicated to actual analysis. Chapter 4 deals with ideational properties 
and learning, whereas in Chapter 5 on bargaining and in Chapter 6 on compliance the actors’ 
ideational properties are held constant. 
The final part draws conclusions. Chapter 7 demonstrates the need for reform and recommends a 
reformed structure for the WTO. Chapter 8 discusses possibilities for generalizing my main findings 
of the WTO to other international institutions. Concluding Chapter 9 then assesses the research design 
and points to avenues for future research. 
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2 Endogenous determinants: Global governance structures 
In this chapter, I specify and justify my understanding of regionalization and legalization, which are 
the endogenous determinants of effectiveness in this study. As in Chapter 3 on trends and in Chapter 4 
on ideational properties and learning, I do not elaborate on the effects of these concepts under 
consideration beyond what is required for their proper definition. Their role for effectiveness of global 
governance is analyzed in Chapter 5 on bargaining and in Chapter 6 on compliance.  
2.1 Regionalization 
Currently, nation states are the dominating actors in global governance. They negotiate, implement, 
and enforce the majority of global agreements. Yet, nation states are not the only actors active in 
global governance affairs. There are also integrated regions in which several nation states cooperate 
above the national but below the global level. In particular, several European nation states have 
integrated into the EU and now speak with one voice in the WTO. On the scale below the nation state, 
regions and cities cooperate across borders. In addition, private agents engage in governance activities 
beyond the nation state, such as companies which develop voluntary global standards and NGOs 
which attempt to hold multinational companies accountable to global rules of conduct of varying 
origin. In these ways, different types of actors with diverse concepts of governance compete for 
influence. 
To qualify for inclusion in the global governance structure, actors need to have the capacity to 
beneficially serve as pillars of a global governance architecture. Furthermore, they have to be powerful 
enough to win the contest for influence in case they are promoted as an effective and legitimate 
solution. Thus, I take a middle-ground between realism and utopianism in believing that we can 
choose among possible constitutive actors, albeit constrained by existing power constellations.  
In the following section, I argue that nation states are especially able providers of governance and that 
they will preserve their preeminence against lower-level, territorial actors and transnational, private 
agents. Then, I reason that starting from a world of nation states regionalization is a viable option. In 
this context, I also describe and justify the properties I impute to integrated regions and the dynamics I 
expect from regionalization. While we are well informed about the properties and interactions of 
nation states, the characteristics of integrated regions and a world composed of integrated regions are 
less clear.51 
2.1.1   Nation states as constitutive actors 
Nation states evolved in a historical process competing with alternative forms of governance such as 
religious rule and cooperation among free cities.52 Nation states succeeded in controlling an increasing 
number of governing functions within their territory and in bringing social spaces into conformity with 
                                                     
51 On nation states, see supra note 40; on integrated regions, see supra note 42. 
52 See Luhmann (1998) and Osiander (2001). 
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their political territory. Such a unitary system of governance, where one authority directly commands 
many governance functions and accomplishes primacy over those governance functions which it does 
not directly provide, is labeled territorial governance. Nowadays, globalization widens social spaces 
beyond territorial borders, while accompanying fragmentation shifts the emphasis towards social 
spaces that are smaller than the nation state.  
These developments exert pressure on nation states from two sides. Within territorial governance, 
lower-level actors claim more authority in the name of subsidiarity and federalism, and they directly 
engage in cooperation with similar entities across national borders.53 The second competition arises 
from functional governance. Under this model, several sources of authority co-exist as equals, each 
providing specific functions for social spaces that do not necessarily coincide with traditional political 
territories.54 Private agents play an important role in functional governance in cooperation with, or 
even without, nation states, for instance, multinational enterprises, NGOs, and scientific communities 
that accept voluntary codes of conduct or agree on standards for efficient cooperation.  
It appears convincing that nation states accommodate these claims to authority without loosing their 
prime position in formulating, legitimizing, controlling, and implementing global governance. This 
implies that governing through government and governing with government dominates governing 
without government. Though attention is increasingly paid to direct involvement of lower-level state 
actors and private agents in governance beyond the nation state, the assumption that states remain the 
central actors of global governance is still widely shared among scholars of international relations. 
Accordingly, realism and (Liberal-/Neo-) Institutionalism, as well as many liberal and constructivist 
scholars, all treat nation states as constitutive entities of the global, political system.55 In addition, most 
studies of global governance explicitly expect nation states to remain the single most important type of 
actors.56  
They do so for several reasons. Firstly, nation states are endowed with unique resources and 
capabilities, so that they are essential for implementing global governance. Secondly, based on a 
strong collective identity, shared culture and institutionalized discourse, nation states enjoy 
particularly high legitimacy. Civil society involvement contributes to the legitimacy of global 
governance dominated by nation states and integrated regions, but it cannot replace the 
legitimatization through territorial democracies.57 Thirdly, nation states have proven to be flexible and 
                                                     
53 On territorial re-organization of authority in response to changing social spaces and on the growing autonomy 
of lower-level actors in particular, see Albert (1998), Blatter (2001), Goodman (1998), Pieterse (1998), Wolf 
(1998) and Zürn (1998). 
54 See Cerny (2000), Luhmann (1998), Messner (2003), Rosenau (2000) and Wolf (1998). 
55 See Wendt (1999). 
56 See Commission on Global Governance (1995), Keohane and Nye (2000), Malanczuk (2002) and Zürn (1998, 
Ch. 5). Wendt (1999, 9,) points out that, “It may be that non-state actors are becoming more important than 
states as initiators of change, but system change ultimately happens through states.” 
57 See Thaa (2001). Section 3.5. provides further discussion of civil society involvement in global governance.  
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resilient in the past, and they display self-interest in reproduction.58 Even if governance by private 
agents grows in importance, nation states will preserve traditional and find new tasks. The need for 
nation states for maintaining the legal framework – and especially for allocating property rights and 
regulating markets – will not abate.59 While we can see only blurred outlines of actors’ new roles in 
the future, we can expect new tasks to involve managing interfaces between different modes of 
governance and launching initiatives.60 
2.1.2   Welfare effects of integrated regions  
The following discussion demonstrates that regional integration of nation states is a viable option, and 
it derives properties of integrated regions that allow treating them realistically as actors of global 
governance. To this end, I consider in turn the direct welfare effects of regionalization, the interaction 
of regionalization with multilateral liberalization in the WTO, and dynamic time-path properties of 
regionalization.  
The formation of an integrated region causes economic benefits and costs for members as well as non-
members of the integrated region.61 Let me firstly address the economic benefits. Regionalization 
creates the same economic benefits on a smaller scale which we have seen in Chapter 1 arising from 
multilateral liberalization. Regionalization creates additional trade, investment, and knowledge flows 
inside integrated regions. Larger markets enable internal and external economies of scope and scale, 
spur learning of more efficient production processes, and intensify competition. Regionalization can 
engender additional gains if it facilitates the movement of natural persons and the coordination of 
national policies. Furthermore, actors can lock in reforms by entering into integrated regions. This 
assures private agents that policies will be maintained even though the government under whose 
                                                     
58 See Wendt (1999, Ch. 5). See also North (1981), who shows how nation states responded throughout history 
with fundamental structural reforms to external changes, e.g. in the stock of capital and in military technology. 
Since nation states were repeatedly able to adopt new structures that were more efficient in reducing the 
transaction costs of governing and in coping with political pressure from domestic groups and foreign states, we 
can expect states to adapt to the current challenges of globalization as well. A second argument can be built on 
North’s observation that nation states systematically failed to provide the most efficient institutional framework, 
in particular for economic growth. Accordingly, nation states do not need to provide an approximately efficient 
response to globalization in order to persist. 
59 On the importance of institutions for economic wealth, see North (1990). He demonstrates that institutions can 
significantly lower the transaction costs of assuring the quality of exchanged goods and services, of monitoring 
and enforcing contracts, and of hedging against risks in economic transactions. Informal institutions such as 
reputation and norms are appropriate to fulfill certain functions in lowering transactions costs. Sophisticated 
economies with highly specialized modes of production, however, require also formal institutions. It is 
convincing that states remain indispensable sources of such institutions. 
60 See Messner (1998) and Wolf (1998). 
61 See supra note 42. On economic effects, see also Baldwin, Cohen, Sapir and Venables (1999), Bhagwati, 
Krishna and Panagariya (1999), DeRosa (1998), Fernández (1997), Schiff and Chang (2000) and Soloaga and 
Winters (1999). 
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jurisdiction the private agents conduct business is troubled by a time-inconsistency problem. A 
frequent time-inconsistency problem is that a government that offers generous conditions for 
investment is tempted to raise the taxes on the returns from investment and to complicate withdrawal 
of capital once substantive investments have been made. External suppliers also benefit from larger 
markets that carry the fixed costs of market entry more easily, so that trade and investment are 
promoted.  
Contrary to these positive effects for members and non-members of integrated regions, the welfare of 
actors outside the integrated region is harmed as trade is diverted away from efficient external 
suppliers to intraregional suppliers, which are exempted from tariffs and face less non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Investment in suppliers who benefit from paying lower tariff results in misguided specialization. 
Furthermore, investment is diverted as external suppliers invest in production facilities within 
integrated regions in order to secure market access for the case of sharp increases in the level of 
protectionism. In addition, the management of rules of origin distorts investment decisions and creates 
transaction costs for governments, as well as for companies.62 
The more protectionist the integrated region becomes, the less benefits the external suppliers receive 
from regionalization and the stronger the diversionary effects grow. There is reason to suspect that the 
level of protectionism established by the integrated region exceeds those levels of protectionism that 
the participating actors would have chosen on their own. Actors can set their tariffs in order to 
manipulate the terms of trade – the conditions of exchange on the world market – in their favor. The 
resulting optimal tariff that maximizes the welfare of a tariff-setting actor rises the larger the actor is in 
comparison with her trading partners. To the extent that regionalization intensifies asymmetries in 
market size, regionalization, thus, leads to higher tariffs. Furthermore, the political economy – the 
interplay of different interest groups in influencing politics – favors high levels of protectionism. 
Regionalization already offers many advantages of liberalization to intraregional export industries, so 
that the lobby for multilateral liberalization may be critically weakened, while intraregional suppliers 
that benefit from trade diversion resist multilateral liberalization.63 In addition, trade policy of 
integrated regions may be systematically biased in favor of those members that prefer the most 
protectionist stance on a given issue.64  
2.1.3   Interaction of regionalization with multilateral liberalization 
Regionalization also affects the viability of multilateral liberalization in the WTO through several 
effects, which are related to the strategic interaction among actors, to the intraregional decision-
making process, to the political economy of integrated regions, and to the question of whether 
                                                     
62 See Bhagwati, Krishna and Panagariya (1999). Rules of origin describe the value creation activities or the 
share of value creation that has to take place inside the integrated regions if a product is to be considered of 
intraregional origin. 
63 See supra note 42. On political economy effects, see especially Bhagwati, Krishna and Panagariya (1999), 
Cadot, De Melo and Olarreaga (1999), Grossman and Helpman (1993), Krishna (1998) and Levy (1997). 
64 See Meunier (2000). For instance, the majority of EU member states repeatedly fails to reform expensive 
protectionism of agricultural production against resistance by the beneficiaries, such as France and Italy. 
 32
integrated regions are a force for convergence or divergence of actors’ policies.  
In regard to a strategic interaction among actors, regionalization undermines the sophisticated 
workings of non-discrimination and reciprocity norms in the WTO.65 In particular, actors agree on less 
multilateral liberalization if they have to fear that subsequent ‘opportunistic’ regional integration 
devalues the concessions they have conceived in multilateral negotiations.66 Furthermore, the 
opportunity of regional integration agreements offers an incentive to large actors to maintain tariffs in 
multilateral negotiations as these tariffs serve as a bargaining chip when negotiating for non-trade 
concessions with smaller countries in regional negotiations.67  
Concerning the intraregional decision-making process, integrated regions are seen as slow decision-
makers that hamper multilateral negotiations. Worse, intraregional disagreement may deadlock 
multilateral negotiations.68 
Regionalization is a force towards multilateral convergence of regulations if integrated regions adopt 
regulations of the WTO or of other integrated regions as implicit standards, or if the WTO develops 
policies based on the experience inside integrated regions. This appears to dominate the opposite effect 
by which regionalization deepens and ingrains the regulatory differences between those actors uniting 
in integrated regions compared to extraregional actors.69 
2.1.4   Properties of integrated regions 
Concerning the welfare effects of regionalization, these considerations indicate that regionalization 
entails benefits and costs, and that intraregional welfare is more likely to rise than the welfare of 
external actors. Regarding the interaction of regionalization with multilateral liberalization that 
regulate strategic interaction among actors, we have observed that regionalization tends to undermine 
the proper working of multilateral norms, to burden the multilateral bargaining process, and to weaken 
the free-trade interests within the political economy; by contrast, regionalization appears to propel 
regulatory convergence. Welfare effects and interaction with multilateral liberalization significantly 
depend on the depth of integration and the level of protectionism which integrated regions adopt, as 
well as on the dynamic of multilateral liberalization. 
These findings have a twofold significance for the present study. They serve as background for the 
following argument about the properties of integrated regions, and they present the current scientific 
assessment of regionalization. The abounding literature about the effects of regionalization tended to 
be critical of integrated regions; recently, opinion has moved towards a more positive evaluation as 
research has broadened its perspective from purely economic to socio-political effects. The present 
study does not confirm or contradict the effects which the current literature propagates; instead, it 
complements it by further extending the subject and methodology of research to include additional 
                                                     
65 See Bagwell and Staiger (2000) and Bagwell and Staiger (2001). 
66 See Bagwell and Staiger (1999). 
67 See Freund (2003) and Limao (2002). 
68 For instance, dispute about protectionism in agriculture divided the EU, jeopardizing successful conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round. See Piazolo (1995). 
69 See OECD (2003). 
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effects of regionalization on global governance. 
To arrive at a realistic treatment of integrated regions within global governance, I look at the dynamic 
time-path properties of regionalization. One strand of this research looks at intraregional dynamics 
asking: How does the economy within integrated regions develop? Which changes occur in their 
political economy? What does that mean for further liberalization? The other strand is occupied with 
the extraregional dynamics of regionalization, and is, thus, interested in questions like: Under which 
circumstances do regions integrate? Under which circumstances are outsiders applying for 
membership and when are they admitted to the club? Will integrated regions merge? Though extensive 
research has been conducted on the dynamics of regionalization, clear answers are mostly missing and 
the research community is far from consensus. However, there are some convincing results that are 
helpful for evaluating global governance structures based on integrated regions.70  
Firstly, regionalization seems to be a self-reinforcing process. The spread of regionalism increases the 
advantages of establishing an integrated region or joining an existing one. With a growing degree of 
regionalization (or the anticipation thereof), the existing integrated regions are induced to enlarge in 
order to gain relative power.71  
Secondly, regionalism is no shortcut to one global union. In a unitary actor perspective, integrated 
regions compare the advantages they receive and those they have to forgo if they merge. The larger the 
integrated regions become, the more gains from liberalization they reap, and the less they gain by 
agreeing on global free trade. This gain may be insufficient to outweigh the advantages which large 
integrated regions would loose by moving to global free trade. These advantages include increased 
power compared to their weaker rivals, particularly in optimal tariff setting, and larger home markets 
for their companies to gain competitive advantage. Furthermore, the political economy of integrated 
regions makes a global union unlikely. To make matters worse, non-economic concerns, like cultural 
identity and transaction costs of cooperating which increase with heterogeneity, reduce the chances of 
a global union arising from merging integrated regions.  
The third conclusion is that integrated regions display a tendency towards deeper integration. From an 
extraregional perspective, deepening integration furthers the regions relative power. Intraregionally, 
dynamics within the political economy propel integration as a self-reinforcing process.72 Furthermore, 
coordination of policies at the international level deepens the need for internal interactions and the 
experience of joint representation invigorates the collective identity. 
                                                     
70 While nation states join into integrated regions for many reasons, security and economic motives are 
considered to dominate their initial decision to form as well as subsequent behavior of integrated regions. 
Security motives lend themselves less for formal theorizing, have been less thoroughly researched, and are only 
of secondary importance for the WTO. Therefore, the following review of the dynamics of regionalization will 
draw mostly on economic literature adduced at supra note 40. See furthermore Choi (2003) and Sampson and 
Woolcock (2003) for recent case studies. 
71 Such extraregional effects carry less weight in comparison with intraregional objectives of regional integration 
as integration deepens, regulating additional issue areas beyond trade policy within integrated regions. 
72 However, counterforces that are ignored by functionalist integration theory limit integration. See Alter (2000) 
and Meunier (2000). 
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These findings yield important insights. We can reasonably envision a world of several (maybe 5 to 
20),73 mostly large and deeply integrated regions that feel no inclination to merge into one global 
union. Thus, a world of integrated regions is a possible stable state of the world. These insights are 
important for the treatment and evaluation of integrated regions. If we expect regions to merge into 
one global integrated region, we will be much more willing to accept (temporary) detrimental effects 
of regionalization than if we believe integrated regions are here to stay.  
It is tempting to complement these general findings with experience from the EU as a model that can 
inform our expectations about regionalization. Yet, we have to be careful with drawing conclusions 
from the EU on other integrated regions. The EU excels in the degree of deep integration and 
legalization it has accomplished.74 The institutional predecessors of the EU developed already in the 
aftermath of World War II. If we consider the significance of ideas and institutions and the time they 
need to develop, it appears unlikely that other regions can arrive at the same point within a short time. 
Furthermore, the European integration has developed through a peculiar political and legal process.75 
Finally, the EU has enjoyed valuable advantages, such as a comparably homogenous, high level of 
wealth and a positive experience with the rule of law that many former colonies lack.76 This lowers the 
transaction costs of cooperating in supranational institutions of substantial scope and depth. Hence, 
other integrated regions may integrate less deeply than the EU and choose different paths of 
integration.77 In addition to these substantive obstacles to drawing analogies from the EU on integrated 
regions in general, little comparative work on integrated regions has been carried out.78 
Therefore, I cannot predict which common features of regionalism are likely to develop in detail. 
Instead, I constrain my definition of integrated regions to the requirement that they are defined by their 
status as subjects of international law and their representation with one voice in international 
negotiations.79 There may be outliers – particularly important issues combined with particularly great 
                                                     
73 A common, alternative scenario envisions a world of only three or four major blocs. See Hufbauer (2003), 
Jackson (2000b) and Krueger (1995). 
74 See Kahler (2000) and Sbraiga (2002). 
75 See Parsons (2002) on the importance of political ideas and discourses; see Alter (2000) and Stone Sweet and 
Brunell (1998) on the role of European Court of Justice (ECJ) in European integration.  
76 See Sbraiga (2002). These advantages may be partly lost as the EU enlarges to include Eastern European 
countries and possibly Turkey and as fragmentation within the EU gives more weight to heterogeneous lower-
level authorities. See Langhammer (1998). 
77 This explanation emphasizes path dependency and efficiency arguments based on the new institutionalism. 
This approach is in line with Choi and Caporaso (2002), who expect functional needs to override cultural 
preferences in the formation of integrated regions. On the contrary, Parsons (2002) stresses the independent 
causal power of ideas in regional integration. To the extent that cultural preferences matter in the formation of 
integrated regions, generalization from the EU to integrated regions in general becomes even less permissible. 
78 See Sbraiga (2002). 
79 Besides the EU, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) develops towards an external negotiating 
responsibility. See Page (2001). Customs unions are automatically required to speak with one voice in tariff 
negotiations. 
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disagreements like the dispute over the war on Iraq in 2003 – that split even the EU. In cases where 
integrated regions do not speak with a single voice, regionalization, nevertheless, reduces the 
heterogeneity of negotiating positions. This can happen because integrated regions provide stable 
institutions for caucusing ahead of international negotiations and, if necessary, for side-payments. 
Moreover, regionalization reduces heterogeneity among members continuously and incrementally. 
2.2 Legalization 
Legalized institutions are a particular subset of institutions that adopt the characteristics of law and, 
thus, resemble domestic political institutions in liberal democracies. This implies that legalization does 
not equal institutionalization as we can observe institution-building that is non-legalistic, like the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).80 
While I spend considerable effort on clarifying my understanding of legalization, I do not purport an 
elaborated definition of (international) institutions. My working definition of international institutions 
refers to those international regimes that are supported by international organizations.81 Thus, I do not 
include informal networks and (implicit) constitutive principles in my working definition of 
international institutions. The restrictions on actors of global governance made for this study further 
narrow international institutions to those run primarily by nation states and integrated regions. Finally, 
this study focuses on international institutions as part of the global level of governance, meaning that 
they at least aim at universal membership.  
In order to develop endogenous determinants that characterize legalized international institutions, I fall 
back upon a customary categorization of law. This categorization stems from Hart (1961) who 
circumscribes law as a peculiar form of social control characterized by rules, moral obligation, and 
sanctions, where rules can be divided into primary rules that impose obligations and secondary rules 
that organize recognition, change, and adjudication of rules. Similar to Hart’s distinction between 
‘primary rules’ and ‘secondary rules,’ Diehl, Ku and Zamora (2003, 50) discern between a ‘normative 
system’ and an ‘operating system’ in international law. The normative system is meant to “mandate 
particular values and direct specific changes in state and other actors’ behavior”, while the operating 
system “provides the framework within which international law is created and implemented and 
defines the roles of different actors as well as providing mechanisms for the settlement of disputes.”  
Table 1 presents the determinants of legalization based on this categorization. Of the secondary rules, I 
adopt decision-making and judicial delegation design as endogenous determinants. Decision-making 
stands for the creation of law through the actors of global governance; judicial delegation refers to the 
                                                     
80 See Choi and Caporaso (2002) and Kahler (2000). 
81 Krasner (1983, 2) frames regimes as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Young 
(1999a) defines regimes as “sets of rules, decision-making procedures, and/or programs that give rise to social 
practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices, and govern their interactions.” International 
organizations stand for bureaucracies that support and administer international cooperation. See also Zürn (1999, 
Ch. 5) for a taxonomy of international institutions. 
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authority transferred to courts.82 
Within the primary rules, I distinguish between specific normative content and structural aspects of 
this content. I consider the level of precision, exemptions, and punishment as structural aspects of 
primary rules. These structural aspects are constitutive aspects of law; rules which are precise, which 
show a moderate degree of exemptions, and which threaten violators with punishment are most likely 
to be recognized as law. The specific normative content of law, by contrast, defines rule-following 
behavior and possible sanctions for rule violations. Specific normative content is interchangeable 
without affecting our definition of law. For instance, for which industry and to which degree a WTO 
agreement prescribes tariff cuts is a matter of specific normative content, whereas the precision of the 
agreement is a structural aspect. 
I do not include the specific normative content of law into my definition of legalization. The reason is, 
firstly, that extensive additional analysis would be required in order to argue what should be regulated 
by global governance as opposed to actors’ autonomous governance or markets and by which 
substantive rules global governance could achieve its objectives best. Secondly, optimal substantive 
rules, which most effectively serve actors’ interests, are very specific to issue areas. Findings on 
optimal substantive rules of the WTO could, thus, be generalized to other international institutions on 
a very limited scope only.  
Therefore, I do not take a stance on interesting questions such as: Should non-discrimination in a 
system of heterogeneous domestic regulation be the focus of the WTO or should the WTO attempt to 
harmonize domestic regulation around global standards? How should the WTO be substantively linked 
to other issue areas and in which cases should the WTO defer to other international institutions? 
Which WTO policies can contribute to balancing effectiveness and equity? Nevertheless, this study 
provides a sound starting point to address such concerns; the analytical framework of this study can be 
employed to discuss the implications of alternative substantive policies for bargaining, compliance, 
and risk. 
Table 1: Determinants of legalization 



















                                                     
82 I use the term ‘court’ with reference to institutions of binding third-party dispute resolution, such as the panels 
and the Appellate Body in the WTO. The terms ‘judicialism’ and ‘juridification’ carry a meaning similar to 
legalization, albeit usually with a narrower focus on judicial delegation. 
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2.2.1   Endogenous determinants of legalization  
Legalization is then characterized by the design of decision-making, judicial delegation, precision, 
exemptions, and punishment. Each of these determinants is attributed several characteristics that 
specify the determinant in more detail. In the following, I give a brief description of each determinant 
with its characteristics.  
 Decision-making 
Decision-making refers to the process by which decisions are crafted in negotiations between actors. 
Generally, I have full-fledged trade rounds in mind when I speak of negotiations. In addition, decision-
making can occur on a frequent basis and at lower levels, such as committees.  
Vital elements of the decision-making process include the identity of the participants and the manner 
in which decisions are passed. If legalization of decision-making is low, powerful actors tend to 
negotiate agreements among themselves and exclude weak actors. Legalized decision-making designs, 
on the contrary, prescribe multilateral participation and either consensus or majority voting.83 
 Judicial delegation 
Conflicts over agreements arise as actors disregard rules or misinterpret rules to their individual 
advantage, when those rules are genuinely unclear or conflicting, or when rules are incomplete and in 
need of amendments. Judicial delegation signifies the degree of authority attributed to the judiciary in 
such disputes, covering the judicial process from the filing of a case to the final ruling. The ruling 
adjudicates the specific dispute but also clarifies existing rules and creates case law with prospective 
effect for all actors. Judicial delegation is characterized by ease of access, legal proceedings, legal 
mandate, and administrative control mechanisms, all of which have an important impact on judicial 
scope – the number and significance of rulings – and on the independence of courts from the influence 
of actors.84  
The ease of access depends on the range of subjects that are entitled to file disputes and on the costs 
they incur from litigating.85 A direct effect of international agreements improves access as it allows 
individuals to invoke international law at domestic courts. The more restrictive the access is, the lower 
the judicial scope and independence will be.  
Legal proceedings can be consensual or compulsory.86 This concerns, in particular, whether all parties 
in a dispute need to consent to an institutional dispute settlement or whether one actor can initiate such 
proceedings regardless of the other actors’ endorsement. The rules for adoption of rulings differ 
fundamentally between international institutions. Rulings can require support of the whole or a 
majority of actors, they can enter into force unless rejected by a consensus, or they can automatically 
apply without further political control. The more automatic the legal proceedings are, the greater the 
                                                     
83 See section 5.4.2 for further discussion of decision-making design. 
84 See section 5.6 for further discussion of judicial delegation. 
85 See Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter (2000) and Trachtman and Moremen (2003) on access to the judiciary. 
86 See Peters (2003) for an overview of legal proceedings in international disputes. 
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judicial scope and independence will be. 
The breadth of legal mandate depends on the objective and authority assigned to the judicial system. 
In the WTO, the courts are not allowed to add or diminish the rights and obligations of any member of 
the WTO.87 More specifically, standards delineate judicial competency. Such standards prescribe what 
can be subject of judicial review – for instance, only procedural aspects of actors’ autonomous 
governance or also its content – and what standard of deference to national fact findings and legal 
interpretations courts have to adopt in their review.88 Whether courts take an active or passive role in 
fact finding and whether they are allowed to accept amicus curiae briefs, third-party submissions to 
courts, broadly belongs to the standard of review. Standards of interpretation determine the autonomy 
granted to courts to interpret agreements. On the one hand, courts can stay close to the wording of 
agreements, but on the other hand, they can interpret the meaning of agreements in the light of diverse 
objectives and under consideration of the law of other international institutions. This non-exhaustive 
list should illuminate the concept of legal mandate and suggest that judicial scope and independence 
increases with the breadth of legal mandate.  
The foremost administrative control mechanisms that influence judicial independence consist of the 
selection of judges, their tenure, their future career, and courts’ control over material and human 
resources. Judges who are specialized experts, who have a long tenure, whose careers are independent 
of the actors’ benevolence, and who are endowed with ample resources, are most prone to deviating 
from the interests of (powerful) actors who are involved or take sides in a dispute.89  
 Precision 
Precision can concern content or structures.90 In the case of content, highly precise agreements exactly 
detail substantive obligations, whereas agreements with low precision only call for vague obligations 
to be heeded. If rules relate to structure, precision refers to procedures for voting, adjudicating, 
granting exemptions, and punishing defectors. For instance, ambiguous procedures for implementing 
rulings allow actors to delay implementation of sanctions or even to avoid sanctions altogether. Actors 
can claim to conform to a ruling after superficial modifications in their targeted policies. Without 
                                                     
87 See DSU Art. III:2. 
88 See Zleptnig (2002) and Oesch (2003) on standards of review. See Cass (2001), in particular, for a discussion 
of legal doctrines and techniques of judicial review that give the WTO a constitutional dimension. 
89 With these characteristics, different ideal types of delegation can be construed. Keohane, Moravcsik and 
Slaughter (2000) discern between two ideal types of courts. At the low end of legalization, actors enjoy influence 
on the courts, the courts have limited legal discretion, and state actors maintain gate keeping control over access 
to the judiciary. Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter label such courts ‘interstate courts’. At the upper end of 
legalization, ‘transnational courts’ are situated with highly independent courts, broad legal mandate, as well as 
automatic and convenient private access. Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal (2000) describe the 
ideal type of ‘anarchic’ conflict resolution at the low end of legalization as interest-driven, power-based, 
interstate bargaining unaffected by any institution, except for those institutions that make up the international 
system in the first place, like sovereignty. 
90 See Jackson (1997) and Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) on precision of content and structure in the WTO. 
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concise provisions about the quality of compliance, litigating actors may have to sue again to receive 
authorization for sanctions or already authorized sanctions may no longer be legally applied in such a 
case. 
Unless I explicitly refer to structures, precision connotes the precision of substantive obligations. Note 
that precision relates to the formal agreement. Clarification by courts is not regarded as part of 
precision because the degree of judicial clarifications already follows from judicial delegation.  
 Exemptions 
Exemptions stand for the leeway afforded to actors to deviate from their usual obligations without 
violating the agreement.91 The value of exemptions depends on the magnitude of exemptions available 
and the restrictiveness of criteria that entitle an actor to resort to the exemptions. Restrictive 
application criteria set demanding standards to qualify for exemptions, for example, that domestic 
industries have to suffer severe damage to deserve temporary protection and that the damage has to 
result directly from liberalization. Furthermore, restrictive criteria can require large majorities to grant 
exemptions, they can definitively limit the duration of exemptions, or they can contain sunset clauses 
so that exemptions expire after a certain deadline unless they are renewed. 
My definition of exemptions does not include initial phase-in provisions or exemptions for certain sub-
sets of states, like special and preferential treatment for developing countries. Only those exemptions 
are included which give flexibility to all actors at any time. 
 Punishment 
Punishment refers to the severity of sanctions which international institutions authorize against 
defecting actors, and the procedures that govern the implementation of these sanctions.92 Legal 
scholars go back and forth between the numerous legal remedies. In the case of illegal subsidies, for 
instance, actors could be obliged to cease the wrongful action, recollect the subsidies from the 
beneficiaries, restitute the damage caused to other actors, or be condemned to pay punitive damages to 
deter future illegal acts. I do not enter the discussion of specific remedies but make the simplifying 
assumption that remedies can be constructed, so that they differ in severity without differing 
significantly along other dimensions that would require consideration. 
Weak actors may abstain from implementing authorized sanctions as they lack the clout to change the 
defecting actor’s behavior; instead, weak actors have to fear retaliation by the powerful. Indeed, even 
powerful actors may prefer to strike agreements with defecting actors and forgo implementation of 
authorized sanctions. In this context, implementation procedures can more or less promote the actual 
application of sanctions that actors are entitled to by the judiciary. Central coordination of the 
decentralized punishment capacities can strengthen the power of sanctions and lower the costs for the 
sanctioning actors. For high degrees of legalization, participation in sanctioning could even be made 
obligatory.  
                                                     
91 See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) and Rosendorff and Milner (2001) on exemptions in the WTO. 
92 For a detailed analysis of actual and possible WTO remedies and implementation procedures, see Mavroidis 
(2000). See also section 6.5 for further discussion of punishment design. 
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 Conclusion 
Table 2 presents all determinants of legalization with their characteristics. This is an ideal-typical 
representation, juxtaposing low and high degrees of legalization. What matters later in the analysis is 
how the determinants affect the cooperation problems and risks of global governance. As long as 
increases in legalization of several characteristics belonging to one determinant have parallel effects in 
the cooperation problems and risks, I, therefore, do not distinguish between the characteristics. I only 
refer to the characteristics where they make a difference in the analysis. In decision-making, for 
instance, the characteristics – how many actors are involved and which majority threshold is 
prescribed to pass decisions – influence effectiveness in significantly different ways.  
Note also that I generally assume convergence of design and practice with regard to the determinants. 
Only at certain points do I distinguish between behavior that is prescribed or enabled by structures and 
the ways actors behave in practice. For instance, actors can decide habitually in consensus though 
decision-making rules provide for majority voting. Also, the design of exemptions solely provides a 
possibility to eschew obligations, but whether actors execute this option in practice depends on further 
factors. 
Table 2: Characteristics of the determinants of legalization 
Determinants Low degree of legalization High degree of legalization
Decision-making Few actors involved, consensus voting
Many actors involved, 
low majority thresholds
Judicial delegation
Difficult access, political influence on 
legal proceedings, narrow legal 
mandate, strict administrative control
Easy access, automaticity in legal 
proceedings, broad legal mandate, 
loose administrative control
Precision Ambiguous obligations  Detailed obligations
Exemptions Extensive exemptions, generous procedures to qualify for them 
Few exemptions, restrictive 
application procedures
Punishment Soft sanctions, weak implementation procedures




In the remainder of this chapter, I clarify my general understanding of legalization. Firstly, I reflect 
about alternative approaches to international law; in particular, I discuss the omission of legal 
obligation as a determinant of legalization. After that, I comment on the relationship between 
legalization and constitutionalization. I then present the processes-oriented understanding of the 
creation and functioning of law that is supported by the interdisciplinary theoretical framework. 
Finally, I contemplate on the position of legalization towards international relations theory. 
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2.2.2   Legalization and legal obligation 
Koskenniemi (1990) considers a rule approach and a policy approach as inherent antipodes of law. 
The rule approach considers those rules to be law that have been created in conformance with 
recognized processes of law creation; the policy approach perceives those rules to be law that are 
effective, especially in constraining state actors. The rule approach establishes an artificial separation 
between law and non-law that does not correspond to the functions which law fulfills; formally legal 
agreements may have little effect, whereas formally non-legal agreements may have substantial effect 
through mechanisms that are generally associated with law.93 By contrast, the policy approach does 
not grasp the normative quality of law and runs the risk of becoming an “apology for the interests of 
the powerful.”94 
The understanding of law implied in the definition of legalization clearly does not follow a rule 
approach. Yet, my definition does neither fully correspond to a policy approach. Instead, I define law 
by a number of structural characteristics and law-specific functions that are closely associated to legal 
structure and which I expect to influence actors’ behavior.95 Staying close to structure in my definition 
of legalization is appropriate for recommending structures. If I subscribed to a policy approach and 
employed functional characteristics of law, such as judicial independence or enforcement capacity, 
directly in my analysis, then practitioners would have to translate this functional advice into 
recommendations for structural reform. This would be laborious given the many options in which 
structural characteristics can be combined to achieve a certain function; worse, no structure may exist 
that is able to realize the functional advice. 
Congruent with the view of law and non-law forming a continuum based on institutional structure and 
working, I do not include legal obligation as a determinant of legalization.96 According to Abbott et al. 
(2000, 401), legal obligation measures to which degree actors “are legally bound by a rule or 
commitment in the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, 
                                                     
93 In favor of a policy approach, Guzman (2002, 1887) suggests to consider “any international promise or 
commitment that has a substantial influence on national incentives to be law.” Reich (1996) measures 
legalization by the severity of limitations imposed on state behavior. Brunee and Toope (2000, 68) espouse a 
policy-oriented view of law that centers on its influence on international interaction from a constructivist 
perspective. They conclude that “law as interaction suggests that there is no radical discontinuity between law 
and non-law, that the process of building legal normativity requires many of the same building blocks as other 
forms of social normativity.” 
94 Koskenniemi (1990, 11). 
95 My definition aspires to be no more than a working definition appropriate for analyzing legalization in global 
governance. It is not meant to define the nature of law, which is so complex that it “stubbornly resists 
specification,” as Chayes and Chayes (1995, 116) note. In particular, I focus on those characteristics that can be 
manipulated – that law is usually practiced by experts, e.g., may be a characteristic, but is not suited to serve as 
an endogenous determinant. 
96 See also Brunee and Toope (2000), Guzman (2002), Hillgenberg (1999), Reich (1996) and Shelton (2000) on 
the policy-oriented notion that the functioning and (thus) existence of law do not crystallize in an explicit, binary 
recognition of an agreement as international law. 
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procedures, and discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as well.” This is considered 
to set formal treaties apart from explicit agreements that do not have legal status, such as declarations 
of intent or codes of conduct, as well as from non-legal rules that do not arise from explicit agreements 
among states, such as informal norms. 
Let me address these three features, relating to general rules and procedures of law, legal discourse, 
and domestic embeddedness, which legal obligation characteristically invokes, in order to assess the 
consequences of excluding legal obligation as endogenous determinant. 
The application and meaning of general treaty law and customary law and the general principles of 
international law in the interpretation of an agreement depend on the status of an agreement. These 
additional rules and procedures are most importantly found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties signed in 1969 and the customary law in the process of being codified by the International 
Law Commission.97 The additional rules and procedures restrain actors if they choose a legal form for 
their agreements, strengthen as well as contain the judiciary, and promote legal discourse. Legal form, 
thus, makes a difference as to when and how general legal sources and specific agreements are 
relevant under legal procedures.  
Legal discourse is a specific form of communication that involves actors in a non-hierarchical process 
of competitive justification in terms of pertinent rules and facts.98 Legal discourse arises if a 
sufficiently influential audience requires actors to interact under the procedures of legal discourse. 
Legal status empowers courts and invites international and domestic society to judge actors’ claims in 
legal terms; however, legal discourse does not depend on legal status. Even without legal status can 
international and domestic society base their evaluation of actors’ claims on legal validity. Note also 
that actors may engage in deliberations that strongly resemble legal discourse without pressure by an 
external audience that expects legal discourse. 
Whether states grant international rules a direct effect within their jurisdiction depends on their 
national legislation. Formal legal status is a suitable characteristic for governments to designate those 
international rules that they want national courts to consider. Even if international law is not formally 
embedded in the domestic legal system, domestic audience costs of violating an agreement may 
increase if an agreement takes legal form.99 
These considerations demonstrate that the characteristics of legal obligation, pertaining to general 
rules and procedures of law, legal discourse, and domestic embeddedness, indeed set legal obligation 
apart from other types of obligation, such as obligations stemming from norms or tacit understanding. 
Yet, the characteristics of legal obligation do not exclusively rest on legal status, but they are 
influenced by other factors as well. Hence, I can explain most of the prevalence of the characteristics 
                                                     
97 On international customary law, see Byers (1999) and Mavroidis (2000). On soft law, see Lipson (1991) and 
Shelton (2000). 
98 See section 4.2.4 for further discussion of legal discourse. 
99 The status of an agreement also determines whether and how international courts consider an agreement in 
their rulings. See Charnovitz (2002a), who contemplates whether the Doha Declaration possesses legal status 
and whether it would be appropriate for WTO courts to draw guidance from the Doha Declaration. 
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of legal obligation by determinants of legalization other than legal status, most importantly judicial 
delegation, as well as by legalization in general as the sum of the single determinants. 
Legalization as a general category is useful in this context as practices associated to law depend on the 
comprehensive perception of a rule as law-like. Whether an agreement is considered a binding treaty 
depends solely on the will of the contracting parties, not on the degree of legalization.100 Actors and 
individual agents who apply legal practice to formal law, even if it ranks low on all legalization 
determinants, can be expected to approach formally non-legal agreements that are highly legalized 
from a legal perspective as well.  
So far, the argument claims that excluding legal form from the definition of legalization signifies a 
loss, albeit one that can be compensated in the course of analysis. The benefits of excluding legal form 
are twofold. Firstly, law is more comprehensive than any reasonable number of determinants; 
sacrifices for the sake of parsimony are unavoidable if we intend to cut law into operational variables. 
Secondly, different forms of agreements are chosen for many reasons that do not relate to the present 
study, such as domestic approval procedures or eligibility of participants in an agreement to conclude 
treaties under international law.101 Therefore, I cannot recommend certain forms to be preferred on the 
basis of my analysis.  
2.2.3   Legalization and constitutionalization 
Constitutionalization is associated with direct effect of WTO rules within the jurisdiction of the actors 
and supremacy over national law. Individual rights stemming from international agreements, thus, 
constrain national legislators; this elevates international agreements into a set of incontestable laws.102 
In the absence of a formal constitution, the presence of constitutionalization can be derived from 
judicial decision-making practice that resembles national constitutional court practice, which is 
characterized by constitutional norm generation and particular judicial techniques.103  
While a constitution is a legal institution, not every legalized institution commands constitutional 
status. Constitutional orders tend to rank very high on legalization, in particular in terms of judicial 
delegation. In theory, however, constitutional status can be combined with low degrees of legalization, 
for instance, extensive exemptions and soft punishment. 
2.2.4   Legalization and process 
At least as important as the inclusion or exclusion of single variables and their definitions in detail is 
                                                     
100 See Hillgenberg (1999). 
101 See Hillgenberg (1999), Lipson (1991) and Shelton (2000) on the motives for choice and the effects of 
different forms that agreements can take. 
102 See Cass (2001), Howse and Nicolaidis (2003), Trachtman (2001) and Zleptnig (2002) for a discussion of 
constitutionalization in the context of the WTO. In contrast, Petersmann (2001) defines constitutionalism 
primarily by the functions which law provides. In particular, law is seen to prescribe a democratic rule of law 
with checks and balances and to aim at promoting human rights, especially through the restraint of power within 
and among nations. 
103 See Cass (2001). 
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the theoretical framework that gives meaning to the determinants. The constructivist elements in the 
theoretical framework emphasize connections between law and process.104 Four links between law and 
process deserve attention. Firstly, law arises gradually from processes of state practice and judicial 
dispute settlement. Thus, customary law and case law are relevant companions of treaty law in 
legalized environments. Secondly, the process of law creation affects the working of law. Whether the 
process of law creation is considered legitimate is an important determinant of compliance pull. 
Thirdly, law affects political processes, particularly when it transforms power-based bargaining into 
legal discourse.  
The fourth conceptualization of law as process allows a link to power, viewing the creation and 
application of law themselves as political processes.105 Power affects whether suits are brought to 
court, how courts rule, and whether rulings are implemented. Furthermore, powerful actors have an 
over-proportionate say even in legalized decision-making. Beyond additional influence of powerful 
actors on the creation of formal law, customary law reflects power constellations. The formation of 
new customary law is partly influenced by formal and customary law, and partly by state practice. 
Powerful actors engage in state practice more frequently and can more successfully alter opposing 
state practice to their advantage.106 Therefore, law does not only work in the shadow of power, but in 
its very creation, it is partially a product of power.  
Law is not only an instrument of power, however, but also a constraint on power. Consequently, the 
risks of legalization are conceptualized from two perspectives. Powerful actors worry about the 
restraining capacity of law, whereas weak actors fear that law subjugates them to the interests of the 
powerful. The interplay between law and power is more than a transitional period on the move 
towards more legalization. Incomplete legalization may be the most effective configuration, and 
correspondingly, power matters even in highly legalized domestic systems.107 An entirely lawless 
international system is equally unlikely as complete legalization because weak and powerful states 
both benefit from law.  
                                                     
104 The Richer Views of Law and Politics which Finnemore and Toope (2001) advocate are helpful for such a 
process-oriented treatment of law. However, Finnemore and Toope (2001, 747) take their focus on process one 
step too far when they dismiss the importance of structural characteristics, “Why delegation and precision should 
be defining features of legalization and what they add to the analytic power of this concept is simply not clear.” 
Whether processes are primarily legal in nature but occur under the shadow of power, or whether they are 
genuinely political though influenced by law, actors’ practice is shaped by legal structure. Delegation, for 
instance, sets law apart from non-legal, normative obligations and strongly shapes the social practice of interstate 
communication. 
105 The close relationship between law and power has often been noted. Goldstein et al. (2000, 387) state, “The 
relationship between law and politics is reciprocal, mediated by institutions.” Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter 
(2000, 488) consent, “It is the interaction of law and politics, not the action of either alone, that generates 
decisions and determines their effectiveness.” Diehl, Ku and Zamora (2003, 43) caution that the relevance of law 
depends on the “political consensus and will of the system’s members to use the law”. 
106 See Byers (1999). 
107 Abbott et al. (2000, 405) note that “the combination of relatively imprecise rules and strong delegation is a 
common and effective institutional response to uncertainty, even in domestic legal systems”. 
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2.2.5   Legalization and international relations 
Realist and, in particular, neo-realist scholars of international relations do not assume law and power 
to interact, but they deny law significant causal power.108 They perceive the international system as an 
anarchy since a global government to enforce agreements and to protect actors from interstate violence 
is missing. This anarchical structure dictates state behavior in a competitive international system.109 
The set of design-driven determinants and particularly the scope of changes discussed cannot establish 
a global state. As long as the world population is not deeply socialized in a global culture, does not 
lead a global political discourse, and does not share a substantial feeling of collective identity, a 
powerful world government can neither be legitimate nor effective. Therefore, I search for structures 
that can effectively supply a ‘moderate’ intensity of global governance – more than today’s world 
witnesses, but still short of a global state. 
While such legalization does not end anarchy in realist terms, I assume that legalization can change the 
conditions of anarchy. This rests well with the approach Axelrod and Keohane (1986, 226) take in 
stating that, “Anarchy, defined as a lack of common government in world politics, remains constant; 
but the degree to which interactions are structured, and the means by which they are structured, vary.” 
Anarchy neither precludes the existence of authority, nor of cooperation, in the international system. 
Authority and order, as the opposite of anarchy, can be construed along two dimensions: the degree of 
centralized authority and the degree of decentralized authority originating in norms.110 Both 
dimensions are continuous – even nation states are not monolithically hierarchical. From a certain 
degree of centralized authority onwards, we speak of a hierarchical system instead of anarchy. 
Systems of authority can display different patterns of centralized and decentralized authority, which 
they uphold by different means.  
Legalization can be characterized by a particular pattern of authority which it establishes and by 
particular means it employs. In my definition, legalization causes moderate increases in centralized 
authority, in decision-making and judicial delegation but without resources for centralized 
enforcement, while resting on increases in decentralized, normative authority. The means of legalized 
global governance are the practices associated to the rule of law, such as generalized rules and judicial 
dispute resolution. Certainly, different patterns of authority can be supported by legal means; however, 
legalization currently points to a specific, moderately decentralized pattern because a central 
government resting on the rule of law (and arising from voluntary cooperation) appears unviable for 
decades to come. Thus, law can be set apart not only from other means – like brute force or religious 
beliefs – but also from other patterns of authority, like central government or highly decentralized, 
evolutionary cooperation. 
That substantial cooperation under anarchy is possible, even with actors who are socialized to a 
competitive and virulently violent anarchical system, has been amply demonstrated by neo-liberal 
                                                     
108 See Copeland (2000) and Grieco (1988). 
109 See section 4.1.3 for further discussion of realist positions. 
110 See Wendt (1999, Ch. 6). See also Bull (1977) and Cerny (2000) on patterns of authority and order. 
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institutionalists. Actors cooperate spontaneously out of self-interest. Additionally, institutions that 
create limited centralized authority or otherwise lower transaction costs promulgate cooperation. Even 
greater cooperation is attainable if actors adopt different norms and identities suited to and sustaining a 
more hospitable international system that still is anarchic in realist terms.111  
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has defined the global governance structures for which the study shall recommend a 
design in order to improve global governance effectiveness. The first dimension of global governance 
structures pertains to the constitutive actors. Either nation states or integrated regions will be the main 
actors in future global governance. Predicting the behavior of integrated regions and the properties of a 
world of integrated regions is a difficult undertaking. Based especially on insights from international 
economics, we can nevertheless reasonably envision a stable state with several, mostly large and 
deeply integrated regions. 
The second dimension concerns the legalization of international institutions. The design of decision-
making, judicial delegation, precision, exemptions, and punishment are central elements of many 
international institutions that display different degrees of legalization. Since the meaning of 
legalization is contested among different schools of thought, I have specified my own understanding 
and suggestions in the context of scholarship in international law and international relations. 
 
 
                                                     
111 See Wendt (1999, Ch. 6). 
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3 Exogenous determinants: Trends in global governance 
Globalization is the overwhelming background trend of the recent past and seems likely to maintain its 
domineering position for decades to come. Accordingly, globalization has invited manifold 
descriptions and definitions, converging around several characteristics.112 Globalization is usually 
considered a multifaceted, uneven and unfinished process of growing interdependence, affecting 
diverse objects in diverse ways. Interdependence of ideas and communication, natural persons and 
capital, goods and services, the environment and violence grows as more linkages develop and as 
these linkages gain in intensity and depth. While no one characteristic is uniquely new, the total of 
growing interdependence beyond borders is set apart from former processes of exchange and joint 
production between nation states. Although globalization is by nature not a well-defined phenomenon, 
globalization can also be perceived as distinct from other global developments, such as technological 
progress. Hence, the term can be used meaningfully in scientific debate.  
Yet, globalization is inherently such a broad concept that it needs to be separated into more palpable 
sub-trends, if globalization is to be employed as major input for analysis. This more fine-grained 
analysis is undertaken for five primary trends that affect global governance, as one aspect of 
globalization, and that are (partly) caused by other aspects of globalization. These are relative 
effectiveness of global governance, linkages within global governance, depth of global governance, 
actor participation, and civil society involvement. 
To each of these primary trends, which change exogenous determinants relevant to global governance 
effectiveness, a separate section is dedicated. First, the exogenous determinant is defined, and then its 
driving factors are discussed to establish a trend for this exogenous determinant. For all trends, I 
assume that no fundamental disruptions alter the background scenario of continuing globalization.113 
Afterwards, secondary trends, which will be useful as references in the later analysis, are derived from 
the primary trends. Finally, I consider the requirements to attain linked objectives. 
3.1 Relative effectiveness of global governance 
With global interdependencies thickening, the effectiveness of autonomous, territorial governance is 
decreasing, while the advantages of global governance yield higher pay-offs. This means that the 
relative effectiveness of global governance is rising when compared to autonomous governance.  
How sharp the increase in costs is, which autonomous governance has to incur in order to reach its 
                                                     
112 See Keohane and Nye (2000) and Zürn (1998). 
113 Diseases, terrorist attacks, and wars are among the potential causes that could thwart this development. Cerny 
(2000) suggests that the increasing complexity of governance makes global conflicts less likely. Brock (2003) 
emphasizes the potential of global governance to pacify conflicts and regulate the use of force, thus creating 
favorable conditions for global governance in general. Hufbauer (2003) and Zürn (1998) consider continuation 
of globalization and global governance along familiar lines as most probable scenario. 
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regulatory objectives, depends on the type of regulation.114 Heavily hampered are macroeconomic 
policy and production process regulation, like social and environmental standards, which inflict costs 
on production without corresponding short-term benefits for producers. Firstly, globalization hampers 
such policies by increasing competition and factor mobility. Thus, companies affected by costly 
regulation that adds no value to the products concerned, are likely to either loose market share or use 
their exit option to relocate production sites.115 Secondly, widening negative integration, which forbids 
actors to establish certain policies autonomously, limits the competence of nation states to regulate.116 
The old GATT prohibited process standards that restrict imports based on the production processes of 
foreign goods, unless in extreme cases, such as prison labor. The WTO forbids less thoroughly the 
establishment of process standards for imports, especially pertaining to compliance with intellectual 
property rights in the production process.117 Still, the use of process standards is severely limited so 
that actors either cannot attain their objectives or have to implement inefficient instruments which are 
not restricted by international agreements. 
The regulation of product standards is less burdened.118 While ‘races to the bottom’ may occur, 
upward competition is also possible, in particular, if fulfilling product standards is a requirement for 
market access. Domestic regulation of product standards is also subject to international regulation; for 
instance, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) of the WTO forbids unjustifiable 
discrimination between foreign suppliers through product standards. It also forbids that product 
standards restrict trade by more than what is necessary to attain domestic objectives. These obligations 
leave actors considerable freedom in setting product standards, in particular in comparison to the 
extensive prohibition of process standards in the WTO. 
Overall, the perception of decreasing effectiveness of autonomous governance is justified.119 To 
evaluate the decline of autonomous governance correctly, however, we have to guard against 
                                                     
114 The diversity of effects on the effectiveness of autonomous governance explains the differing results of 
specific empirical studies. See Scharpf (1998). 
115 See Garrett (1998), Lorz (2003) and Scharpf (1999). However, Garrett (1998, 823) finds autonomous 
governance less constrained than often thought because “governments provide economically important collective 
goods – ranging from the accumulation of human and physical capital, to social stability under conditions of 
high market uncertainty, to popular support for the market economy itself – that are undersupplied by markets 
and valued by actors who are interested in productivity.” Furthermore, Lorz (2003) points out that locational 
competition between actors may have positive implications for national welfare if public expenditures are cut 
that serve only powerful special interests groups. 
116 On negative integration, see section 3.3 about the depth of global governance.  
117 Appellate Body rulings have further expanded the right of actors to set process standards for imports. See, for 
instance, Biermann (2001), Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) and Pfahl (2000) on disputes about actors’ right to 
restrict imports based on the ecological effects of production processes. 
118 See Scharpf (1998) and Scharpf (1999). 
119 Altvater and Mahnkopf (1999), Cerny (1998), Chayes and Chayes (1995), Habermas (1998a), Perraton, 
Goldblatt, Held and McGrew (1998), Rosenau (2000), Scharpf (1999), Weiss (1999) and Zürn (1998) all make 
this diagnosis though with differing limitations on the nature, extent, and causes of decreasing capacity of 
autonomous governance. 
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idealizing past performance of nation states.120 
Changes in effectiveness are even harder to demonstrate empirically for global than for autonomous 
governance.121 Yet, we can take the unprecedented boost in the scope of global governance as an 
indicator for its effectiveness. This is particularly convincing if we are aware of the reluctance of 
nation states to cede jurisdiction to international institutions. If actors nevertheless transfer authority to 
the international sphere, it is reasonable to assume that substantial gains in effectiveness are the 
driving factor.122 In addition, growing experience in global governance suggests increasing absolute 
effectiveness. Even if scope extension can be better explained by decreasing effectiveness of 
autonomous governance, relative effectiveness of global governance still increases. 
We can conclude that autonomous governance has become less effective and global governance 
probably more successful. In the future, both globalization and negative integration are likely to 
proceed and to continue diminishing the effectiveness of autonomous governance. This spurs the 
demand for global governance, which restrains autonomous governance even further. Contrary to this 
self-reinforcing decline in autonomous governance, the unabating run towards international 
institutions suggests that the prospects for global governance are deemed promising. Therefore, the 
relative effectiveness of global governance appears set to grow further. 
3.2 Linkages within global governance  
Linkages within global governance refer to interdependencies in the governance of different issue 
areas that affect global governance.123 Linkages within global governance are, thus, subjective and 
related to political action: Actors connect their behavior pertaining to global governance in one issue 
area with governance and external developments in other issue areas.  
Linkages within global governance are driven by substantive linkages and by the opportunity to form 
strategic linkages.124 Substantive linkages between issue areas describe real-world interdependencies 
in which governance of one issue area inherently affects the outcomes of governance in other issue 
areas. Strategic linkages connect substantively unrelated issue areas politically, for instance, to expand 
the negotiation set.  
                                                     
120 See Höffe (1999) and Werner and Wilde (2001). 
121 On the difficulties of measuring effectiveness of international institutions, see section 9.1.  
122 Domestic interests that benefit from and lobby for more global governance offer an alternative explanation for 
the extension of global governance. Yet, interest groups that resist scope extension are also well organized, and 
there is no satisfying explanation why the domestic political balance should have shifted in favor of more scope 
in most countries.  
123 Linkage between and scope of issue areas are interdependent concepts. The more expansively we demarcate 
issue areas, the fewer linkages we are to find. Still, issue areas are a helpful concept in thinking about linkages. 
See Leebron (2002) and Young (1999a, Ch. 1). Since issue areas and international institutions do not need to 
converge, linkages can exist within and among international institutions. 
124 See Leebron (2002).  
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3.2.1   Substantive linkages 
As mentioned above, substantive linkages exist if the governance of one issue area affects the 
outcomes of governance in another area. The background trend of globalization establishes increasing 
interdependence between different nation states and agents throughout the world with regard to 
various issue areas. From this we cannot immediately infer that increasing interdependence among 
issue areas arises. Indeed, it seems more convincing that the issue areas have always been interwoven 
on a global scale, yet with growing importance of this global dimension, their interdependency moves 
to the center stage of interest as well. 
Owing to the rising importance of substantive linkages, the WTO expanded into other economic issue 
areas, like the movement of capital and labor and the regulation of intellectual property, as well as 
non-economic issues.  
As regards economic issue areas, the linkage between goods and service markets on one side and 
factor markets on the other has become particularly apparent with the liberalization of services under 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). For instance, tight restrictions on the movement 
of labor contort the choice by which mode services are supplied. If national laws inhibit the plan of a 
service provider from one country to set up shop in a neighboring country to serve her customers 
directly, her foreign customers have to go abroad to benefit from her services. The interdependence 
between goods and factor markets is not limited to services, however, since domestic laws affecting 
factor mobility also distort the location of production sites.  
The WTO is linked to non-economic issues to the extent that their regulation on the domestic or 
international level can cause barriers to trade. On the domestic level, protectionism increasingly hides 
behind non-economic objectives.125 Therefore, the WTO has to evaluate more closely whether 
domestic policies contain hidden discrimination or lead to inadequate trade restriction. 
Concerning international environmental regulation, WTO rules are, for instance, in conflict with the 
ban on round-log exports to protect forests, with the Basel Convention on hazardous waste trade, and 
with restrictions on trade in regulated chemicals under the Montreal Protocol.126 The more that 
regulation originating in other international institutions affects trade, the more the WTO will have to 
be involved to warrant that trade implications are duly considered and that legal obligations are 
compatible across international institutions.  
Particularly relevant linkages to the WTO exist where other international institutions directly regulate 
trade or authorize trade sanctions. Charnovitz (2002c) suggests that such trade measures will be used 
less by other international institutions for three reasons. Firstly, economic integration makes them less 
efficient and more costly. Secondly, they fit poorly with market-based instruments that replace 
‘command-and-control’ regulation. Thirdly, national and supranational courts facilitate enforcement 
without having to rely on trade-based sanctions. However, the scope of global governance in non-
                                                     
125 See section 3.3 on the depth of global governance.  
126 See Biermann (2001), Conca (2000) and Pfahl (2000) on tensions between the WTO and multilateral 
environmental agreements. Biermann (2001, 423) reports that, “The trend of establishing multilateral 
environmental rules with trade effects continues”. 
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economic issue areas will grow and its value will increase, so that actors are ready to accept associated 
costs. Moreover, measures that apply only to traded goods cannot be substituted in certain cases, for 
instance, if the objective is to prevent the invasion of alien animal or plant life. Therefore, trade 
measures authorized by other international institutions will continue to concern the WTO.  
The WTO is not only expanding into non-economic fields, but non-economic interests are equally 
pushing into the WTO as trade affects the pursuit of their objectives. Among these non-economic, 
substantively linked interests, environmental, social and developmental concerns stand out.127 
3.2.2   Property rights and substantive linkages  
Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002) show in a model that a mechanism based on improved 
definition of property rights can relieve the WTO of having to deal with certain substantive linkages. 
The mechanism mends two imperfections in how the WTO handles the relationship between 
standards, which have protectionist effects, and tariffs. Since standards and tariffs can function as 
substitutes regarding their protectionist effect on trade, alternative policy combinations are possible for 
a given level of market access.  
Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002, 61) point out that, “The first imperfection – that under 
GATT/WTO rules market access commitments are not secure against unilateral infringement by 
adjusting standards in import-competing industries – can lead to a race to the bottom, in which 
standards in import-competing industries are lowered. The second imperfection – that under 
GATT/WTO rules a government is not free to adjust its policy mix as it desires so long as it maintains 
its market access commitment – can lead to a ‘regulatory chill,’ in which governments refrain from 
raising standards in import-competing industries. If GATT/WTO rules were enhanced to secure 
market access commitments against unilateral infringement through changes in trade or standards 
policies, while allowing each government to fulfill its market access commitment with the policy mix 
that it prefers, there would be no race-to-the-bottom or regulatory-chill problems of this nature.” 
Based on this framing, Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002) propose that problems associated with 
pecuniary externalities, those externalities that are transmitted through markets, can be eliminated by 
improving market access rights. If a country then desired to lower its standards for import-competing 
industries, it would have to cut back on its tariffs correspondingly. Along the same line, if a country 
intended to raise standards for exporting industries, it would be allowed to increase its subsidies up to 
the point where current terms of trade are maintained. If such a solution worked, it would free the 
                                                     
127 According to Dunoff (1999), environmentalists highlight negative external effects of trade on the 
environment, competitive advantages stemming from low environmental standards leading to a ‘race to the 
bottom,’ and WTO provisions that override domestic environmental regulation. See also Helm (1995) and Pfahl 
(2000) on the linkages between trade and the environment. Pfahl (2000) and Shaffer (2001) show how 
boundaries of the WTO are drawn in the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment. Concerning further issue 
areas, see Wai (2003) on the influence of global governance in trade on individual social rights, and Hoekman 
(2002a), Hoekman (2002b) and Mattoo and Subramanian (2003) on trade and development. Focusing on 
development and peace, Nuscheler (2000) gives an account of linkages in global governance that also affect the 
WTO. Charnovitz (2002c) provides a detailed discussion of diverse substantive linkages pertaining to trade.  
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WTO of many problems caused by linkages and transfer the resolution of many conflicts about values 
and norms back to the national level. 
Noting the developing countries’ inability to finance the subsidy programs, Bagwell, Mavroidis and 
Staiger (2002) see the need for negotiations in which actors trade changes in standards. They concede 
that such negotiations would be hampered by intricate complexities; yet, leaving this task to the 
judiciary would unduly burden courts.128 
It is difficult to imagine how consent of all (or just the most strongly affected) actors to the frequent 
domestic policy changes that would occur is to be achieved. Such negotiations would, first, require the 
evaluation of market access effects of standard changes and of compensational tariff changes, while 
every country has a strategic incentive to misrepresent how it is affected. Secondly, it would 
necessitate finding a new policy mix to balance these effects, which are likely to be dispersed over 
many actors, affecting them differently.  
Therefore, improving market access rights cannot easily rid the WTO of the problems of pecuniary 
externalities. Furthermore, non-pecuniary externalities cannot be tackled by this market access 
mechanism. 
3.2.3   Strategic linkages 
Aside from substantive linkages as a response to interdependence, linkages also have strategic 
purposes. Six such strategic incentives can be discerned.129 The first is the interest of actors to enhance 
their relative bargaining power in one issue where their power is insufficient to satisfy their 
aspirations, by linking this issue to another issue in which they enjoy a strong position. At the 1999 
WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle, developed countries attempted to link trade to social and 
environmental standards because developed countries deemed their ability to negotiate strict standards 
insufficient without strategic linkage. Actors also unilaterally link trade with non-economic concerns. 
For instance, the EU and U.S. tie their General System of Preferences for developing countries to 
adherence of (labor) standards.130 Linkage that serves to enhance bargaining power expands as actors 
become more concerned with externalities that were of minor significance in former times. In the 
environmental realm, for instance, growing physical externalities and concerns over common goods, 
as well as an increasing ‘non-use value’ that is perceived in nature, give incentives to interfere with 
other actors. Furthermore, traditional humanitarian motives gain influence in politics, in particular, 
with more civil society involvement. 
A second, related rationale for strategic linkages is to expand the scope of negotiations in order to 
open up additional possibilities for mutually advantageous trade in concessions. This is necessary 
since international relations are a barter system where monetary side-payments are rare. The larger the 
number and heterogeneity of actors involved in negotiations and the lumpier the agreements, the 
                                                     
128 Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002) annotate that non-violation complaints work exactly into that 
direction. 
129 See Charnovitz (2002c), Leebron (2002), Trachtman (2002) and Young (1999a, Ch. 7). 
130 See Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2002). 
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greater the need to enlarge the negotiation set to forge a mutually advantageous grand bargain. As we 
will see later in this chapter, number and heterogeneity of actors are indeed rising, and agreements 
become increasingly lumpy because positive integration gains importance. Contrary to negative 
integration, positive integration requires actors not to refrain from but to implement certain policies. 
Since agreements of positive integration need internal coherence, they cannot be incrementally 
adapted to distributional requirements without significant efficiency losses.131 Hence, linkages as an 
efficiency-enhancing negotiating strategy become more attractive. 
A third motive for strategic linkages is building domestic political coalitions. Politicians may find 
more support at home if they combine issues in one package that provides benefits for every critical 
constituency. They may also encounter less political obstacles in domestic implementation of new 
initiatives as part of existing international institutions.  
Fourth, actors link institutions together for the sake of ‘regime borrowing.’ Regime borrowing occurs 
if capacities such as sanctioning, legitimacy, or funding are extended or transferred between 
institutions. In this way, an institution well-endowed with a certain capacity assists another institution 
lacking in this capacity. We can expect to see more regime borrowing to occur in the coming decade 
because civil society promotes thrusts that fall into the core responsibility of mostly weak institutions. 
As civil society’s influence is likely to grow and as fostering institutions will take time to fulfill civil 
society’s requests, regime borrowing, particularly with regard to the WTO, seems a probable 
intermediating solution. Only after international institutions in other issue areas have been 
considerably strengthened, regime borrowing – and ‘regime lending’ as the WTO needs to regulate 
linked issues for lack of specialized global governance – will abate.  
Fifth, economies of scale can lower the costs of negotiating and administering different issues linked 
in one institution. Finally sixth, a shared vision for a cluster of issues, like in the negotiations leading 
to the law of the sea, can ease negotiation and administration. 
3.2.4   Political linkages 
If actors note substantive linkages or strategic linkage opportunities, they tend to respond by installing 
political linkages. Political linkages connect governance in one issue area through political means to 
the governance in another issue area. Political linkage occurs, for instance, if two issue areas are 
negotiated together or even incorporated into one institution. Linkages within global governance can 
also exist without any political linkages if actors individually take substantive linkages and strategic 
linkage opportunities into account in negotiating and implementing global governance.  
Beyond mere expression of substantive linkages and strategic linkage opportunities, political linkages 
influence linkages within global governance in their own right. Political linkages do not necessarily 
live up to the substantive linkages or strategic linkage opportunities. Actors do not need to be aware of 
all substantive linkages or strategic linkage opportunities, and they can decide to ignore them at costs. 
Adversely, political linkages can outreach the demand posed by substantive linkages and strategic 
linkage opportunities. That is, substantive linkages and strategic linkage opportunities do not dictate 
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the degree of linkages within global governance alone. It also matters how actors react to these 
external factors in forging political linkages.  
Several mechanisms are available to link issue areas in global governance.132 The simplest structure, 
negotiating linkage, implies that negotiations on two issues are interdependent for one ‘negotiating 
transaction’ similar to a spot market. Alternatively, issues can be linked enduringly in an institutional 
form. This can happen selectively. For instance, the WTO cooperates with the IMF when dealing with 
certain monetary issues.133 Furthermore, the IMF participates as an observer in the WTO. More 
comprehensive is incorporation of several issue areas into one institution.134 
These mechanisms are mostly substitutes with similar results for global governance for similar degrees 
of substantive and strategic linkage. Whether substantive linkages are coped with through frequent 
one-shot negotiations in an integrated manner, through a web of specific institutionalized linkages, or 
by incorporation into one institution, is of secondary significance for the effectiveness of global 
governance structures. Negotiating linkage only seemingly provides more flexibility in creating a 
negotiation set than does incorporation into one institution. As witnessed in the WTO, not all issues 
that are part of the WTO have to be on the negotiating agenda in all trade rounds, while frequent 
negotiating linkage of issues can shape perceptions that two issues belong together. In that case, these 
issues are hard to sever, even if doing so would be supportive for coming to an agreement. 
In addition to those linkage mechanisms mentioned above related to negotiations, courts can link 
international institutions. Courts can interpret the rules of the international institution to which they 
belong with reference to other international institutions. Furthermore, courts with superior authority 
can resolve conflicts of competing authority.  
Linkage through courts makes a difference to global governance because it lowers bargaining 
complexity for actors. Thus, the analysis of the bargaining problem should be affected by the degree of 
linkage through courts.  
Yet, the role of linkage through courts is limited. Linkage through courts is beset with legal and 
political problems, especially if all concerned actors, who are members of the institution interpreting 
its rules in the light of the rules of another institution, are not also members of this other institution. 
Institutional bias is likely to make linkage through courts, which elevates one international institution 
above another, unacceptable for resolving norm conflicts between issue areas and corresponding 
institutions on a large scale. Only an overarching world Supreme Court could impartially cope with 
the tremendous task of balancing competing values, world views, and cause-and-effect systems of 
linked issue areas. This would shift considerable complexity from bargaining to the judiciary, as 
potential flaws and unanticipated interdependencies could later be resolved. However, judicial 
delegation risk among other obstacles is likely to prevent the establishment of a world Supreme Court 
                                                     
132 See Leebron (2002). For an alternative classification, see Trachtman (2002). 
133 See GATT 1947 Art. XV. 
134 Not only the expansion of the WTO to new issue areas in the Uruguay Round increased the degree of political 
linkages. The adoption of the ‘single undertaking’ in the WTO, making plurilateral agreements applicable to all 
members, worked into the same direction. 
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for many years to come. 
Overall, we can conclude that substantive linkages and strategic linkage opportunities entice actors to 
perceive global governance comprehensively across issue areas and that they call for political 
linkages.135 Yet, no particular political linkage architecture can avoid aggravating the complexity of 
global governance.136 Therefore, the effects of linkages can be considered in the cooperation problems 
without knowledge of the specific linkage architecture.137 Most linkage mechanisms are substitutes, 
whereas linkage through courts, which can actually make a difference, is inherently limited or out of 
reach for political reasons for the foreseeable future. 
3.3 Depth of global governance  
Shallow and deep integration are commonly used concepts to describe the depth of global governance. 
Shallow integration combines negative integration and border regulation, whereas deep integration 
displays positive integration and domestic regulation. I establish the trend towards increasing depth of 
global governance by first showing a trend from negative towards positive integration and then 
demonstrating a trend from border towards domestic regulation. Finally, I highlight the reduction of 
actors’ governance autonomy following from deep integration. 
3.3.1   Positive integration 
The main difference between negative and positive integration is that negative integration forbids a 
certain action, while positive integration prescribes an action.138 Along with this fundamental 
difference between the two modes of integration come two further differences. First, negative 
integration only applies if a country chooses to regulate, while positive integration always poses 
demands on autonomous regulation. Secondly, negative integration, which only needs to define what 
is forbidden, is less complex than positive integration. While defining prohibited policies becomes a 
cumbersome task at times, like determining which subsidies shall be illegal under WTO rules, positive 
integration is far more comprehensive, usually requiring detailed elaboration on standards and often 
requiring far-reaching domestic legal efforts for implementation.139 
Market-correcting and positive integration are often used interchangeably in the literature. However, 
positive integration perceived as prescriptive, compelling, and relatively complex regulation does not 
inherently aim at correcting markets in the pursuit of non-market, political objectives. Positive 
regulation can also intend to create markets, for instance, in the realm of competition policy.140 In this 
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context, positive regulation interferes with markets in order to overcome market failure and to make 
markets more efficient, not in order to subjugate markets to political objectives.  
In the WTO, the market-creating and the market-correcting function of positive integration is 
increasingly needed.  
Let us first address the argument about the function of positive integration for attaining economic 
integration. Within the WTO, the prevailing negative integration forbids certain kinds of regulation: 
Tariffs are not allowed to be higher than the rate at which an actor has bound its tariff in the WTO 
Agreement, quotas are largely forbidden as a way to protect domestic industries, and export subsidies 
are also interdicted. With progress in negative integration, however, the marginal benefits from further 
negative integration decline. In developing countries, (domestic and even border) barriers to trade stem 
less from protectionist policies than from lacking institutions, such as customs and certification 
agencies, which require positive integration for upgrading.141 In addition, actors resort to contingent 
protection to replace protectionist instruments forbidden under negative integration. Thus, barriers to 
market access that can be removed only by positive integration gain in relative importance.142 
Moreover, successful negative, market-creating integration increasingly requires positive, market-
creating integration to offset its economic flip sides. For instance, with high barriers to trade, 
competition policies in other countries had little effect on domestic competition. Now that barriers 
have fallen, companies that make extraordinary profits due to lax competition policies in one market 
can engage in strategic pricing in other markets. Thus, fair competition requires positive integration to 
harmonize competition policies and to cope with the adverse effects of divergent national policies.143 
The second reason for increasing positive integration is growing demand for market correcting, 
positive integration.144 With global wealth rising, the demand for non-economic objectives also grows, 
calling for more governance to serve these non-economic ends. At the same time, globalization and 
negative integration decrease the effectiveness of autonomous governance. Thus, positive integration 
becomes vital to empower the actors to supply non-economic goods.145 In addition, while the 
willingness of civil society to accept a purely competitive, market-based world trade regime is waning, 
its voice becomes harder to ignore.146 
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3.3.2   Domestic integration 
The trend towards positive integration is accompanied by a shift from regulation of border-related 
barriers towards regulation of domestic policies that are not formally targeted at trade.147 Historically, 
the WTO set out to reduce tariffs. As tariffs fell, non-tariff barriers to trade rose. First, border-related 
barriers like classification and valuation of goods were prominent, but later the focus shifted to 
domestic regulation inhibiting free trade in the form of subsidies, competition law, government 
procurement, and standards concerning diverse issues like health or the environment. As a 
consequence, the WTO was compelled to move into domestic regulation. 
While the initial approach to domestic regulation was to enforce national treatment, that is, non-
discrimination of foreign companies, the WTO now tackles all barriers to trade. Most notably, the 
WTO reduced in the Uruguay Round the set of defensible barriers by restraining the reasons which 
can justify an exemption from WTO rules. For instance, sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
restricting trade must now be based on scientific principles, subject to the ruling of the Dispute 
Settlement System. This subtly promotes harmonization of product standards, as it allows judicially 
challenging product standards on other grounds than discrimination.  
Insofar, the trend towards domestic integration follows a logic similar to the trend towards positive 
integration: decreasing marginal benefits of border regulation compared to increasing gains from 
domestic regulation, and the need to curb circumvention of border regulations. 
In addition, two further dynamics propel domestic regulation: scope enlargement to issues that are 
prone to domestic regulation and linkages within global governance that convert the WTO into an 
instrument of good governance. 
Concerning the ascent of new issues with a propensity to domestic (and frequently also positive) 
integration, the liberalization of services is most prominent.148 Due to the often sensitive nature of 
services and prevailing information asymmetries, services require relatively strong regulation to 
protect customers. This opens the door to hidden protectionism, which in turn necessitates WTO 
disciplines. Even without domestic protectionist regulation, service markets may be hard to contest as 
many ‘backbone’ services, such as telecommunication or energy, display network externalities. Here, 
international disciplines may be required to enhance market access for foreign competitors. 
Furthermore, the liberalization of services partly rests on the movement of natural persons, which is an 
extraordinarily heavily regulated area of domestic politics. With a strong interest of developing 
countries and a growing interest of developed countries with aging populations, the movement of 
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natural persons is likely to increase and will have to be adequately regulated by international 
institutions.149 
Another new issue area that requires domestic regulation is trade in cultural goods. A loss of cultural 
identity to foreign cultural influences is increasingly felt in many countries. Besides patriotic 
sentiments, protection of cultural goods can also be based on economic reasoning. Francois and 
Ypersele (2002) make such an economic case for protecting the French movie industry. High 
investments by Hollywood combined with increasing returns to scale in production wipe out 
alternative U.S. and foreign production of movies that is sensitive to cultural context. These movies 
are highly valued by a share of the public that cannot express its preferences as price discrimination is 
not feasible. Thus, protectionism that keeps the culturally sensitive movie industry alive creates a 
consumer surplus, which can outweigh losses in the Hollywood movie industry. As witnessed in 
France, we have to expect increasing protectionism in favor of domestic culture, which needs to be 
disciplined by domestic regulation.  
This dynamic towards domestic regulation could intensify if the WTO further relaxes its focus on 
trade and takes linked objectives more into account. For instance, if trade is considered an instrument 
for development and if the WTO is already regulating domestic issues for the purpose of trade, the 
temptation is imminent to take development objectives directly into account and attempt to improve 
domestic governance when designing WTO rules.150 If this point of view comes to dominate the WTO, 
it will accelerate the trend towards domestic regulation. 
3.4 Actor participation 
Actor participation rises if new actors become members of the WTO, if passive or weak members 
participate more actively, or if their participation becomes more important.151 At this point, I only 
describe the trend in light of the negotiation history. The rationale behind the trend will be delivered in 
Chapter 5 about bargaining where I reason that decision-making exclusively among the powerful 
actors is on the decline. 
In the past, the role of developing countries in the WTO was of secondary importance. Steinberg 
(2002) dissects the influence of powerful actors throughout the negotiating process in GATT/WTO 
trade rounds. He finds in the first stage, the launching of a new trade round, that developing countries 
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were able to push their issues into the mandate for negotiations. Yet, in the second stage of informal 
agenda setting, powerful actors, particularly the U.S. and the EU, took over. They dominated the 
development of initiatives into broad conceptualizations, the fine-tuning of proposals as legal texts, 
and the packaging of proposals into a ‘final act’ by means of their superior resources, negotiations 
with selective sets of actors, and their influence on the secretariat. In this stage, Steinberg (2002, 355) 
annotates, “initiatives from weak countries have a habit of dying”. Under pressure from the powerful 
actors, the resulting packages were usually accepted in formal plenary meeting without modifications 
or with only minor amendments.  
Kahler (1992, 707) draws a similar picture for past global governance in general, “The collective 
action problems posed by multilateral governance were addressed for much of the postwar era by 
minilateral great power collaboration disguised by multilateral institutions and by derogations from 
multilateral principles in the form of persistent bilateralism and regionalism.”  
Yet, the power of the U.S. and the EU declines as developing, newly-industrialized, and formerly 
communist countries participate (more actively) in the WTO.152 Minilateralism in the Uruguay Round 
had declined in comparison to the Kennedy Round finalized in 1967 and the Tokyo Round finished in 
1979.153 It is also worth noting that the U.S. and the EU had to implement a severe threat – exiting the 
GATT and entering the WTO – in order to conclude the Uruguay Round. Such a strategy cannot be 
employed frequently without fundamentally damaging the legitimacy of global governance. In 1999, 
the Seattle negotiations failed partly because of resilience to the minilateral decision-making model.154 
Following negotiations involved developing countries more actively in decision-making.155 
3.5 Involvement of civil society 
Civil society refers to voluntary associations that aim to shape politics without pursuing public office 
or pecuniary gains.156 Such associations may come in a variety of forms, such as professional NGOs, 
grass root movements, think tanks, and religious institutions. Civil society involvement may take 
different shapes. Through participation in formal meetings or preparatory working committees, 
through advocacy on public events or in writing, or through lobbying may civil society introduce 
opinion and expertise into governance processes, thus, affecting single decisions as well as 
overarching learning. If civil society deems its voice not sufficiently heeded, it may protest against 
global governance policies, international institutions, or selected governments through various forms 
of activism.157 
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The interest of civil society in global governance has increased tremendously since the Rio Summit in 
1992.158 With the introduction of the WTO in 1994, public scrutiny turned to global governance in 
trade. The 1999 WTO ministerial meeting in Seattle marked a watershed as the number of 
participating NGOs soared and the variety of groups widened to include, for instance, health and 
human rights groups. 
The WTO reacted on growing public interest in its work in 1996 when it formulated “Guidelines for 
Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations” and initiated a series of WTO 
sponsored symposia with NGOs. The results of these conferences were rejected by many actors and 
the practice of high-profile exchange between the WTO and civil society was reduced. To date, no 
veritable, formal channel of direct participation in the WTO’s decision-making process exists, though 
the WTO conducts briefings and dialogue discussions and publishes information comprehensively and 
timely thanks to an accelerated declassification process. 
On the judicial side, the Appellate Body ruled in 1998 that panels and the Appellate Body itself had 
the authority to consider unsolicited amicus briefs, statements pertaining to a dispute filed by third-
parties to the dispute such as NGOs. This ruling met with vigorous resistance from the majority of 
actors. While the Appellate Body upheld its ruling in general, amicus briefs were rarely accepted after 
continuing attacks on the Appellate Body. 
For legislative and executive processes alike, the WTO expanded its efforts in recent years to manage 
its external relations with civil society. Information now is declassified more broadly and rapidly, and 
is disseminated actively through the WTO website and targeted briefings.159 
Civil society participation is seen as a function of demand for and supply of access to the WTO. If 
supply and demand increase, civil society participation rises. If demand exceeds supply, civil society 
involvement turns to protest. 
First, I turn to the demand for participatory rights. I then consider advantages and disadvantages of 
civil society participation with the assumption that they are the best indicator for future supply of 
access.160 The discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of civil society participation 
furthermore prepares the argument about the effects on global governance which civil society 
participation will exert. Note that I do not aspire to normatively assess to which extent civil society 
should participate in the WTO. 
3.5.1   Demand for participation 
The pressure from civil society demanding access will further rise. Democratization and direct 
participation of civil society in domestic governance accustom individuals to the expectation that they 
are entitled to have an audible say on issues relevant to their lives. An increase in relative 
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effectiveness, scope, and depth of global governance makes the WTO more significant to the 
individual agent so that she desires to voice her concerns also in the WTO. Tariffs affect individuals 
through their influence on prices of imported goods and on economic growth. The relationship 
between tariffs and other economic parameters are complicated in theory and frequently difficult to 
pin down empirically in concrete and current cases. More apparent, detrimental effects of tariffs on 
foreign economies may be disapproved of by private agents, but they lead only to limited political 
activity by idealists. Private agents can, thus, generally be expected to remain poorly informed and 
passive about tariffs. On the contrary, deep integration affects private agents significantly, directly, 
and evidently. Accordingly, private agents expect high standards of legitimacy for issues such as the 
regulation of genetically modified organisms.161  
Civil society insists especially vigorously on its involvement as long as global governance appears 
unbalanced in its efforts to promote different objectives and in its trade-offs between competing values 
and norms. The strengthening of individual economic rights, through the protection of foreign 
investment and of trade-related intellectual property, contradicts an understanding of international 
agreements as utilitarian-consequentialist bargains between states. This invites civil society to claim 
other individual (human) rights in the WTO.162 
While the desire to participate rises, organizing civil society and influencing global governance 
becomes cheaper through technological advances and more common with time. As civil society 
experiences the effects of transnational activism – such as acceptance of amicus briefs, the derailing of 
the Seattle ministerial meeting and of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment in the OECD – it will 
activate additional resources and shift existing resources to the global level.  
3.5.2   Advantages of civil society participation 
One main advantages of civil society participation for the effectiveness and legitimacy of global 
governance pertains to the quality of WTO policies.163 Civil society participation improves the quality 
of WTO policies by contributing to deliberations since the intellectual competition in the WTO is 
limited by several factors.  
First, many actors lack sufficient resources to contribute meaningfully in deliberations, whereas 
numerous organizations of civil society command special expertise. While actors can theoretically 
build on these private resources and embody them in their argument, in reality, the transfer of 
knowledge faces friction. In particular, participation warrants that civil society can relate information 
about its political reaction to different policy proposals, undistortedly and timely. Secondly, the 
perspective of governments is crafted by traditional territorial, often competitive mindsets. Civil 
society, on the contrary, is mostly characterized by a universalist approach that promises to be more 
suited to solving global problems. Thirdly, governments filter information consciously. Governments 
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may benefit from serving special interests or from avoiding the risk of standing exposed in 
international negotiations. Civil society, thus, leads to more pluralist and creative input into 
deliberations.  
Decisions of better quality will be considered more legitimate in their own right. In addition, 
participation of civil society enhances the legitimacy of the WTO in several further ways. In the real 
world, democracy within countries is never perfectly achieved. Many members of the WTO grant their 
citizens no, or only rudimentary, democratic rights. Even in advanced democracies, the political 
process is partly corrupted by special interests. Furthermore, attitudes of politicians and political 
parties concerning the WTO constitute only a minor aspect in elections; politicians may change their 
stances when in office, and the positions of representatives in negotiations commonly diverge from 
initial bargaining positions. For all these reasons, even individuals that have voted for the government 
in power may be discontent with the behavior of their country in international negotiations. Yet, the 
ability of ex-post control through ratification is fictitious. Blocking negotiation results does not 
directly further alternative goals and is associated to often tremendous costs. Therefore, civil society 
involvement contributes to the legitimacy of global governance by offsetting deficiencies in domestic 
democratic processes. 
Even if excellent mechanisms for democratic representation are in place on a national level, civil 
society participation will be needed on a global level for legitimate governance. Democracy is more 
than voting. Civil society participation is needed on the actor level to enrich the deliberative side of 
democracy that complements representative mechanisms, to give voice to minorities, to hold 
governments accountable beyond elections, et cetera. The same functions are needed in global 
governance.  
Moreover, actor-based global governance suffers from particular weaknesses that can be mended 
through civil society participation. Countries become an increasingly unsuitable level to aggregate 
preferences about global governance. Individual identities become less shaped by nation states and 
better reflected in civil society organizations. With the end of the cold war and no security cleavages 
in sight that would again separate the world along national boundaries, issues other than non-security 
concerns move to the center stage of political debate about which domestic preferences are more 
heterogeneous. This makes it more likely that opinions, which are in the minority on the domestic 
level and, therefore, systematically disregarded in domestic political processes, carry more weight if 
they are aggregated directly at the global level. Furthermore, individual agents in an interdependent 
world are increasingly affected by decisions of foreign actors who are not democratically accountable 
to them. Defending their interests through actor-based negotiations alone is less effective than 
additional activism of concerned individuals at the international stage. Particularly for private agents 
from small or weak countries, chances are dim that their governments can protect their interests. 
In addition to improving the quality decisions and the legitimacy of decision-making processes, civil 
society participation provides a credible channel to disseminate information about global governance 
to a skeptical public. This enhances popular support for global governance. If civil society 
organizations that participate in global governance lend their support to global governance policies or 
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at least demonstrate understanding for the inevitable, popular resistance to global governance is 
attenuated. This has an important political effect: The greater the support for global governance is in 
domestic society, the more willing governments are to cooperate and to cede authority to international 
institutions. 
3.5.3   Disadvantages of civil society participation 
A number of arguments speaks against civil society participation for principled or functional reasons 
pertaining to the effectiveness and legitimacy of global governance. Rather principled is the argument 
that no global demos exists so that global democracy is self-contradictory. Global governance 
correspondingly cannot evolve beyond inter-state bargaining. However, a sense of global common fate 
and a global transnational political discourse evolve, and democracy can be reconfigured to new 
spaces beyond the nation state.  
A further principled argument claims that civil society organizations are non-representative, 
intransparent, and unaccountable. Consequently, civil society may promote special interests that 
should be isolated from global policy making. This argument carries little significance if civil society 
only observes meetings and contributes arguments; the market for ideas considers their arguments 
only if they are meritorious. Furthermore, accreditation disciplines can complement market control. If 
civil society indeed causes public choice distortions, then wielding inappropriate influence in formal 
meetings is far more difficult than informally. Another consequence of non-representativeness may be 
that civil society influence weakens developing countries as the majority of civil society organizations 
is based in developed countries. Yet, civil society is forming increasingly in developing countries as 
well. Furthermore, developed countries’ civil society frequently supports positions of developing 
countries.164 Finally, more deliberative decision-making, which civil society struggles to promote as 
this is its channel of influence, favors weak actors. 
On the functional side, Charnovitz (2002b, 324) debunks the claim that civil society leads to over-
politicization, “Another argument against NGO participation is that trade politics should be cabined at 
the national level and screened out of the WTO. This view is puzzling because the WTO is solely 
about politics. In contrast to many other international organizations that address market failure, the 
WTO addresses mainly government failure. So the idea of preserving an unpolitical WTO is fantasy 
… [the WTO’s] mission is to put controls on the way governments use discriminatory and 
protectionist trade measures. That is an additional reason why the WTO should not insist that NGOs 
filter their ideas through national governments. A consumer NGO may advocate an idea like free trade 
that its government will be unwilling to relay to the WTO.” 
A related argument warns that civil society lacks commitment to free trade and that civil society 
participation infuses more heterogeneity into the WTO. However, the increasing heterogeneity stems 
from scope, linkages, and deep integration and is not artificially created by civil society. Dealing with 
this heterogeneity in negotiations and court rulings is necessary to achieve appropriate and widely 
                                                     




Other critics point out that deals which disadvantage special interest groups are easier to strike behind 
closed doors. Civil society involvement that implies more transparency would accordingly add to the 
influence of special interest groups and lead to more distortions in the political process. However, such 
distortions are generally best attenuated through transparency and deliberations. 
Comparing advantages and disadvantages of civil society participation, we see that international 
institutions can reap many benefits at limited costs. In the future, experience and continuing research 
will improve institutional capabilities to integrate civil society at even lower costs.165 Moreover, civil 
society participation is self-enforcing. The more access the WTO grants to civil society, the more 
transparent the WTO becomes and the greater the influence civil society has in the future.166 Another 
self-reinforcing mechanism is peer pressure. The more civil society participation spreads, the harder it 
becomes for single international institutions to withdraw from this trend.167 Therefore, we can expect 
the growing demand for participation to be at least partly matched by more access for civil society to 
the WTO. 
3.6 Secondary trends 
In the remainder of the study, I frequently refer to the primary trends presented so far. At other 
occasions, I refer to effects that result from a combination of the primary trends. Defining these 
recurring effects as secondary trends in advance allows me to argue more specifically and 
economically in the later analysis.  
3.6.1   Number of participating actors  
In WTO decision-making, a greater number of actors will participate more actively and with growing 
influence. In addition, further agents are likely to receive a place at the table, time to speak, and the 
right to submit proposals. Civil society will probably be directly involved in WTO processes. In order 
to balance diverging norms and interests pursued in different issue areas and in order to combine the 
knowledge required for coherent governance, other international institutions increasingly need to be 
represented in WTO processes. 
3.6.2   Ideational heterogeneity of actors 
Ideational heterogeneity means the heterogeneity of values, norms, perceptions and causal beliefs 
within international society.168 The trends expose the WTO more strongly to ideational heterogeneity. 
Trade in a strict sense can be considered as an issue area with universally shared knowledge and a 
                                                     
165 See, for instance, Albin (1999) on possible criteria for accreditation of NGOs at international institutions. 
166 See Shaffer (2001). 
167 See, for instance, the OECD (2000) comparison of civil society participation in five international institutions 
and the Global Accountability Report written by Kovach, Neligan and Burall (2003) for the One World Trust, 
ranking 18 international governmental organizations, corporations, and NGOs according to their accountability. 
168 Ideational properties have been briefly introduced in Chapter 1 and are discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
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universal, material logic of action. Economic knowledge differs little between actors as gauging 
economic trade effects is an international and specialized science mostly independent of a national 
context.169 The logic of action is similar as the consequences of trade regulation in a strict sense are 
material and as every actor is striving to maximize material wealth.170 Any domestic income 
distribution that could be subject to value judgments resulting from trade regulation can be altered 
domestically afterwards.171 Differences between actors in knowledge, values and norms can, thus, be 
largely neglected in negotiations about tariff reductions. 
However, the same does not hold for negotiations about the complex economic effects of deep 
integration. When designing intellectual property rights or liberalizing trade in services, actors 
negotiate issues for which clear scientific advice is missing. Consequently, they bring divergent (and 
partly poorly developed) concepts to the negotiating table.172 
With scope extension to non-economic issue areas, heterogeneity of knowledge is even more present, 
and heterogeneity of values and norms matters decisively. For instance, knowledge of environmental 
destruction and preferences for environmental goods significantly differ between actors,173 and they 
are discussed in a strongly normative international discourse. Global governance becomes even more 
difficult as one issue can touch on several non-economic value systems. Trade in genetically modified 
organisms, for instance, arouses ethical and religious concerns, health concerns, and environmental 
concerns.174 Trachtman (2002, 93) notes, “Indeed, I see the ‘trade and ...’ problem as the working out 
in the international system of something we long ago worked out – but continually revise – in the 
domestic system: how should society integrate its values expressed in the market with its values 
expressed through nonmarket mechanisms (politics and law)?” The analogy to the domestic level 
provides an image to gauge the even more daunting difficulties in reconciling the conflicting norms 
                                                     
169 See Reich (1996). 
170 Landau (2000) and Wendt (2001) observe that normative thinking is less important if economic issues are 
concerned than if other issues, such as the environment, are affected. Indeed, we may consider serving one’s own 
interest as normatively appropriate economic behavior based on Adam Smith’s invisible hand that guides self-
interested agents towards collective welfare. 
171 Clearly, domestic distributional effects of trade agreements are not fully offset by domestic redistribution and, 
thus, trade policy has a real-world distributional effect which is subject to normative reasoning. See Kapstein 
(2000). However, the normative importance of distributional effects is moderate compared to the many 
normative concerns that arise from global governance of non-economic issues. Moreover, domestic 
distributional effects are subject to a normative dispute mostly at the domestic policy stage. The normative 
distributive discourse on the international level instead focuses on the international distribution of wealth. Here, 
we have a near-consensus that reciprocal liberalization is best for developing countries. By contrast, domestic 
normative effects and the international normative effects of governance in non-economic issues are discussed 
intensively and confrontationally at the international level. 
172 See Sjöstedt (1994). 
173 See Helm (2000). 
174 See Safrin (2002). 
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and value systems on a global level.175  
Global governance needs to account for further ideational differences beyond ‘ethical’ issues of risk 
assessment for human beings, adequate treatment of animals, and environmental protection. For 
instance, regulation in the food sector is confronted with mundane problems – such as diverging 
consumption patterns, informational problems on the food market, and agency and capture problems 
within national regulatory institutions – that require specific regulatory responses.176 
Increased ideational heterogeneity originates not only in new issue areas regulated or affected by the 
WTO, but also in the number and nature of actors who are recently involved in global governance. 
Developing countries and civil society bring in new perspectives and force the WTO to recognize the 
new nature of issues with their effects on ideational heterogeneity.177 This undermines a core 
mechanism of how international law manages cultural differences. Kennedy (1997, 571) observes in 
the traditional international law system that “most cultural differences simply do not rise to the level of 
the international. Differences are manageable when they can remain internal matters, below the 
waterline of sovereignty.” In the future, global governance has to face heterogeneity increasingly on 
the global stage. 
Ideational differences can be intensified through domestic institutions. Skogstad (2002) reasons that 
based on varying attitudes towards science in the EU and the U.S., different mechanisms for domestic 
decision-making have developed. The divide between the participatory, deliberative approach of 
network governance in Europe and the decision-making approach in the U.S., by experts that are 
accountable only to elected politicians, accentuates the original ideational heterogeneity between 
societies.178 
Furthermore, the relevance of ideational heterogeneity can be increased through domestic institutions 
if they embody ingrained ideas about how things should be done. If policy proposals are at odds with 
domestic norms, agreeing to such proposals constitutes normatively inappropriate behavior and causes 
domestic audience costs.179 If ideas are ingrained in domestic institutions, this increases the costs of 
compromising beyond what would be warranted by ideational differences on a clean slate.180 
                                                     
175 Albrow (1998) points out that even issues that are of technical nature on the domestic level involve value 
conflicts on the global level where the heterogeneity of values is greater. On increasing norm and value conflicts 
in global governance, see also Dunning (2000), Dunoff (1999), Howse and Nicolaidis (2003), Zampetti (2001) 
and Zürn (2002).  
176 See Joerges and Neyer (1998). 
177 See Commission on Global Governance (1995), Chayes and Chayes (1995) and Zampetti (2001). 
178 See also Shaffer (2001) on how the involvement of ministries and civil society in trade policy formulation 
differs between actors. 
179 See Börzel and Risse (2002). See also the discussion of domestic audience costs in section 6.2. 
180 See Jackson (2000a). See Bailey (2002) about problems in the EU with dissonance in regulatory style. 
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3.6.3   Material heterogeneity of actors 
Material heterogeneity stands for the heterogeneity of actors’ material properties, such as natural 
resources and infrastructure. Deep integration and broader actor participation raise the degree and 
relevance of material heterogeneity. Negative integration, such as the prohibition of import quotas in 
the WTO, tends to more similarly affect materially different actors than positive integration like 
TRIPS. Generally, industrialized countries prefer demanding standards that provide competitive 
advantages to their industries and result in relatively low costs, compared to the expenses developing 
countries have to incur in order to achieve demanding standards.181  
With an increasing participation of developing countries in the WTO, the gap between developing and 
industrialized countries, as well as the heterogeneity within the group of developing countries, matters 
more. For instance, tariff revenues have entirely different implications for an industrialized country, an 
oil exporting developing country, and a developing country poor on natural resources.  
3.6.4   Governance autonomy of the actors 
Deep integration limits the ability of materially and ideationally heterogeneous actors to reach their 
objectives through autonomous governance. To reduce tariffs, actors need only to agree on a limited 
amount of figures. How to cope with the domestic consequences of tariff reductions, for instance, on 
employment or health, is left to the individual actors as long as they do not impair or nullify their 
concessions.182 
With deep integration, actors increasingly agree on comprehensive courses of actions that leave less 
opportunity to modify the consequences of WTO agreements to their specific ideational and material 
properties.183 A major case in point is the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS). This agreement restrains actors’ rights to impose regulation which aims to protect 
human, animal, and plant life. Thus, the WTO increasingly regulates issues that are strongly affected 
by ideational and material heterogeneity, and leaves at the same time less space to actors to attenuate 
the resulting repercussions. 
3.6.5   Scope of global governance 
Scope is defined by the number of issue areas subject to global governance, as well as the intensity of 
regulation within the issue areas.184 The WTO embodies new issues such as services and intellectual 
property rights, which were not covered under the old GATT. Regulation became also more intensive 
as the use of non-tariff barriers has been regulated in more detail and more strictly, as waivers in 
textiles and agriculture have been scaled back, and as temporary exemptions have been subjugated to 
                                                     
181 See Joerges and Neyer (1998) and Scharpf (1998) on the quarrels arising from distributional implications of 
standards which hinder positive integration even in the comparably homogenous EU. 
182 See Howse and Nicolaidis (2003).  
183 See Dunoff (1999). 
184 Thus, increasing scope is analogous to ‘institutionalization’ in the terminology of Goldstein et al. (2000). 
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tighter control.185 Expanding scope can also be witnessed in other areas.186 
Global problems are pressing for the most effective form of governance. Since relative effectiveness of 
global governance is growing, we can accordingly assume the trend of scope expansion to continue. 
This conclusion is even more compelling as global governance often reinforces interdependencies, 
creating its own demand for further global governance.187 
3.6.6   Uncertainty about efficiency and distributional effects of agreements 
Actors become more uncertain about the distributional implications of agreements and their efficiency 
properties.188 One explanation for growing uncertainty is a widening span of possible wealth effects of 
agreements. The wealth effects of agreements can diverge so widely for different actors that even the 
sanguine promises of trade theory on traditional trade bargains do not hold anymore; integration 
ceases to be a mutual gain phenomenon by nature, but actors can loose through integration.189 
Increases in the depth of integration not only widen the span of possible wealth effects but also 
aggravate a prediction of these effects. Assessing the impact of tariff reductions on traditional 
industries is easier than estimating the effects of health provisions for the bio-tech industry. As actors 
become aware and care more about non-pecuniary effects of WTO regulations, accurate predictions 
about effects of agreements become even harder to achieve. 
Linkages within global governance are also responsible for unreliable assessments. A clarification of 
the consequences of agreements in advance is more important and difficult at the international than at 
the domestic level because no superior authority exists that could coordinate competencies of 
international institutions. The interaction between international institutions must be foreseen and 
adequate coordination mechanisms must be integrated into agreements. For instance, concerns arose 
about the relationship between the WTO and the Biosafety Protocol, which regulates transboundary 
movement of bioengineered living organisms. While the Biosafety Protocol and the WTO Agreement 
both contain similar precautionary language and an obligation for actors to base their decisions on 
scientific principles for risk assessment, even modest differences in wording led to fear of treaty 
collision. In addition, so many linkages from the Biosafety Protocol to other issue areas, such as 
medicine, food, and forests, arose, that actors feared to unintentionally modify already existing 
agreements.190  
The need to consider the dynamic effects of linkages further exacerbates assessing and handling 
                                                     
185 See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), Jackson (1997) and Reich (1996). 
186 See Scherer, Blickle, Dietzfelbinger and Hütter (2002) on social standards and labor rights, Clark (2001) and 
Vogler (1998) on environmental protection, Lake (2001) on security issues, Schiff and Winters (2002) and 
Solimano (2001) on development, and Diehl, Ku and Zamora (2003) and Zürn (1998) on scope extension in 
general. 
187 See Höffe (1999, Ch. 6). 
188 See Haas (1992) and Hoekman (2002b). 
189 See Bhagwati (2001), Howse (2002a) and Howse and Nicolaidis (2001). 
190 See Safrin (2002). See Biermann (2000) on the possibility to clarify the relationship between the WTO and 
international environmental institutions in order to attenuate tensions between trade and environmental rules. 
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linkages. Once social and environmental standards are incorporated into the WTO, developing 
countries fear that there will be no halt to industrialized nations and civil society pursuing their social 
and environmental thrusts on a far broader scale in the WTO.  
Increasing uncertainty about efficiency and distributional effects of agreements was reflected only 
partly in the Uruguay Round, as actors were often unaware that agreements would not necessarily lead 
to win-win outcomes.191 In particular, we have to expect that developing country actors will be more 
careful in accepting obligations in the future. 
3.6.7   Value of having a good reputation 
Actors derive value from specific reputations that suggest a certain behavior in certain situations.192 
Moreover, diffuse trust enables international cooperation.193 Defined in reputational terms, trust can be 
understood as expectations of continuing good-natured behavior across issues. On flagrant 
transgression, emotional responses that disturb cooperation across the board and for a long time can 
occur.194  
The value of having a good reputation is rising. The greater the scope of the WTO and the greater 
relative effectiveness of global governance by the WTO, the greater the value is which actors ascribe 
to the WTO. With increasing value of global governance, the value of having a good reputation and 
the reputational costs of rule violations rise.195 
Besides, reputational costs are spread through negative reputational spill-overs. Concerning 
legalization and reputational spill-overs, Abbott and Snidal (2000, 427) state, “Another way 
legalization enhances credibility is by increasing the costs of reneging. Regime scholars argue that 
agreements are strengthened when they are linked to a broader regime. Violating an agreement that is 
part of a regime entails disproportionate costs because the reputational costs of reneging apply 
throughout the regime. Legal commitments benefit from similar effects, but they involve international 
                                                     
191 Jackson (2000b, 8) formulates provocatively, “Probably no nation which accepted the Uruguay Round really 
knew quite what it was getting into.” See also Dunning (2000) and Raghavan (2000). 
192 Reputation is often understood as a valuable mechanism to signal an enduring quality, such as law obedience. 
Less discussed yet also important for the WTO is a second understanding of reputation, as a device for signaling 
the relative importance of issues in negotiations. Sartori (2002) shows how such signaling allows actors mutually 
beneficial trade of issues over time, as actors gain on those issues that are particularly important to them and 
concede on others. While this reputation hinges on truthful representation of issue valuation, we can expect to 
see this particular reputation be affected by more diffuse trust. An actor that cannot be trusted to maintain her 
treaty obligations is, thus, not to be trusted in negotiations either. 
193 See Schiff and Winters (2002). 
194 See Chayes and Chayes (1993) and Lipson (1991). The potential ‘loss of political good will’ as force for 
compliance has found entry even into game theoretic modeling, e.g. by Lockwood and Zissimos (2002). 
195 Furthermore, the value at stake in negotiations does matter. The value at stake in negotiations is distinct from 
the value of the WTO that depends on the gains from cooperation. The value at stake in negotiations hinges in 
particular on the heterogeneity of actors. If actors are extremely heterogeneous, there is little to win but much to 
loose in global governance. Thus, in such a situation, the value of the WTO is low, but the value at stake is, 
nevertheless, high. 
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law as a whole in addition to any specific regime. When a commitment is cast as hard law, the 
reputational effects of a violation can be generalized to all agreements subject to international law, that 
is, to most international agreements.” The greater the relative effectiveness and scope of global 
governance and the stronger the linkages between the international institutions, the more severe these 
indirect reputational costs become. 
Having a generally good standing among the actors who together form the international society 
becomes more important in addition to the value of specific reputations in specific issue areas. Being 
recognized as a legitimate state entails benefits concerning security, autonomy, and participation in 
global governance, including decision-making and material benefits.196 
3.7 Requirements to contribute to linked objectives 
Before we turn to the claim that the trends incorporate the requirements to contribute to linked 
objectives, we should notice that the coherence and overall effectiveness of global governance 
depends to a large extent on aspects that are not subject to this analysis. Most conflicts between the 
WTO and proponents from other issue areas are rooted in content, not in structure. As far as structure 
is concerned, many issues in interface management relevant to global governance coherence do not 
correspond to my level of resolution. Proposals for a world Supreme Court, or a corresponding 
political body that could solve deference conflicts between international institutions, are above the 
scope of my analysis which models only one institution. On the other side, advice on operational 
management of institutional interfaces is too detailed. Therefore, the impact of structure, as defined in 
this analysis, on the attainment of linked objectives is limited. 
Which capabilities should structures lend to the WTO within these limits to contribute to linked 
objectives in issue areas, such as environment, health, and development? Evidently, the WTO has to 
be able to deal with linkages. As argued above, managing linkages in global governance is a challenge 
the organization has to face anyway to reach its core objectives. Moreover, the WTO has to cope with 
challenges in the related issue areas that differ from the task of lowering traditional trade barriers. Yet, 
these challenges are not that alien to the current and future WTO either. Involvement in the design of 
environmental or health standards and in policies to fight poverty requires domestic and positive 
integration. Again, developing the capabilities to manage deep integration is a necessity for the WTO 
in any case. Finally, participation is handled differently in other international institutions. For instance, 
developing countries play a greater role in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) than in the WTO. Civil society participates more prominently in many agreements of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) than in the WTO. However, developing countries 
and civil society are enlarging their weight in the WTO so that the WTO cannot circumvent the task to 
find ways how decision-making can function under broader participation.  
                                                     
196 See Schimmelpfennig (2000). Chayes and Chayes (1995, 27) even claim that “sovereignty no longer consists 
in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in membership in reasonably 
good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life.” 
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My point should be clear by now: If global governance structures enable the WTO to solve the 
bargaining and enforcement problem against the background of the trends affecting global governance, 
then the WTO can effectively pursue core and linked objectives alike. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have established five primary trends, connected to globalization, that affect global 
governance in the WTO. These are relative effectiveness of global governance, linkages within global 
governance, depth of global governance, actor participation, and civil society involvement. 
Furthermore, we have derived several secondary trends from these primary trends. We have also seen 
that the trends incorporate the requirements for attaining linked objectives.  
In addition to the trends presented in this chapter, additional trends that are pertinent only to one 
specific argument are introduced at a later stage wherever they are relevant, for instance, trends 
concerning specific investments and the discretion of negotiators. 
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Before we delve into the analysis, let us briefly piece together the preparatory work we have 

















Figure 2: Analytical framework: Review of Part I 
In Chapter 1, I have suggested that the effectiveness of the WTO should be measured based on 
economic and non-economic objectives. Bargaining and compliance problems impede attainment of 
these objectives. The better the solution of these problems that global governance structures facilitate, 
the more effective structures are. Furthermore, structures have to cope with the risks that arise from 
delegation of authority for decision-making and dispute resolution to the WTO.  
Actors behavior with regards to bargaining, compliance, and risk is not dictated by material factors but 
also depends on their ideational properties, which are lasting, internalized ideas, such as norms and 
causal beliefs. All learning processes, changing actors’ ideational properties, are dealt with in Chapter 
4, so that actors can be treated as exogenous in the analysis of the bargaining and compliance 
problems. 
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In Chapter 2, I have defined regionalization and legalization as endogenous determinants of 
effectiveness. Regionalization refers to the move from nation states to integrated regions as 
constitutive actors of global governance. Though predicting the properties of a world of integrated 
regions is difficult, a world organized in several, deeply integrated regions appears a possible scenario. 
Legalization signifies the move towards institutional design that vests substantive authority in 
international institutions and adopts the form of law for international institutions. I have constructed 
legalization by five determinants: decision-making process, delegation of authority to the judiciary, 
precision of rules of global governance, exemptions from rules of global governance, and punishment 
to enforce the rules. 
In Chapter 3, I have presented trends in exogenous determinants of global governance effectiveness. 
Table 3 presents the primary trends, related to globalization in general and to the WTO in particular.  
Table 3: Primary trends 
Primary trends Key elements
Civil society 
involvement
More civil society involvement as civil society demands it, as it enhances 
the quality of decisions, as it improves the legitimacy of decision-making processes, 
and as it is self-reinforcing
Increasing importance of substantive and strategic linkages 
to economic and non-economic issue areas, 
independently of political linkage architecture
Shift towards positive integration and domestic regulation due to decreasing returns 
from shallow integration, new issues such as services, and demand for global 
governance that corrects markets and promotes good governance 
New members enter the WTO, passive members become more active, and weak 
actors' participation turns more influential
Decreasing effectiveness of autonomous governance as opposed to probably 
increasing effectiveness of global governance




of global governance 





Table 4 provides an overview of the key elements of the secondary trends, which are driven by the 
primary trends. 
Table 4: Secondary trends 
Secondary trends Key elements
More actors, more active and influential participation
More participation by civil society and other international institutions
New issues in which ideational heterogeneity is substantial
New actors and civil society raise degree and relevance of ideational heterogeneity
Domestic institutions increase degree and relevance of ideational heterogeneity
New issues in which material heterogeneity is substantial
New actors increase degree and relevance of material heterogeneity
Wider span of possible wealth effects
Increasing depth and linkages make effects harder to predict
Greater value of the WTO
Greater reputational spill-overs to other international institutions








Scope of global 
governance
Problems pressing for broader use of global governance 
given increasing relative effectiveness of global governance
Governance 
autonomy
Deep integration limits actors' capabilities to adjust the effects of global governance to 




Now we are prepared to move on to the analysis set out in the second part of the study. I begin with a 
discussion of ideational properties and learning in Chapter 4 and then turn to bargaining in Chapter 5 
and to compliance in Chapter 6. 
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4 Ideational properties and learning 
In order to assess how global governance structures affect actors’ behavior, we need a theory on how 
actors make decisions. To this end, we first need to understand the spirit or logic by which actors are 
led in their decisions. This logic of decision-making determines how actors develop desirable courses 
of action. Broadly speaking, actors can employ two different logics to make a decision: a logic of 
consequences and a logic of appropriateness. 
Pursuing the logic of consequences, actors behave strategically in order to maximize their utility as 
defined by their interests. These interests do not directly result from their immediate material needs, 
but actors construct their interests based on their material needs. Interests are, thus, determined by 
material factors and ideational properties.197 This construction process is either internalized in readily 
applicable routines or it is involved in conscious searching for what is in one’s best interest.198 How 
actors construct their interests depends on how they interpret their material needs, how they perceive 
the situational constraints, how they causally link actions to outcomes, and how they appreciate their 
gains from cooperation in relation to the gains that accrue to other actors. This understanding 
corresponds to the everyday application of the term interest, which usually includes valuations, 
perceptions, causal beliefs, and perspectives on gains. If we say, for instance, that actors have an 
interest in liberalization or protectionism, we do not mean that actors derive utility from the act of 
changing tariffs but that they expect this action to bear fruits further down the road.  
Instead of strategically pursuing their interests, actors can attempt to make right decisions, guided by 
norms. Norms are standards that prescribe appropriate behavior depending on the situation and the 
identity of the actor. If actors strive to behave normatively right, they follow the logic of 
appropriateness.199 Two ideal types of the logic of appropriateness can be juxtaposed. Actors can 
follow internalized norms unconsciously if norms are taken completely for granted and if they directly 
prescribe a certain behavior.200 In this case, actors rely solely on norms and on their perception of the 
situation that triggers the corresponding norm. Alternatively, actors can reason what is normatively 
appropriate and search for the right behavior in a given situation. Risse (2000, 12) describes such 
collective truth searching, “Communication in truth-seeking discourses oriented toward reaching a 
reasoned consensus is not motivated by the players’ desire to realize their individual preferences – be 
they egoistic or altruistic. Communication is motivated by the desire to find out the ‘truth’ with regard 
to facts in the world or to figure out ‘the right thing to do’ in a commonly defined situation.” The quest 
can, thus, involve searching for appropriate norms, perceptions, and causal beliefs. This reflective 
                                                     
197 See Goldstein and Keohane (1993), Haas (1992), Hall (1993), Hay and Rosamund (2002), Knodt and 
Jachtenfuchs (2002), Parsons (2002), Ruggie (1998), Snyder (2002), Wendt (1999) and Yee (1996).  
198 Wendt (1999, 126) summarizes this construction as “desire plus belief plus reason equals action.” 
199 See Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and March and Olsen (1998). 
200 In the words of Fukuyama (1999, 184), “the norm has become an end in itself – one that is heavily invested 
with emotion.” See Fukuyama (1999) also for an interdisciplinary overview of explanations why human beings 
have developed a disposition towards arational norm following. 
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ideal type of the logic of appropriateness has been labeled by Risse (2000) as logic of arguing. 
In the complex world of international politics, solving norm conflicts and normatively ranking the 
possible outcomes are not trivial undertakings.201 For instance, norms connected to free trade and 
sovereignty reject trade bans for the protection of endangered species, whereas norms connected to the 
environment are supportive. Furthermore, norms often do not directly point to a course of action, so 
that the most effective way to achieve an appropriate outcome needs to be evaluated. For instance, it is 
not always certain that a complete ban on trade in endangered species will actually help protecting 
these species. In such a case where norms do not directly prescribe behavior but actors construct 
appropriate behavior in the first place, actors need causal beliefs, in addition to norms and perception 
of the state of the world. Realistically, intermediate forms between the ideal types of logic of 
appropriateness are to be expected. Actors consciously reflect on what the appropriate behavior is, 
while they take some norms, perceptions, and causal beliefs for granted.  
For most decisions in the complex real world, actors, in addition, combine the logics of consequences 
and appropriateness. For instance, one option for behavior is excluded on normative grounds and the 
choice among the remaining two options is made with regard to both utilitarian consequences and 
normative appropriateness. Furthermore, the two logics are intertwined at an unconscious level as they 
influence perception. In particular, actors tend to interpret their normative obligations in a way that fits 
their interests.202  
Whether actors make decisions according to the logic of consequences or the logic of appropriateness 
and attempt to behave normatively right, they base their decisions on material factors and ideational 
properties. Material factors refer to the world that exists outside and independently of the decision-
makers’ minds. Ideational properties exist inside the decision-makers’ minds and influence how 
decision-makers think of the world. This distinction for the explanation of behavior is purely 
theoretical; both dimensions play a role in almost all decisions, and material factors and ideational 
properties are interdependent in their development. Note in particular that reality shapes and constrains 
our ideas about the material and social world in the long run. While many ideas about the world are 
possible, certain representations of the world fare better than others. Since the world does not 
presuppose any specific understanding, global governance structures can affect the ideas which actors 
hold. But their ideas have to remain within the limits set by reality, otherwise actors would fail.203  
This chapter deals with the ideational properties of actors and explains how they develop under the 
influence of global governance structures and trends. The first section presents the fundamental 
ideational properties that shape behavioral decisions. These are values, norms, perception, causal 
beliefs, the perspective on relative versus absolute gains, and collective identity. The ideational 
properties play a different role depending on the logic which actors apply. The second section 
scrutinizes the circumstances under which interaction at the international level changes the ideational 
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properties. Instead of ‘changes in the ideational properties of actors,’ I also simply speak of learning. 
The argument centers on deliberating as a special mode of communication, which is particularly 
conducive to learning. In the third section, I focus on norms as one type of ideational properties, 
explaining the influence of structures and trends on the legitimacy of norms. 
4.1 Ideational properties 
In the following section, I describe the ideational properties that determine behavior, and I argue that 
actors learn when interacting on the global level.  
4.1.1   Values and norms 
Values and norms are both concerned less with what is and more with what is desirable. I understand 
values as beliefs about what is valuable from a utilitarian perspective; values shape actors’ desires at 
the core of actors’ interests, which actors pursue with the logic of consequences. Wendt (1999, 123) 
relates, “Beliefs define and direct material needs. It is the perception of value in an object that 
constitutes the motive to pursue it, not some intrinsic biological imperative.” 
Norms establish standards of desirable behavior under the logic of appropriateness. In the WTO, 
norms serve actors’ cooperation in distinct ways. Norms call for integrative bargaining which 
emphasizes the overall gains over distributional bickering. Furthermore, they require compliance with 
agreements and compel actors to conform to court rulings.204  
Legitimacy is the feeling of obligation which a rule or international institution can invoke through the 
logic of appropriateness. The more legitimate a rule is, the stronger its compliance pull becomes. The 
more legitimate an organization is, the more normative weight the organization can lend to a rule it 
endorses.205 If norms become more legitimate in the process of learning, this suggests a gradual shift in 
the relative weight from the logic of consequences towards the logic of appropriateness. 
The feeling of obligation does not directly correspond to ‘objective’ factors, such as democratic 
quality of the decision-making process or effectiveness of governance. Instead, legitimacy depends on 
the subjective perception of rules and international institutions by governments, negotiators, and 
domestic agents.206 
                                                     
204 Occasionally, scholars differentiate between constitutive and prescriptive/regulative norms. In a WTO 
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4.1.2   Knowledge 
When speaking of knowledge, I mean actors’ perception of the state of the world and the causal beliefs 
which actors harbor about the functioning of the world. I have suggested that actors construct their 
interests and normative obligations in reference to their perception and their causal beliefs. For 
instance, liberalization and globalization are assessed in widely diverging representations across 
countries.207 Such different perceptions of the situation suggest different interests and call for different 
strategic responses under the logic of consequences. Under the logic of appropriateness, perception 
determines whether a certain situation fulfills the requirements for a norm to apply. For instance, 
actors first have to come to the conclusion that a domestic policy functions as an export subsidy before 
they consider countermeasures to be justified. Furthermore, if more than one norm applies, how actors 
perceive a situation is relevant to their ranking of norms. Causal beliefs, which link actions to expected 
outcomes, matter whenever actors pursue the logic of consequences. Causal beliefs matter also when 
actors consciously search for appropriate behavior. 
Knowledge that shapes actors’ behavior is largely socially constructed. Young (1999a, 206) takes 
discourses as the means by which actors form their beliefs, “Discourses are systems of thought that 
not only provide a way of framing and addressing problems and the behavioral complexes within 
which they are embedded but also contain normative perspectives on the importance of the problems 
and appropriate ways to resolve them.” Discourses, thus, entail more than exchanging information. 
They are social processes generating explicit and implicit shared understanding.  
Social construction takes place primarily in domestic society.208 However, social construction also 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“popular legitimacy”. Accordingly, my presentation of legitimacy differs from philosophical accounts as 
espoused by Rawls (1972) and Höffe (1999). Though legitimacy is defined subjectively, it is not equivalent to 
the power which norms exert on governments to comply. The power of WTO norms rests also on domestic 
politics and institutions that shape how the government, society, bureaucracies, and courts – all influenced by 
WTO norms – interact in determining their national or regional policy towards the WTO. Furthermore, the 
reputational costs that defecting actors incur within international society and on global markets depend, aside for 
legitimacy, on the international political and economic system. Chapter 6 on compliance elaborates on these 
institutional factors. 
207 See Hay and Rosamond (2002). 
208 Goldstein (1989) gives an excellent example for the social construction of knowledge and the influence of 
knowledge on interest formulation. She shows how the discourse of U.S. economists and politicians in the 1930s 
can explain the diverging policy stances of the U.S. on agriculture and manufactures. Neither international 
structure, nor domestic interests, nor functional necessity can explain the different sectoral policies. Instead, 
expert advice which differed for policies on agriculture and manufactures was decisive for the choice of 
diverging policies. When the theoretical void between desirable export expansion and domestic market access 
was recognized, the U.S. followed strong recommendations by economists and, in 1934, undertook a radical 
policy shift towards liberalization of manufactured goods. On the contrary, economists’ short-term 
recommendations for agriculture, a sector in which the U.S. was running a deficit, were mixed. Political 
discourse favored protectionism in agriculture, and by the time economists clearly recommended agricultural 
liberalization, protectionist policies were already entrenched and institutionalized. 
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occurs within the international society of states. Wendt (1999, 372) argues that “ideas held by 
individual states are given content or meaning by the ideas which they share with other states – that 
state cognition depends on states’ systemic culture.” 
4.1.3   Relative versus absolute gains 
How utilitarian actors perceive the gains of cooperation affects whether actors consider policy 
proposals sufficiently beneficial to agree to them and whether they consider agreements sufficiently 
beneficial to comply with them. Consequently, the perspective on gains matters for the effectiveness 
of global governance. I look at two aspects of the perspectives which actors adopt towards the gains 
from cooperation. In the next section, I deal with collective identity which delineates actors’ definition 
of Self; in this section, I discuss actors’ consideration of relative versus absolute gains. Either actors 
assess their own gains in absolute terms, independently of other actors’ gains from cooperation, or 
they adopt a positional stance and compare their (relative) gains to those that accrue to other actors. I 
reason about the respective significance of relative versus absolute gains in neo-realist and social 
identity theory, which both claim predominance of relative gains. 
Neo-realists perceive states as dominant actors in world affairs and as rational unitary entities. 
According to neo-realists, actors’ behavior is dictated by the security dilemma in which actors are 
trapped at the international level. Under anarchy, states have to constantly worry about being attacked 
by other states. The current motives of other actors can be misinterpreted and other actors can 
strategically misrepresent their true intentions. Thus, actors can never be certain that seemingly 
peaceful actors do not harbor expansionist ambitions. Even more uncertain are future preferences 
which can change with domestic political processes. Though actors can influence the interests and 
identities of other actors through international interactions, domestic political processes predominate. 
Actors cannot be sure then that a security seeking state will not turn aggressive. Since relying on 
seemingly good intentions and domestic stability of other states could prove fatal, states are unwilling 
to take this risk. Instead, even non-aggressive states are compelled to care about their relative power 
positions in order to deter or fight aggressors. To the extent that gains from cooperation can be 
translated into military capabilities, actors are, therefore, concerned about relative gains.209 
This neo-realist core proposition about the security dilemma under anarchy and the corresponding 
importance of relative gains needs modification on several accounts. Within a neo-realist framework, 
military technology, like nuclear weapons and a reconnaissance revolution, makes surprise attacks less 
threatening.210 In addition, the value of conquered territory has fallen with current modes of production 
and destruction, while the costs of occupation have risen due to national consciousness.211 Finally, 
relative-gains problems appear to be of minor relevance empirically in the economic issue area and 
even more so in other issue areas, such as environmental protection, where it is hard to transform gains 
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into military capabilities.212  
Wendt (1999) provides a constructivist critique of the security dilemma. He claims that different 
international cultures under anarchy are possible. Conflict is not an inherent feature of anarchy but the 
product of a certain culture among different, viable cultures of anarchy. Wendt distinguishes among 
three ideal types of anarchy. In a Hobbesian culture, actors resolve conflicts by force without restraint. 
In a Lockean culture, actors resort to violence in their conflicts but abstain from eliminating defeated 
opponents. Finally, actors ban in a Kantian culture violent conflict resolution. Importantly, even those 
actors who do not share the norms of a given international culture have rational incentives to conform 
to those norms, in order to avoid sanctions. Therefore, the system will remain peaceful, even if the 
motives of a limited number of actors are aggressive or turn aggressive in the future.  
The liberal perspective, focused on the domestic level, suggests that the spread of democracy will 
make the international system more peaceful. Adjacent theories hold that the expansion of capitalism 
and the continuance at global economic integration also promote peace.213 
Moreover, Fearon (1998) shows that relative gains only pose a cooperation problem if actors cannot 
credibly refrain from abusing relative gains against cooperation partners. In addition, the relative gains 
problem presupposes a bargaining problem that prevents acceptable sharing. The better the structures 
of global governance are able to cope with bargaining and enforcement problems, the less relevant the 
relative-gains problem becomes. 
These arguments ease, but do not completely remove, the risk that follows from less favorable power 
positions stemming from participation in global governance. Yet, actors appear willing to accept a 
minor risk and to tolerate relative losses in exchange for absolute gains. 
Social identity theory offers a second argument for the significance of relative gains. Groups 
surprisingly display competitive behavior in situations where no threat to security looms. This finding 
applies even to ‘minimal groups.’ These are groups whose members share nothing systematically in 
common, apart from membership in the group. Hence, the group shares no culture that could give 
meaning to membership and demand competitive behavior towards other groups. Social identity 
theory explains such inherent group competitiveness in social psychological terms. Actors are seen to 
seek positive self-identity, which benefits from favorable comparison of the own group with other 
groups. This suggests that actors, who are more densely socialized than minimal groups, behave at 
least as competitively.214  
Empirical studies on the significance of relative versus absolute gains are scarce and contradictory.215 
The behavior of individuals and groups is mostly studied in experiments as inferences from field 
observations on the perspectives on gains are difficult. What has been revealed is that actors apply 
complex combinations of absolute and relative gain considerations, contingent on situational factors. 
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Cross-cultural variation exists, albeit to a limited degree.216  
The theoretical debate on relative versus absolute gains, as well as the empirical findings, suggests two 
conclusions. First, actors pursue relative and absolute gains. Their respective weights depend on many 
circumstances; in the WTO, relative gains are at least not the domineering concern. Secondly, the 
importance that actors assign to relative and absolute gains is partly a question of culture. Actors can 
be conditioned by culture to focus on absolute gains, and a prevalent culture of cooperation increases 
the weight rational actors give to absolute gains. International interaction can, thus, change how actors 
evaluate gains, and there is reason to expect that cooperative, deliberative interaction shifts the focus 
towards absolute gains.  
4.1.4   Collective identity 
Collective identity exists if an actor identifies herself with another actor so that the distinction between 
Self and Other partly or entirely blurs.217 The most important effect of collective identity formation is 
the change of the perspective on gains among those actors sharing a collective identity. Actors include 
the gains that accrue to those actors with whom they share a collective identity, as if they accrued to 
them individually.218 Attitudes towards actors outside the collective identity are not necessarily 
affected; accordingly, actors sharing a collective identity may behave competitively towards outsiders 
and maximize relative gains. A second effect of collective identity is its transformation of perceptions 
and expectations concerning the behavior of other actors. Actors who share a collective identity hold 
more optimistic views of one another and of the opportunities for cooperation.219 
Collective identity formation is seen as a gradual process requiring diffuse reciprocity and mutual 
understanding. Actors led by a sense of diffuse reciprocity do not expect equal rewards at every 
bargain and do not renege at every possibility. Instead, they rely on the stability and overall 
distributional fairness of cooperation. They are convinced that the long-term benefits of generous and 
frank cooperative behavior outweigh the short-term gains from bickering, deceiving, and cheating.220 
The sense of diffuse reciprocity is stimulated if collective results can only be attained when the 
interests of the others are heeded, as if they were part of one’s own interests. In such cases, diffuse 
reciprocity enables more beneficial cooperation and, thus, is rational from a long-term perspective.221 
Therefore, rational, long-term oriented cooperative behavior tends to, with the passage of time, receive 
backing by norms calling for diffuse reciprocity and mutual responsiveness. By and by, the rational 
motives underlying diffuse reciprocity fade in favor of a genuine sense of reciprocal commitment.  
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To see how the behavior, beliefs, and norms associated with diffuse reciprocity are a stepping stone 
towards collective identity formation, let us look at two actors, Ego and Alter. If Ego assists Alter only 
if she expects a direct reward, Ego’s assistance will not affect her definition of Self. Yet, if Ego assists 
Alter because she believes in the long-term value of their cooperative endeavor and feels a sense of 
commitment to stick to her partner, and if all this becomes a habit rather than a conscious 
consideration at each instance, then collective identity can arise. This process is likely to be reinforced 
by corresponding role casting from Alter’s side. Responding to Ego’s friendly behavior, Alter comes 
to treat Ego as if Ego shared a collective identity with Alter. This inclines Ego to actually adopt this 
role and, eventually, the corresponding collective identity.222 
Mutual understanding is beneficial to the emergence of diffuse reciprocity. Actors need knowledge 
about other actors, in order to understand each other’s behavior. Only then are role casting and role 
taking likely to develop into collective identity. Otherwise, this process boils down to “ethnocentric 
projection”.223 Moreover, mutual understanding enables actors to discern strategic pretenses from 
domestic obstacles to cooperation, which actors adduce to justify the need for consideration. With 
sufficient mutual understanding, actors can accept justified, temporary, asymmetric distributions of 
benefits and maintain a sense of control.  
Interaction at the international level is the place where role casting and role taking occurs, where 
diffuse reciprocity can evolve, and where mutual understanding is fostered. Deliberation as a mode of 
discourse aims at fairness based on generalized principles. As Ruggie (1992) notes, this promotes 
diffuse reciprocity. Druckman (2001, 283) also considers deliberation to induce collective identity 
formation, “Intense problem-solving activities may lead to a sharing of identities as the parties 
progress through stages of awareness, acceptance, identification of similarities (and differences), and 
shared identity.”  
Furthermore, judicial delegation and legal discourse have a distinctive influence on collective identity 
formation. Since we will see that actors face growing difficulties in discerning between justified and 
unjustified accounts for defections, judicial delegation furthers mutual understanding by empowering 
courts to verify motives behind defections. Concerning legal discourse, Verweij and Josling (2003, 10) 
suggest, “The continuous attempts to justify one’s position, and convince others thereof, also 
encourages mutual understanding.” Therefore, deliberating in general, which strives for mutual 
understanding, and legal discourse in particular, which requires justification, contribute to collective 
identity formation. 
4.2 Deliberating 
So far, I have presented actors’ ideational properties, I have shown which role they play in decision-
making, and I have argued that their formation partly depends on interaction on the international level. 
Now I look at deliberating as a particular mode of communicative interaction. According to Verweij 
and Josling (2003, 10), we can understand “deliberation as decision-making based on a search for 
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consensus among all those who have a distinct opinion on the issue at hand, rather than by using 
force, voting, or bargaining.” 
When deliberating, actors challenge the ‘validity claims’ involved in communication. They do not take 
and accept their identities from social structure, but actively and consciously construct their 
identities.224 Through recurrent deliberating, actors instead establish social structure in a “process by 
which agent action becomes social structure, ideas become norms, and the subjective becomes the 
intersubjective.”225 
Deliberating implies that both sides are willing to change their attitudes. Alternatively, one party may 
attempt to consciously alter ideational properties of another party without changing its own ideas.226 If 
actors engage in communication with strategic motives, they can all nevertheless learn and advance to 
genuine deliberating.  
In the following, I first show that substantial deliberating and learning arise on the international level, 
and then I ask how trends and structures affect deliberating. Afterwards, I look at the link between 
negotiators, who are primarily involved in negotiations and, correspondingly, learn most, and 
governments, who set negotiating mandates and control negotiating outcomes. 
In explaining the prevalence of deliberating and learning, I ignore interaction effects. These interaction 
effects can occur between different ideational properties. For instance, knowledge or worldviews 
affect the legitimacy of norms and institutions.227 Interaction effects can also arise between ideational 
properties and learning processes which concern other ideational properties. For instance, legitimacy 
on its part influences learning.228 In their desire to conform to the surrounding group, actors are 
inclined to adopt widely-held ideational properties. The more legitimate the WTO is, the more willing 
actors are to adopt ideas which are widely promoted in the WTO. In particular, actors are more open to 
persuasion if they perceive the process of interaction as legitimate.229 Furthermore, collective identity 
makes deliberating and learning more likely. Egeberg (1999, 471) points at the difference collective 
identity can make for learning, “A considerable degree of collective responsibility may be reflected in 
the overall willingness of participants to move and reformulate their positions during and subsequent 
to meetings.” I do not trace these interdependencies but assume that deliberating fosters learning in all 
ideational properties in a mutually reinforcing process. 
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4.2.1   Deliberating and learning on the international level 
Despite all mutual reinforcement, learning on the international level faces limitations. Generally, 
ideational properties are resilient to change. According to Lepgold and Lamborn (2001, 19), this 
stability arises as “cognitive and affective processes usually work to keep people’s beliefs and 
expectations stable … Because actors rarely realize their biases in noticing and interpreting 
information, their beliefs tend to grow stronger over time as new evidence seems only to confirm 
them.”  
If ideational properties change at all, then this is more likely caused by domestic level factors than 
through international processes. Individual agents receive stronger incentives from the domestic level 
and socialization is thicker at the domestic level. Therefore, priors that stem from domestic 
socialization limit learning at the international level.230 
Learning is particularly difficult if actors do no share basic ideas. Basic ideas channel communication 
by connecting certain ideas and making them more or less appealing. Additionally, basic ideas provide 
standards for assessing statements and establishing intersubjective meaning.231 On the international 
level, actors have only a limited supply of basic ideas in common, upon which they can build more 
sophisticated or tailored shared understanding. 
Nevertheless, empirical research indicates considerable learning processes at the international level. 
Sjöstedt (1994) reports learning among actors of the Uruguay Round, especially in the early 
negotiating stages when actors attempt to develop a common understanding to make issues 
‘negotiable.’ In later stages, when informal drafts were consolidated into official documents, conflict-
prone bargaining gained the upper hand. Ford (2002) finds that developing countries changed their 
role fundamentally during the Uruguay Round. They moved from a protectionist role in opposition to 
developed countries towards the role of liberalizers. Based on this new mindset, they pressured 
developed countries to open markets based on liberal norms, and they criticized TRIPs, environmental 
and social standards, as well as immigration restrictions, for inhibiting trade.  
Despite accounts that relate numerous instances of learning in the WTO, the importance of learning 
must not be overestimated. While providing a major example for learning, interpretation of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations demonstrates the difficulties in proving that learning matters. Ideational 
accounts always compete with explanations based on material incentives. In the case of the Uruguay 
Round, the debt crisis, looming American protectionism, or new trade patterns may have changed 
developing countries incentives.232 Furthermore, some negotiations are clearly not deliberative, even in 
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small settings and in early stages of negotiations removed from final treaty-making. For instance, 
Shaffer (2001, 35) finds “mercantilist” bargaining dominant in the negotiations of the WTO 
Committee on Trade and Environment.  
Studies from other international institutions support the relevance of learning triggered by interaction 
at the international level. These studies stress the importance of civil society involvement for learning, 
as opponents and partners of actors.233 Extensive research that has been conducted on learning in the 
context of the EU also indicates considerable learning. According to Egeberg (1999, 467), forty-five 
percent out of forty-seven officials in EU Commission committees on the road and rail sector state that 
positions are often “modified or altered during, or subsequent to, meetings”. Checkel (2003) reports 
committee deliberation about even highly divisive issues and despite apparent tensions. In the course 
of EU biotechnology regulation, Skogstad (2002) observes learning through deliberation in informal 
networks comprised of representatives from civil society, companies, governments, and the EU, 
despite massive divergence of their initial objectives. Eriksen and Fossum (2000b, 258) see integration 
through deliberation even as a marked feature of the present-day EU, which is “less the manifestation 
of a particular conception of governance and more of a meeting ground in which different conceptions 
of democracy and justice are discussed and assessed.” Nevertheless, deliberation is limited even in the 
relatively dense European society. Pollack (2003), for instance, finds few deliberations even in those 
committees where deliberation should be expected most.  
Taking this evidence from the WTO, other international institutions, and the EU together, we receive a 
mixed picture. Deliberating and learning at the international level is less pronounced than in domestic 
societies; yet, significant deliberating and learning does occur. Furthermore, the degree of deliberating 
and learning varies according to factors that correspond to the trends and structures identified in this 
study. 
4.2.2   Effects of trends on learning 
The effects which the trends exert on learning are ambivalent. The increasing heterogeneity of 
knowledge and cognitive complexity of issues inhibit learning; the broader the differences in 
perceptions and causal beliefs and the more difficult it is to bring them more into line, the less 
common ground exists to endeavor reconciling diverging values and norms.234 Growing normativity 
and increasing heterogeneity of values and norms make learning more difficult as progress is stalled 
by broad disagreements.235 As policy proposals for deep and linked global governance have to be 
internally consistent in order to be efficient, gradual convergence, which is relatively easy to accept for 
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actors, becomes less feasible.236 Finally, increasing transparency impedes learning as individuals are 
more ready to change beliefs in settings that are protected from public scrutiny.237 
Other trends further deliberative learning. Civil society is active in framing deliberations and changing 
ideational properties of actors.238 Especially civil society’s universal perspective, expertise, and value-
synthesizing capacities are deemed conducive to intercultural learning. Brown et al. (2000, 20) 
conclude that, “The construction of shared international values and norms is central to the creation of a 
global culture, and international NGOs can be important catalysts for constructing parameters that 
shape meaning and interpretations in the shrinking world.” 
Furthermore, uncertainty about distributional and efficiency properties of policy proposals makes 
actors more willing to engage in deliberating.239 Actors also involve experts more readily in complex 
negotiations where uncertainty is high.240 This promotes further deliberation as experts tend towards 
this mode of interaction.241  
4.2.3   Effects of structure on deliberating 
Research about the role of ideas in international politics focuses on demonstrating that ideas affect 
outcomes and on explaining how ideas can acquire causal significance. A second research topic asks 
how social processes, such as deliberating, change ideas. However, deliberation does not take place in 
an institutional vacuum, but hinges on the structural background within which deliberative processes 
unfold.242 This relationship between structures and learning processes has been less thoroughly 
researched.243 Nevertheless, we can make three cases on how global governance structures impact 
deliberation. The number of actors involved in negotiations and the decision-making design governing 
those negotiations directly affect deliberating. Furthermore, legal discourse in dispute settlement, 
which is influenced by judicial delegation and precision, supports deliberations.  
 Number of actors 
Deliberation is more likely to occur with few actors involved. A face-to-face discussion is personally 
more involving than a series of statements made to a large audience. With many actors, a large share 
of communication is redundant and frequently devoted to protocol and ceremony, and the 
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manageability of conferences may become intractable.244 Furthermore, if fewer persons are involved, 
personal relationships tend to be more lasting and in-depth, allowing friendships to develop, 
reputations of impartiality and expertise to strengthen, and trust to grow.245  
In addition to deliberating, the mechanism of role taking and role casting, as a further process of 
learning, works more powerfully with small numbers. I have argued that if society casts an actor in a 
certain role – for instance, as if she was genuinely complying with norms or as if she was furthering 
the common interest – she is induced to adopt that role. For large numbers, actors are likely to receive 
weaker and more contradictory signals that cast them into certain roles. Their role taking efforts may 
go unnoticed by a share of international society. As social interaction becomes less dense, actors’ roles 
become less important and less pronounced and international society becomes more anonymous. 
A likely disadvantage accompanying regionalization and smaller numbers of actors is that a greater 
share of actors is likely to have a stake in each dispute over existing agreements or disputed aspects of 
agreement-creating negotiations. Actors who are unaffected or have only a minor interest in a debate 
form an impartial audience that can sort out the legitimacy of competing normative claims and that is 
more open to persuasion.246 Comparing this disadvantage with the positive effects of enhanced 
communication and role casting, smaller numbers of actors appear to contribute to deliberating. 
 Decision-making design 
Deliberating can be a distressing process. Kohler-Koch and Edler (1998), for instance, trace how 
norms, interests, and causal beliefs changed in the course of European negotiations aimed at the 
establishment of a joint research and development policy. Governmental research and development 
policy were traditionally imbued with an egoistic and competitive mentality that inhibited effective 
cooperation. Reframing the issue of research and development policy and reaching consensus on an 
innovative agreement necessitated a time-consuming, laborious, deliberative process.  
Consensus voting forces actors to take on these efforts if they want to come to an agreement, whereas 
majority voting makes decision-making after briefer discussion possible. Though actors still have an 
incentive to reach a consensus, they do not need to convince everybody. Hence, the spirit of 
interaction is likely to be less deliberative under majority voting. 
4.2.4   Legal discourse 
Deliberation within the heterogeneous international society is naturally a form of intercultural 
discourse. My first task, thus, is to show that legal discourse provides an effective language for 
intercultural discourse. I then propose that legal discourse entails certain characteristics that dispose it 
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towards deliberation. In a third step, I reason which global governance structures favor legal discourse. 
At last, I point out that the practice and effects of deliberating in disputes about existing agreements 
spill over into agreement-creating negotiations. 
 Law as language appropriate for intercultural communication 
Whether law is appropriate for intercultural discourse can be assessed based on its communicative 
performance, as well as from a critical perspective. Considering its communicative function, law 
stands out as the only globally valid language for negotiating international agreements, based on a rich 
set of rules and principles that can readily serve as common framework.247 The definition of discourse 
as “systematic statements linked to social practices,”248 points to a further strength of law in 
facilitating intercultural discourse. Legal discourse is particularly clearly and closely associated with a 
set of stable and well-defined practices. If an actor claims to have a right, she has to engage in a well-
delineated practice of claiming this right at court. This sets law apart from indirect, subtle, even tacit 
forms of communication, as well as from high-rising, idealistic rhetoric that is not anchored in social 
reality. 
The critical perspective lays stress on the crucial lesson from history that discursive structures must 
“eschew ethnocentrism and overcome cultural barriers, combining diverse, participating entities into a 
single, unified whole.”249  Kennedy (1997, 568) appraises international law as “universal, in the sense 
that it has no particular culture of its own and can remain agnostic as between cultures.” Yet, the 
appropriateness of legal discourse as polycultural language is subject to debate.  
Against the criticism that international law is imbued with Western culture, I bring forward three 
arguments, claiming that the basic structure of law is shaped rather by efficiency needs than by any 
particular culture, that whatever cultural imprint exists in international law is benign, and that law is 
indeterminate, stimulating increasingly universalist evolution of its specificities.  
First, the procedures, principles, and discourses of international law are tailored more to efficiency 
needs than to the interests of powerful actors.250 Though the efficiency of law, as of all institutions, 
depends on the cultural context, this still suggests that efficiency properties have considerable weight 
also in comparison with cultural forces. 
Secondly, while legalization is not entirely independent of and indifferent towards particular cultures, 
Kennedy (1997) and Koskenniemi (1990) rightly note that this cultural heritage is bound to 
universalist, instead of particularistic ambitions. In other words, the European foot-print in 
international law is that of cosmopolitan Enlightenment and not that of ethnocentric nationalism.  
From a dynamic perspective, the specificities of international law are, thirdly, a product of continuous 
evolution within the legal framework. Since this evolution is shaped by legal discourse disposed 
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towards deliberating, the evolution of international law is directed by the better argument.251 This 
makes legal discourse unsuspicious for criticism of rigid, power-based, cultural imposition.  
More problematic than the particular specification of law are the tensions that arise from law 
inherently as mode of interaction. For instance, law as a candid and confrontational language may 
conflict with cultures that practice consensus-oriented communication and shun open controversy and 
loss of face.252 Additionally, law as a generalized, principled language may contradict cultures that 
emphasize in-group ties, such as family and clan loyalty. The spread of the rule of law as a domestic 
governance device, as well as cultural changes in traditional societies furthered by globalization, 
appear to weaken cultural inclinations opposed to legalization of global governance.  
All in all, I do not consent to Bull (1977, 142), who concludes, “That modern international society 
includes international law as one of its institutions is a consequence of the historical accident that it 
evolved out of a previous unitary system, Western Christendom, and that in this system notions of law 
– embodied in Roman law, divine law, canon law and natural law – were pre-eminent.” Nor do I agree 
with Bull’s notion that “moral rules or supernatural rules” could equally well be the cornerstone for 
providing international order. Rather, I consent to Koskenniemi (1990, 4) who believes that in our 
world of sovereign nation states “the Rule of Law seems indeed the sole thinkable principle of 
organization – short of a bellum omnium.” Legal discourse is an appropriate approach for intercultural 
discourse in global governance – not without its disadvantages, but with the potential to grow into an 
ever more polycultural, universal language. 
 Law as language disposed towards deliberating 
Based on their review of legal scholarship about international relations, Slaughter, Tulumello and 
Wood (1998, 381) conclude that “the processes of persuasion and justification on the basis of norms 
play a constitutive role in the formation of actors’ identities and interests and in the structure of the 
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international system itself. On a deeper level, this approach rejects a simple law/power dichotomy, 
arguing instead that legal rules and norms operate by changing interests and thus reshaping the 
purposes for which power is exercised.”  
How legalization achieves these ideational changes can be explained by three broad characteristics that 
dispose legal discourse towards deliberating.253 First, legal discourse stimulates rhetorical competition 
in disputes. Secondly, legal discourse warrants fairness, participation, and stability in discursive 
relations as a background condition for turning rhetorical competition into deliberation. Thirdly, the 
move towards deliberation is further promoted by the specific ground rules of legal discourse. Abbott 
and Snidal (2000, 429) elaborate the specificities of legal discourse, ”Legalization entails a specific 
form of discourse, requiring justification and persuasion in terms of applicable rules and pertinent 
facts, and emphasizing factors such as text, precedents, analogies, and practice. Legal discourse 
largely disqualifies arguments based solely on interests and preferences.” Neyer (2002, 14) 
emphasizes the normative criteria and normative hierarchy legalization provides, “Legalisation is a 
necessary instrument to structure the discourse and to provide normative criteria against which 
preferences can be assessed.”, and deliberation “necessitates from governments and societies alike to 
accept that their preferences are not intrinsically legitimate – even if they are the products of domestic 
democratic procedures. Deliberation relies on a well-established normative hierarchy. Although 
deliberation is unlikely to happen under conditions of material hierarchy, which is when an actor 
commands the resources to act as benevolent or coercive hegemon, a legal or normative hierarchy is a 
necessary condition.” Fisher et al. (1997) also appraise the benefits of principled solutions based on 
impartial criteria. 
In summary, legal discourse prescribes that actors have to compete, that they have to compete under 
fair and stable general conditions, and that they have to observe particular rules of rhetorical 
competition.  
When we perceive the essence of legal discourse in these competitive terms, we notice tensions 
between legal discourse and collective truth searching, which is an undertaking that requires good-will 
and trust. Legal discourse is part of a broader legal culture. As Weiler (2001, 339) observes, 
“Juridification is a package deal. It includes the rule of law and the rule of lawyers. It does not affect 
only the power relations between members, the compliance pull of the agreements, the ability to settle 
disputes definitively, and the prospect of authoritative interpretations of opaque provisions. It imports 
the norms, practices, and habits … of legal culture.” Weiler directs attention to the adversarial nature 
of this legal culture. Lawyers become more central and push towards litigation. Once a panel has been 
established, the chances for compromise dwindle as actors want to fight it out. A case is no longer 
settled, but won or lost. The result can be rulings that create tensions instead of compromises.  
Whether legalized dispute settlement renders interaction more or less conflict-prone depends largely 
on the diplomatic culture it replaces. Legal culture has relatively clear implications compared with 
diplomatic culture, which varies more broadly. If diplomatic culture means hard-nosed, power-based 
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bargaining, legalization is clearly an improvement. On the other hand, diplomatic culture can be 
inspired by a sense of common fate and a shared vision. In this case, legal culture that tolerates the 
exploitation of law for individual advantage leads to inferior results.  
The claim that legal discourse generally improves learning can be based on three arguments. First, the 
adversarial aspects of legal discourse must not be overrated. Actors have an interest in long-term 
socialization of other actors to reduce norm conflict and strengthen the legitimacy of global 
governance.254 Even if actors are initially not inclined to learn and engage in purely rhetorical action, 
discourses may evolve into genuine reasoning.255 Secondly, experience shows that diplomatic culture 
in global governance is rather conflict-prone when it comes to important and disputed matters. When 
we look at legal discourse, we automatically witness disputed cases, and the whole conflict is revealed 
openly. Amicable impressions of diplomatic culture are often invoked by conciliatory speeches on 
consensual issues, whereas conflicts are fought out behind closed doors. Thirdly, if a serious interest in 
collective well-being dominates, diplomatic culture may be better equipped to fully exploit this lucky 
condition. But legal discourse does not need to be a strait jacket that binds actors to legal form and 
culture if they agree to settle a conflict diplomatically.  
 Effects of structure on legal discourse 
The main prerequisite for legal discourse is judicial delegation. Courts offer the stage for legal 
discourse where they instigate rhetorical competition by rewarding the better argument, and they 
administer and refine the rules of rhetorical engagement. Furthermore, precise agreements offer more 
and clearer rules upon which actors can base their legal claims, while they leave less space for power-
based dispute settlement. Finally, those structures that weaken the power of threats and achieve strong 
enforcement capacity support legal discourse. By leveling the playing field, they firstly create a less 
hierarchical negotiating situation conducive to deliberation. By impeding power-based bargaining, 
they secondly make deliberation as alternative negotiating approach more attractive. Thirdly, if 
external pressure forces resistant actors to submit to legal discourse, even reluctant participation can 
engender learning.256 
 Spill-over effects of legal discourse into negotiations 
Actors negotiate when creating new agreements and they negotiate if disputes over existing 
agreements occur. Dispute-related negotiations not only shape the meaning of agreements but also set 
directions for future agreement-creating bargaining. If an actor changes the opinion of another actor 
who holds opposing ideas in the process of a legal dispute, the learning will then carry over to 
multilateral negotiations and may influence additional actors beyond the parties to the initial dispute. 
Moreover, learning may occur after a ruling has been implemented if the defeated party realizes that 
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its concerns had been exaggerated. Rulings can force actors to make experiences with policies they 
resent to; rulings provide a rationale for adopting disliked policies and they pave the way for changing 
one’s point of view without loss of face because acceptance of court rulings can be better justified at 
home than defeat by other actors in negotiations.  
This means that learning that arises in dispute settlement is valuable for existing agreements and for 
the creation of new agreements. In addition, deliberating as a mode of interaction itself may spill-over 
to agreement-creating negotiations. Deliberating is not what actors expect and it is a demanding form 
of communication for which people are not prepared. Fisher et al. (1997, Ch. 10) consider this as the 
main reason why deliberating as a superior form of conflict resolution is not more wide-spread. Actors 
who have practiced legal reasoning may be better able to deliberate in negotiations. That legal 
discourse can assist in training people for the art of deliberating is pointedly reflected in the following 
advice Fisher et al. (1997, 139) give to negotiators, “See negotiations as a joint search for a principled 
solution (as with two judges seeking a basis for a joint decision).”  
A second reason to expect that legal discourse carries over to general negotiations is that actors, 
domestic audiences, and civil society come to expect deliberating. The more deliberation is practiced, 
the more despised power-based bargaining and unwillingness to learn becomes.  
Thirdly, actors anticipate that a current agreement will later be the basis of legal disputes. The 
anticipation of legal disputes provides incentives for actors to develop agreements in deliberations. 
Incoherent agreements that clearly reflect power-based bargaining undermine the legitimacy of courts 
that have to apply such agreements. Recurrent, reasoned application of such agreements also reflects 
badly on those actors whose arm-twisting lead to awkward rules.257 Thus, actors have a systemic and a 
reputational interest in deliberating. 
Hence, learning as the result of legal discourse and deliberating as negotiating style stimulated by legal 
discourse carry over to agreement-creating negotiations. In addition, legal discourse entices actors to 
develop their negotiating positions in a way that reduces actors’ ideational heterogeneity. Since courts 
expect actors to base justifications of their behavior on scientific knowledge, actors have to take 
scientific evidence into account – either in order to defend themselves in front of the court or in order 
to avoid litigation proactively. If actors work with this evidence and engage scientists to formulate 
their policies, then they are likely to adopt a share of the perceptions and causal beliefs espoused by 
the international scientific community. 
4.2.5   Negotiators and governments 
We have seen that the structure of negotiation and enforcement processes can elicit deliberating and 
learning. Small numbers of actors and consensual decision-making design promote deliberating in 
(agreement-creating) negotiations. Legal discourse engenders deliberation in dispute settlement, which 
spills over into (agreement-creating) negotiations. So far, the argument has implicitly attributed 
learning only to negotiators as those persons directly involved in global governance processes. What 
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remains to be demonstrated is that it makes a difference for the effectiveness of global governance 
when negotiators learn.  
The importance of negotiators rests on two factors. They enjoy a degree of discretion within their 
negotiating mandate and they influence the mandate they receive. Governments grant discretion to 
negotiators mostly for efficiency purposes. To understand negotiators’ influence in shaping their 
mandate, we have to recall that deliberating is particularly likely to occur and to succeed in situations 
where identities and interests are not yet strongly established.258 In international negotiations, this is 
frequently the case because heterogeneous interests have to be aggregated into a national position with 
a long-term perspective. Since day-to-day, foreign politics contribute little to defining national 
positions, international negotiations serve as instances for interest formation.259 Negotiators with their 
expert knowledge about the international sphere can affect how the national interest is defined and 
how their negotiating instructions are formulated ahead of negotiations.260  
Since negotiators prefer playing a constructive role in negotiations for social and professional reasons, 
they are motivated to change the ideational properties of governments towards cooperation in 
negotiations and towards compliance with agreements.261 Sharing more collective identity and more 
commitment in reaching agreements than national political leaders, negotiators at times even cooperate 
in order to produce more cooperative mandates.262 Occasionally, negotiators also overstrain their 
mandate with the hope that their governments will not overturn their unauthorized commitments.263 
Given the important role negotiators assume, diminishing discretion for negotiators and their 
decreasing ability to influence their negotiating mandates constitute a trend that hinders learning. 
Keohane and Nye (2001, 5) see the “club model of multilateral cooperation” coming to an end, which 
isolated the trade ministry from involvement by other ministries and the general public and immunized 
agreements from disaggregation. Esty (2002, 12) consents that “the closed-door style of negotiations 
that lies at the heart of the Club Model is no longer workable.” 
Similarly, Petersmann (2001, 27) notices that the “special ‘fast-track legislation’ facilitating reciprocal 
tariff liberalization agreements in GATT and their speedy incorporation into national implementing 
legislation” are not suited to new deep-integration issues. The first reason he gives is that the welfare 
and legitimacy enhancing function of GATT to restrain policy makers in pursuing special interests 
becomes less salient with deep integration. The second reason is that the parliamentary ratification of 
increasingly comprehensive and intrusive agreements, proceeding under time pressure and without 
real choice, develops into a “democratic nightmare”. Furthermore, we have seen in Chapter 3 how 
increasing relative effectiveness, scope, and depth of global governance spur civil society involvement 
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and politicize the formulation of negotiating mandates. Increasing scope and linkages require 
coordination between ministries producing rigid compromises. With less need for negotiators’ 
discretion and increasing political problems in granting negotiators discretion or letting them strongly 
influence their mandates, governments and domestic society will assume tighter control of actors’ 
behavior on the international stage.264 
4.3 Legitimacy 
In the last section, I have analyzed how one factor, deliberating, influences all ideational properties. In 
this section, I focus on one ideational property, norms, and explain how diverse factors impact their 
legitimacy, defined as the feeling of obligation which a rule or international institution can invoke 
through the logic of appropriateness. I consider whether rules are created and administered under 
legitimate processes, whether rules produce valuable and reversible results contributing to their output 
legitimacy, whether rules resonate with other norms, whether conforming to rules furthers self-esteem 
and social esteem, and whether rules are determinate so that they clearly prescribe appropriate 
behavior and bar unjustified accounts of violations. These factors influence the legitimacy of single 
rules, as well as the legitimacy of the WTO at whole. Additional discussion in Chapter 5 about 
bargaining appends factors that specifically influence the legitimacy of the judiciary. 
4.3.1   Process legitimacy in the creation of agreements 
Process (or input) legitimacy conveys the idea of governance by the people, leading to policies that 
adequately reflect the preferences of the people.265 Rule addressees concede legitimacy to a rule or 
institution if they “believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance 
with generally accepted principles of right process.”266 These principles and standards of democratic 
processes are increasingly applied to international institutions as a test of their legitimacy.267  
Traditionally, theories of democracy can be most broadly discerned into a liberal and a republican 
category. Liberal democratic theory separates society from state. Individuals elect representatives who 
pass decisions by majority. Republican democratic theory aspires to converge society and state, so that 
individuals can directly participate in forming a collective will based on their shared culture and 
community.268   
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To achieve and assess democratic legitimacy of governance beyond the nation state, traditional nation-
based models have to be combined and adapted.269 Size, heterogeneity, and weak collective identity of 
world civilization impede implementation of the republican model. Long chains of representation 
detract from the principle of accountable representation upon which the liberal model rests. Proper 
delineation of the electorate, to warrant that all those affected by decisions have a say, is equally 
problematic. The underdeveloped collective discourse and the weak collective identity further devalue 
the legitimacy of liberal democracy. If an actor has to assume that a democratic decision was informed 
by collective discourse and made with collective welfare in mind, she can be expected to accept the 
decision as legitimate. In an adversarial context, aggregation of non-reflective preferences by majority 
voting confers little legitimacy.  
Therefore, accountable representation has to be accompanied by deliberation. Deliberating creates 
legitimacy because actors participate actively in forming a consensus through a fair process led by the 
most persuasive argument.270 Global governance structures that foster deliberating, thus, enhance 
legitimacy directly; in the long run, they additionally improve those community conditions on which 
the republican model lays stress. 
Moreover, deliberative processes are legitimate because they master the technical difficulties of 
developing coherent law.271 Coherence has been defined by Franck (1990, 144) as requiring “that 
distinctions in the treatment of ‘likes’ be justifiable in principled terms.” Franck (1990, 147) states 
more precisely, “Coherence legitimates a rule, principle, or implementing institution because it 
provides a reasonable connection between a rule, or the application of a rule, to 1) its own principled 
purpose, 2) principles previously employed to solve similar problems, and 3) a lattice of principles in 
use to resolve different problems.” Since rules are to be connected to common principles, Franck 
(1990, 153) understands coherence “to convey an intrinsic, usually logical, relationship not only 
between a rule, its various parts, and its purpose, but also between the particular rule, its underlying 
principle, and the principles underpinning other rules of the society.”  
 Decision-making design 
The current WTO system, in which large numbers of actors with highly uneven capabilities interact, 
weakens legitimacy. We have already seen that smaller numbers of actors involved in negotiations 
contribute to deliberating, which is one factor of process legitimacy. Reducing the number of actors 
can enhance equal representation in further ways.  
First, smaller numbers make consensus decision-making more viable, which enjoys particular 
legitimacy. Secondly, certain approaches for reducing the number of actors distribute power more 
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equally among actors, which also improves process legitimacy. While the WTO formally grants equal 
rights to all members, actors face highly uneven opportunities to influence the course of the WTO. 
Powerful actors use threats to bias outcomes in their favor. In the extreme, powerful actors make 
decisions among themselves and then force them upon weak actors. Since wringing concessions by 
threats weakens legitimacy, the tighter global governance structures restrain the power of threats, the 
more legitimate international institutions become. Furthermore, smaller numbers make the exclusion 
of weak actors less attractive for powerful actors, as will be seen in Chapter 5 about bargaining.  
Thirdly, poor actors lack the resources to fully exploit their rights to participation.272 Global 
governance structures that enhance the relative capabilities of poor actors, thus, receive additional 
legitimacy. Indeed, certain approaches that reduce the number of actors level the playing field with 
regard to resources.  
Therefore, I consider four approaches which prescribe alternative participation modes in decision-
making. These are delegation to experts, common-interest groups, institutionally mandated 
representation, and regionalization. In order to select among these approaches, I assess their legitimacy 
and their practical viability. 
Delegating authority to experts promises increasing efficiency and quality of decision-making while 
lessening the impact of power. Nevertheless, large-scale expert delegation is not an attractive option. 
Delegation to experts lengthens the chain of representation. This implies principal-agent risks, thereby 
weakening legitimacy. Furthermore, doubts have to be cast on the quality of expert decision-making 
for political decisions that involve normative judgments. In an environment that turns more normative 
and political and less willing to accept technocratic decision-making, delegation to experts appears 
especially problematic and remains marginal from an empirical perspective.273 Esty (2002, 10) 
observes that, “Trade is no longer considered to be an obscure policy domain best left to technical 
experts. Instead, trade issues and initiatives are now a major focus of public attention and discussion 
across the world. The trade regime can no longer function on the basis of technocratic rationality and 
quiet accomplishments.“ A preparatory and advisory role for experts within a democratic process 
appears more suited than ample delegation of decision-making authority. 
A special case is judicial delegation. Though judicial delegation is problematic viewed from the 
principle of accountable representation,274 the gains in terms of other criteria of legitimacy and 
effectiveness justify a considerable degree of judicial delegation.  
Group formation resting on common interests was frequent at the large international negotiations of 
the last two decades, like in the Uruguay Round and in the negotiations leading up to the 
Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) regime and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). These groups can be formed solely on the basis of shared interests in one negotiation, or 
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groups can extend over several negotiations. 
Common-interest groups can reduce the problem of large numbers.275 Kahler (1992, 696) concludes 
from UNCLOS negotiations that “through a messy and often ad hoc process of institutional 
innovation, the participants negotiated rules that both satisfied the major powers and won the 
necessary consent of the developing countries.” These institutional innovations include ‘contact 
groups’ for those excluded from negotiations and internally rotating entitlements to participate in 
negotiations. Membership practice in common-interest groups is also benign. Membership is 
voluntary, and entry and exit are generally possible at low-cost. Since members, thus, can influence 
their group position or switch to other groups, common-interest groups represent the preferences of 
their members adequately. 
Yet, practical challenges overtax common-interest groups. Hormats (2001) sees little willingness to 
delegate negotiating authority. He considers the coherence of the Cairns Group as a scarcely replicable 
exception that stemmed from the important common ground in agriculture overriding differences in 
most other accounts. Drahos (2003) and Shaffer (2001) observes growing fragmentation of interests 
among developing countries. In general, Kahler (1992) and Leigh-Phippard (1999) note that internal 
heterogeneity causes problems in developing a common proposal for international negotiations. This 
leads to incoherent proposals and inflexible negotiating mandates. If actors participate in several issue-
specific groups at the same time, each group can focus on a narrow set of issues with overwhelmingly 
shared interests, attenuating the problem of internal heterogeneity. Yet, multiple membership weakens 
the association of actors to groups, disables narrowly focused groups to handle linkages, and increases 
the number of groups. From my perspective, common-interest groups are useful bridging devices for 
the current negotiating system but are too weak institutionally and too unreliable to serve as main 
pillars of a global governance structure. 
Institutionally mandated representation, assigning actors to mandatory groups that have to agree 
internally on proposals and representatives, is used in some international institutions as a device to 
reduce the number of actors involved in their negotiations. The Bretton Woods organizations, for 
instance, organize their constituencies on a roughly geographical basis. 
Like common-interest groups, institutionally mandated groups lack the prerequisites for decision-
making that is at once effective and legitimate if they are heterogeneous. These prerequisites include 
collective identity, established institutions for deliberation, and opportunities for side-payments. Due 
to their rigid membership rules that do not allow members to choose the group they want to participate 
in, institutionally mandated groups are faced with problems of substantive heterogeneity more 
frequently than common-interest groups.276 Therefore, a model based on institutionally mandated 
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American development bank. 
 98
groups is unlikely to work for the WTO, and it has been rejected by developing countries during the 
Uruguay Round and at other occasions.277  
The fourth and last approach is regionalization. Several factors explain superior effectiveness and 
legitimacy of decision-making processes in integrated regions. Formal decision-making procedures are 
in place, supported by communicative practices, deliberative institutions, trust, and crescent collective 
identity.278 Bargains across issues and time, as well as side-payments, are relatively advanced to offset 
distributional asymmetries. Actors are particularly interested in their reputation as the other regional 
members are highly relevant to them and closely scrutinize each other’s behavior.  
Clearly, integrated regions suffer from greater heterogeneity as an initial disadvantage compared to ad 
hoc groups that assemble common interests for each negotiation. Yet, with increasing depth of 
regional integration, intraregional heterogeneity diminishes. Notably, a gradual reduction in material 
and ideational heterogeneity within integrated regions affects all issue areas. This confers an 
advantage to integrated regions over common-interest groups as increasing scope and linkages render 
common-interest groups increasingly heterogeneous themselves. More scope of global governance 
with stronger linkages needs to be negotiated, so that common ground on single issues will be 
insufficient to override the many differences within common-interest groups. Furthermore, increasing 
relative effectiveness, scope, and depth of global governance will make actors even less willing to 
delegate negotiating authority to loose groupings. 
Regionalization is, thus, a way to combine actors into groups that work relatively legitimately, 
effectively, and reliably. Moreover, regionalization bundles resources of several actors. Since poor 
actors benefit more from uniting resources than rich actors, regionalization equalizes capacities. 
A pragmatic counter-argument against regionalization is that integrated regions are overly slow for the 
important process of last-minute consensus finding in international negotiations. However, if certain 
characteristics of integrated regions are problematic for the current international negotiating process, 
then this process will likely be adapted to the new needs of a world of integrated regions. 
 Adherence  
The argument up to this point claims that the process of rule creation can confer legitimacy to rules 
based on its democratic quality, which is measured particularly by equitable representation and 
deliberation in rule making. Regionalization has been shown to be the most viable and advantageous 
approach to promote equitable representation and deliberation by reducing the number of actors. 
As a further determinant of process legitimacy, Franck (1990, 193) adds adherence of rule creation to 
a framework of organized normative hierarchy, “A rule has greater legitimacy if it is validated by 
having been made in accordance with secondary rules about rule-making.”  
                                                     
277 See Hormats (2001) and Raghavan (2000). Unwillingness to delegate authority also makes other models of 
mandated representation unacceptable, e.g. election of temporary representatives as practiced in the UN Security 
Council. 
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weakness of these mechanisms as major impediment to fruitful common-interest group cooperation in the past. 
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Franck continues that these secondary rules rest on the ultimate rule of recognition, which “tells us 
that agreements, once validated, are binding, whether or not states wish to abide by them. These three 
rule categories constitute a validating hierarchy each level of which legitimates the next. The 
legitimacy of the primary rule may be demonstrated by showing that it was entered into in accordance 
with the right process outlined in the secondary rules. The legitimacy of the secondary rules may be 
demonstrated by the specific or implied consent of states. The legitimacy of the ultimate rule of 
recognition, however, cannot be demonstrated by reference to any other validating rules or procedures, 
but only by the conduct of nations manifesting their belief in the ultimate rules’  
validity as the irreducible prerequisites for an international concept of right process.”  
In other words, primary rules of legalized global governance, which impose obligations, are linked to 
higher rules, which rational actors have to accept as precondition for their statehood and for orderly 
conduct within the community of states. If an obligation adhering to the normative hierarchy of a 
community is violated, this positions the violator in opposition to the functioning of the community.279 
Legalized decision-making and extensive judicial delegation engender rule-creation processes that 
promote the adherence of primary rules to the orderly functioning of the community. 
4.3.2   Process legitimacy in the operation of agreements 
Rule application is considered legitimate if rules are applied because of their moral value as individual 
right rather than with regard to their consequences.280 Rule application is also considered legitimate if 
rules are applied coherently.281 Application of law, which aims at maintaining its moral value and 
coherence, equalizes power asymmetries. This further enhances legitimacy.282 Accordingly, applying 
rules coherently and regardless of their consequences is particularly important, yet difficult, for 
legitimacy if powerful actors are concerned. The equalizing effect of legalized dispute resolution 
extends beyond those cases brought to court. In the majority of cases when actors settle disagreements 
in bilateral or minilateral negotiations, the procedural alternative of formal court proceeding influences 
outcomes as well.283 
The operation of agreements becomes more legitimate with legal discourse and particularly with 
judicial independence as courts are more committed to and more experienced in upholding the moral 
values and coherence of law than states that display a more instrumental attitude towards international 
law. Therefore, the more disputes the legal mandate adequately covers and the more automatically 
lawsuits proceed, the more legitimate rule application becomes. If courts are restrained by their 
mandate or if the legal proceeding is blocked by actors, the loss tends to stay where it falls and 
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powerful actors tend to dominate over weak actors.284  
Coherent treatment at court produces coherent results only if enforcement mechanisms are capable of 
binding both weak and powerful actors. If enforcement mechanisms treat actors formally alike but 
impose costs on defectors which powerful actors perceive as small and weak actors as high, then 
powerful and weak actors are not treated equally in the face of law, as only the powerful actor is able 
to break the law. 
4.3.3   Output legitimacy 
Output legitimacy connotes governance for the people that improves collective welfare. With all other 
things equal, legitimacy rises with the effectiveness of global governance.285 Within limits, global 
governance structures, which are highly effective but perform otherwise poorly in terms of legitimacy, 
can still be accepted as legitimate. Importantly, the legitimacy of the WTO is measured not only based 
on its performance in governing trade but also based on its impact on linked objectives.286 
Another aspect that can be subsumed under output legitimacy is reversibility.287 In an international 
institution like the WTO with sluggish decision-making and high exit costs, decisions are difficult to 
reverse. This harms legitimacy as decisions that can be altered at later stages enjoy more legitimacy 
than those decisions that foreclose future options. The better a structure solves the bargaining problem, 
the more flexible institutional decision-making becomes, so that policies can be reversed more easily. 
If global governance policies cannot be changed, the possibility of exemptions, non-compliance, and 
exit enables actors to evade unwanted obligations.288  
4.3.4   Norm resonance 
Process legitimacy bases on the normative quality of the processes by which rules are created and 
administered; output legitimacy bases on the normative quality of the results which the rules produce. 
The following two criteria for legitimacy, norm resonance and esteem, do not carry normative 
significance. Their effects on (perceived) legitimacy rest on human peculiarities; we appreciate what 
fits into our currently held worldview and we want others and ourselves to think well about us. 
Norms resonate if they prescribe identical or mutually supportive actions for a given actor in a given 
situation. Norms conflict if they prescribe incompatible actions or if they prescribe actions that detract 
from the desired effects of other norms. Norms at the international level may resonate or conflict with 
other norms at the domestic and the international level.  
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Resonance with generally shared international norms can increase the legitimacy of a particular norm 
or institution.289 For instance, reference to interpretative norms of general public international law 
enhances the legitimacy of courts. Referring to specific pertinent international law, like reference to 
the Rio Declaration in the Tuna-Dolphin case, strengthens legitimacy as well. Thus, growing linkages 
in global governance have the potential to raise the legitimacy of global governance overall. Yet, norm 
conflicts on the international level weaken the legitimacy of the conflicting norms and of global 
governance in general. 
Resonance with domestic norms increases the legitimacy of international norms even more strongly, 
whereas conflicts with domestic norms often lead to non-compliance.290 The greater the heterogeneity 
of norms between actors is, the more the norm conflicts occur. Deliberation, thus, enhances legitimacy 
as it initiates learning and reduces the heterogeneity of norms within international society. Without 
affecting the heterogeneity of norms, exemptions and weak enforcement provide flexibility to actors, 
easing conflicts between international and domestic norms. 
A further mechanism by which deliberation contributes to legitimacy is by nesting specific rules in 
broader norms. Nesting means that actors deliberatively negotiate rules with a strong reference to 
international norms. This intensifies the relationship to those norms with which a given rule resonates. 
Neyer (2002, 10) observes, “As opposed to policy outcomes conducted by means of bargaining, 
deliberative norms are part of an overarching normative framework, in which the coherence of basic 
norms with more specific norms implies that non-compliance with a specific rule equals non-
acceptance of the implications of basic rules. Non-compliance with the outcome of a deliberative 
procedure, therefore, not only rejects a specific deal but implicitly opposes the whole normative 
structure of which the specific norm is part.” In the context of the WTO, let the general norm be non-
discrimination and the specific rule fair government procurement. If the specific rule has been 
deliberatively based on the general norm, instead of being the result of horse-trading, then the 
fundamental norm of non-discrimination will demand fair procurement and will be damaged if the 
specific rule of fair procurement is violated.  
4.3.5   Esteem 
Decision-makers are human beings and human beings desire esteem.291 One psychological motive for 
compliance is the need to maintain a positive self-image bound to conforming to the behavioral 
expectations that flow from one’s self-image. Another motive rests on the human need for positive 
peer evaluation. The more that other states comply with a norm, the greater the psychological need to 
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comply becomes.292 Thus, legitimacy increases with compliance.293 Also, actors learn by experiencing 
or observing punishment, which deepens the divide between acceptable and inappropriate behavior.294 
Judicial delegation is important in this regard to warrant consistent and reasoned condemnation which 
is conducive to learning.  
Esteem plays a further role in explaining how enforcement mechanisms influence actors’ attitudes 
towards norms. Contrary to legitimacy-based or incentive-induced compliance, coercion hurts the self-
esteem of actors who are targeted by sanctions. Thus, coercion creates resentment and erodes 
legitimacy among targets of sanctions.295 Yet, actors also internalize practiced norms in order to raise 
their self-esteem. If actors behave in a way compatible with a norm without genuinely sharing the 
norm, these actors are induced to adopt the norm with time so that their norms correspond to their 
changed behavior.296 Consequently, incentives and pressure to comply can create compliance pull ex 
post, as long as the emotional resistance to external pressure does not dominate. 
4.3.6   Determinacy 
In order to be induced to comply, actors have to construct what constitutes appropriate behavior for a 
given situation. This is not trivial because actors tend to perceive their policies as conforming to WTO 
norms and to give accounts of violations of WTO norms. Accounts are justifications of norm 
violations with which governments aim to convince themselves, as well as domestic and international 
society, that norm violations were conducted in good faith. Convincing accounts reduce the 
psychological tensions resulting from rule violations. Furthermore, convincing accounts ease domestic 
audience and reputational costs of violations. Accounts can also lower the damage that violations 
cause to the legitimacy of the violated norm and of the international institution endorsing this norm.297 
To understand the justifying power of accounts one needs to consider that rule violations can be 
involuntary. Actors may not live up to their obligations involuntarily if they are caught in 
implementation problems or if they are uncertain about the meaning of agreements. Since telling 
voluntary and involuntary defections apart is difficult, actors can justify rule violations as involuntary. 
In addition to implementation problems and ambiguity of the meaning of rules, diverging knowledge 
and competing values and norms can serve as the basis for accounts.  
 Implementation problems 
Involuntary violations can occur if actors are unable to implement the measures set forth in agreements 
or to reach agreed-on targets. As Chayes and Chayes (1993, 194) note, compliance may be so 
demanding on “scientific and technical judgment, bureaucratic capability, and fiscal resources” that 
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even developed states cannot be confident to achieve the contractual objectives. Furthermore, political 
obstacles may impede ratification or implementation.298 Even if governments have the resources and 
political power to implement appropriate measures, policies may need time to show effects during 
which actors may not be in compliance. 
Implementation problems tend to be greater if rules target many private agents and require 
considerable changes in their behavior.299 This is increasingly the case. Deep integration shifts the 
identity of ultimate rule addressees from state actors to private agents and imposes substantive 
constraints on their behavior.300  
Distinguishing voluntary from involuntary violations is difficult because actors attempt to present even 
voluntary defections as involuntary actions. The existence of a continuum of cases between purely 
voluntary and completely involuntary defection facilitates such misrepresentations. Extreme cases of 
voluntary defection may arise, when states can conform with their obligations easily but still choose to 
defect. On the other extreme, states may be truly incapable of conforming to their obligations at 
whatever costs. More likely are intermediate cases. So the attention turns from the categorical question 
“Could a defiant actor have complied?” to the more nuanced examinations “Under what costs could 
the actor have complied? And could she have been reasonably expected to incur these costs?”  
 Ambiguity 
Whether domestic policies can be justified as conforming to WTO rules depends on the interpretation 
of the rules’ prescriptions and parameters, as well as on the interpretation of the situation with which 
the parameters are matched. Perceptions of situations are inherently subjective. Agreements contain 
gaps and are ambiguously drafted, partly intentionally and partly inadvertently, as precision is costly, 
as language is naturally imprecise, and as cultural differences breed misunderstandings. Therefore, 
different constructions of appropriate behavior are possible. Actors’ interpretation tends to be biased in 
making self-interested behavior normatively acceptable. Shannon (2000, 303) speaks of “creative, 
subconscious interpretations of one’s normative environment, in the effort to free oneself from a moral 
dilemma.”  
In some cases, the gains from defections are overwhelming, so that actors do not even abstain from 
blunt violations of clear obligations. In other instances, actors are uncertain about the meaning other 
actors give to agreements and test for their responses. Usually, actors are aware that their defiant 
behavior possibly contradicts agreements. With increasing complexity, more interpretations become 
reasonably viable. Thus, the focus turns to whether actors behaved in good faith and honored the spirit 
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of the agreement in their self-serving interpretation.  
 Ideational heterogeneity 
In normatively heterogeneous environments, violating one norm can be justified by the necessity to 
protect competing values or conform to other, overriding norms. Facing increasing normativity and 
linkages in global governance, it, thus, becomes more and more difficult to authoritatively establish 
what constitutes appropriate behavior. In addition, such intricate normative conflicts become more 
frequent with growing depth of global governance and growing heterogeneity of actors.301 
A second set of ideational differences that triggers conflicts and invites accounts concerns perceptions 
and causal beliefs.302 If domestic policies are perceived to restrict trade only insignificantly and to 
substantially promote competing domestic objectives, resorting to exemptions or defection from 
agreements can be excused. With increasing depth of and linkages within global governance, the 
reasoning brought forward to justify trade restrictions becomes more sophisticated and different 
assessments can be justified.  
 Effects of structure on determinacy 
Structures that achieve high determinacy make clear which behavior is appropriate and reduce the 
possibility to account for rule violations. The more precise rules are, the more determinacy they can 
provide.303 Arguing against simple, precise rules from a perspective of legitimacy, Franck (1990) notes 
that rules need to contain exemptions for coherence. Yet, these exemptions lower rule determinacy. 
Concerning the option of sophisticated, precise rules, we will see in Chapter 5 about bargaining that 
actors are neither able nor interested in creating legally complete contracts that precisely prescribe 
obligations for every state of the world. Therefore, authoritative interpretations are needed to check 
self-serving interpretations and to maintain the applicability of complex rules. Formal decision-making 
is one way to interpret rules authoritatively. The alternative and more convenient approach is 
authoritative interpretation by courts.304 
Judicial delegation allows authoritative interpretations of prescriptions, parameters, and the situation at 
hand. If courts are equipped to distinguish good accounts from weak accounts, and opportunistic 
violations from justifiable violations that occur in good faith, then judicial interpretation is hard to 
challenge for actors. An actor faces problems in creating satisfactory accounts for herself if a court, 
and international society in the wake, condemns her behavior. Wendt (1999, 177) reasons that actors’ 
self-perception rests on the collective creation of meaning, so that “the truth conditions for identity 
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claims are communal rather than individual.” Therefore, judicial delegation strengthens compliance 
pull.305  
Whether courts are able to evaluate accounts adequately and, thus, maintain authority in the long run 
hinges on their mandate. Chayes and Chayes (1993, 198) conclude that “questions of compliance are 
contestable and call for complex, subtle, and frequently subjective evaluation. What is an acceptable 
level of compliance will shift according to the type of treaty, the context, the exact behavior involved, 
and over time.” In the future, the trends require even more sophisticated rulings to match the 
complexity of disputes. Increasing depth requires more capacities for implementation. Increasing 
complexity leads to more ambiguity and more disputes based on differences in knowledge. Increasing 
normativity of global governance and heterogeneity within international society lead to more disputes 
based on normative differences. Moreover, linkages are currently not adequately regarded in WTO 
dispute settlement as Trachtman (1999b, 376) notes, “While present WTO law seems clearly to 
exclude direct application of non-WTO international law, this position seems unsustainable as 
increasing conflicts between trade values and non-trade values arise.” This means that courts have to 
catch up with a reality that, at the same time, turns more complex. Therefore, courts need a broad 
judicial mandate to cope with the complexity of compliance questions. 
The standard of review by which courts must abide is of preeminent importance in courts’ dealing 
with accounts. Two extreme standards of review can be distinguished.306 On the one side, courts can 
practice total deference to fact findings and legal interpretations of the defendant. Such an approach 
unduly weakens the obligatory character of WTO commitments. On the other side, courts can entertain 
a de novo review, reassessing factual and legal matters. This grants courts constitutional powers that 
actors have not vested in the legal system. Winters (2001, 112) warns, “If the genuineness of certain 
differences in taste between countries and the right of governments to respond to these differences are 
not recognized, the whole of the trading system could be undermined.” While courts can respect the 
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heterogeneity of actors even in a de novo review, we will see in Chapter 5 on bargaining that actors 
will not transfer such power to courts in order to avoid the risk inherent in judicial delegation.  
Oesch (2003, 642) stresses the importance of finding a middle-way, “Acceptability of, and compliance 
with, panel and Appellate Body reports largely depends on whether they succeed in achieving a trade-
off between appropriate deference to important national policy values and the need to strengthen the 
multilateral trading system and its disciplines.”  
Protection of obligations and deference to diverging national policies arising from heterogeneity can 
be partly reconciled through a strict procedural standard of review.307 In the case of risk assessment, 
this means that courts may verify that a risk assessment has been provided timely and that the risk 
assessment is based on recognized scientific opinion. Yet, courts refrain from second-guessing the 
scientific evidence and the normative evaluations that underlie actors’ policies.  
A particular aspect of procedural review concerns procedural legitimacy. In this review, courts probe 
whether deliberative conditions have been established for the domestic decision-making process that 
has led to the disputed policy. The better the deliberative conditions are, the more reason the court has 
to assume that the disputed policy genuinely reflects the values and norms broadly shared within the 
defendant actor’s domestic society. Accordingly, courts show particular deference in such cases. In 
addition, national deliberations provide courts with ample information and expertise upon which 
courts can base their rulings. This enables courts to give specific justifications of their rulings. Such 
justifications are more acceptable to loosing actors than court-conducted expert hearings, which 
override the scientific evidence brought forward by actors, and normative trade-offs by courts, which 
contradict national preferences.308  
A strong procedural standard of review reduces the number of cases for which contestable rulings on 
substance are necessary. However, a strong procedural standard of review cannot always relieve courts 
of developing sophisticated rulings, which reconsider scientific evidence in substance and address 
normative evaluations. For instance, courts determine whether the litigated party has a true interest in 
the value that the party promotes at the cost of the complainant. Courts also consider whether the value 
is internationally recognized. This is a subjective task as soft law and law to which actors involved in 
the current dispute are not members may serve as indicator that a disputed value deserves recognition. 
Finally, courts may have to weigh competing values.309 Hence, courts need a sufficiently strong 
standard of review for ruling on substance if this is necessary in order to legitimately distinguish 
between weak and strong accounts. If a limited legal mandate biases judicial value trade-offs 
systematically in favor of economic objectives, rulings will evoke protest by civil society and override 
legitimate, national legislators who pursue linked values.310  
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that actors’ behavior is not dictated by material circumstances, but depends 
also on ideational properties of the actors, especially on values, norms, perception, causal beliefs, the 
perspective on relative versus absolute gains, and collective identity. These ideational properties can 
change through interaction on the international level. Global governance structures influence these 
learning processes; in particular, structures can stimulate deliberation.  
How the ideational properties matter for the effectiveness of global governance is discussed in 
Chapters 5 on bargaining and Chapter 6 on compliance. Since the analysis of bargaining and 
compliance shows that learning which arises from international interaction and legitimacy of 
international institutions generally promote the effectiveness of global governance, I also speak of 
learning and increases of legitimacy as social capital formation. Strong international norms, shared 
values and knowledge, a focus on absolute gains, and collective identity all form valuable social 
capital. This capital is social as it is constituted socially – there are no international norms without an 
international society, and a sole actor cannot share values and knowledge, cannot strive for relative 
gains, nor can she extend her identity to others. This capital is also social from a functional point of 
view as it helps to create value in cooperation among actors. 
The analysis of bargaining and compliance will further clarify the impact of structures on the 
ideational properties. For instance, legalization does not automatically imply more legitimate 
governance. Instead, the various effects of legalization have to be analyzed under the circumstances of 
a specific situation, in order to assess the overall effect on legitimacy. This is most evident in the case 
of output legitimacy when actors appraise the effectiveness of global governance. In the wording of 
Trachtman (2001, 354), this means that, “Legitimacy refers to the ‘right’ governance structure for a 
given social context.” This social context, and the bargaining and compliance problems actors face 
there, is what I turn to now. 
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5 Bargaining 
Bargaining refers to the attempt of coming to an agreement between exogenous actors who disagree on 
preferred policy proposals at the outset. While learning and bargaining are intertwined and occur often 
in the same communicative process, I split my analysis into two distinct phases. First, actors learn 
thereby adopting more congruent beliefs. Then, actors bargain without any further change in their 
ideational properties occurring. The effectiveness of bargaining is evaluated by how much scope of 
global governance it permits to agree on. Distributional considerations trigger strategic behavior that 
may prevent the attainment of optimal integration. Yet, distributional criteria are not employed in 
assessing bargaining effectiveness.  
5.1 Bargaining theory 
Bargaining theories can be loosely grouped into a formal, deductive and a verbal, inductive 
tradition.311 The formal strand of bargaining theory draws on the theory of games as its dominating 
methodology. Accordingly, it assumes the virtues and vices of game theory. Game theory provides a 
language that excels at analytical rigor, broad applicability, and transparency. Yet, game theory is 
inherently troubled by complexity. Its models need parsimony in order to remain traceable. However, 
depending on the particular selective perspective adopted for the purpose of modeling, the results can 
change fundamentally. The more restrictive the assumptions needed to develop a model, the more 
problematic becomes the sensitivity of game theoretic results to modifications in the underlying 
assumptions. 
In international negotiations, the strategic environment is most complex. Large numbers of players 
negotiate about many issues. Institutions give a specific, albeit loose structure to the bargaining 
process. Negotiations take place repeatedly, but one negotiation differs from another. Actors’ 
properties and external circumstances of negotiations change over time in ways that are only vaguely 
predictable. Actors are uncertain even about the past and the current state of the world and have 
asymmetric information about each other’s preferences. When actors develop strategies for this 
complex background, they have to select from a rich set of bargaining tactics, knowing that the other 
actors have similar options at their disposal. Furthermore, they have to take numerous effects of every 
bargaining tactic into account when they develop their strategies, such as inside options (the pay-offs 
they receive during the status quo throughout negotiations), outside options (they pay-offs they receive 
if they terminate negotiations in failure), the enforceability of agreements, and reputational and other 
long-term effects of their behavior on future negotiations. Therefore, we lack a comprehensive theory 
how rational actors bargain in international negotiations that would allow calculating effectiveness 
based on the endogenous and exogenous determinants.312  
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The complexity that overstrains game-theoretic modeling also overcharges the intellectual capacities 
of the actors. In addition, data about national policies that affect trade and data about economic effects 
of changes in these policies are often lacking.313 This erodes the basis for game-theoretic calculations. 
Hence, models that assume bounded rationality, placing less demands on preferences, knowledge, and 
strategizing capability of actors, are more realistic.314 In these models, actors limit the information they 
collect for decision-making in order to save on the costs of acquiring information. Furthermore, they 
consider only a limited set of strategies and only to a limited depth until they have found a ‘satisficing’ 
solution.315 Such boundedly rational actors can be modeled to apply heuristics to develop their 
strategies and change their heuristics adaptively throughout negotiations.316 During the approximation 
process, transaction costs amount and negotiations may break-down. An extraordinary property of 
adaptive learning models is that negotiations become path dependent; negotiations can take trajectories 
that foreclose efficient agreements.317 The problem with the concept of bounded rationality is that an 
infinite number of alternatives exists how to model actors’ strategizing and that every approach evokes 
at some point an uneasy feeling that actors would recognize and exploit regularities. 
The negotiations studied by the verbal strand of bargaining theory and experiments indicate that actors 
do not maximize egoistic, well-ordered preferences as postulated by game theory. Instead, actors’ 
behavior is also shaped by altruism, norms, and emotions. Finger, Reincke and Castro (1999) find in 
an extensive study of the Uruguay Round that delegations were significantly motivated by collective 
gains and norms of distributive fairness. Actors did not tally concessions given against concessions 
received but aimed at average reduction targets for industrialized nations of one-third and for 
developing nations of one-fourth of their current levels of protection. Such observations are 
underpinned by experiments that demonstrate that norms coordinate expectations and that emotions 
like spite affect bargaining outcomes.318 
We can conclude that bargaining is such an elusive phenomenon that we can neither fully grasp actors’ 
objectives nor the strategizing they undertake in pursuit of their objectives.319 Actors are motivated by 
a combination of the logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness, and further emotions. And 
they apply a highly complex version of bounded rationality that performs somewhere between the 
heuristics used for modeling bounded rationality and perfect rationality. Nevertheless, formal models, 
empirical research, and common sense can provide guidance in identification and appraisal of factors 
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that influence bargaining effectiveness. With this understanding of bargaining theory in mind, I 
examine three factors that shape bargaining.  
Looking at toughness of bargaining strategies as first factor, I analyze under which circumstances 
actors try to push through their self-serving proposals with high resolve and when, on the contrary, 
actors are more willing to compromise and to focus on overall gains. Examination of the second factor 
reveals various effects that raise the internal complexity of the issues to be negotiated. Here the 
challenge is that, burdened by uncertainty and communication problems, actors have to select among a 
large number of reasonable policy proposals that require internal consistency. Finally, I look at the 
influence of the number and nature of veto players on bargaining. 
The explanations of why a certain factor aggravates bargaining vary according to how we theorize the 
bargaining process. High numbers of actors, for instance, can worsen strategic effects among rational 
actors, such as free riding or blocking negotiations to increase one’s share of the benefits. From the 
perspective of bounded rationality, high numbers of actors can be expected to prolong the time needed 
until offers and counter-offers converge. And when actors bargain oriented on norms, agreeing on 
measures of fairness and maintaining a fairness-based bargaining approach is likely to become more 
difficult as the number of actors rises. With these three perspectives on actors’ bargaining behavior – 
fully rational and boundedly rational bargaining according to the logic of consequences, and norm-
following bargaining according to the logic of appropriateness – I analyze the three bargaining 
problems. 
5.2 Toughness of bargaining strategies 
Actors can engage in tough, distributional or in soft, integrative bargaining. When actors bargain 
integratively, they reasonably deliberate in order to find the most effective policy proposal. In their 
attempt to maximize overall gains from an agreement, actors are solely interested in the efficiency 
properties, as opposed to distributional properties, of an agreement. I focus on this pro-social interest 
as the essential feature of integrative bargaining. Learning properties of deliberating, which are often 
attributed to integrative bargaining, have already been addressed in the previous chapter.  
Soft, integrative bargaining is the more prevalent, the more actors focus on absolute gains, the more 
they share collective identities, the less they know in what future position they will be concerned by 
the current policy proposals, the lower the value at stake in negotiations compared to the costs of 
delay, the lower actors’ reservation values, and the more powerfully norms of appropriate bargaining 
call for integrative bargaining. 
5.2.1   Perspectives on gains 
While a focus on absolute gains does not imply integrative bargaining, it diminishes relative gains 
concerns which are antagonistic to integrative bargaining. If relative gains are the dominant motive, 
“state positionality may constrain the willingness of states to cooperate,” so that actors cooperate little 
even though enforceable agreements promise absolute gains.320  
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Collective identity entails integrative bargaining by definition. Sharing collective identity, actors want 
to arrive at effective proposals because they care about the well-being of other actors as well. Even if 
collective identity is shared only by a limited set of actors, it eases bargaining as these actors care less 
about distributional implications among themselves.  
5.2.2   Veil of uncertainty 
To assess the impact of uncertainty on bargaining, different kinds of uncertainty have to be 
differentiated. If efficiency properties of agreements are clear, so that uncertainty concerns solely the 
distribution of the gains from cooperation, actors face an incentive to maximize overall gains. 
Uncertainty, which pertains to the efficiency properties of agreements on the contrary, does not alter 
the bargaining behavior, but it reduces the optimal scope of global governance for risk-averse 
actors.321 
Low precision, which leaves distributional implications open, creates a ‘veil of uncertainty.’322 Judicial 
delegation is also considered to contribute to the veil of uncertainty.323 This can be justified along two 
lines of reasoning. Either the workings of courts are deemed so opaque that actors can predict court 
rulings less than future bargains, which will decide about the distributional aspects that have remained 
open in the initial agreement. Alternatively, judicial delegation is considered to facilitate low 
precision, by avoiding continuous bargaining to clarify distributional outcomes. 
5.2.3   Value at stake compared to costs of delay 
In a seminal paper, Fearon (1998) studies a complete-information game of war of attrition. Actors can 
choose in each period whether to hold out and incur bargaining costs, or to accept the less favorable 
among two possible outcomes of cooperation. Fearon (1998, 282) observes that with increasing 
expected duration of agreements, “both states choose tougher and tougher bargaining strategies on 
average, implying longer and longer delay till cooperation begins.” The reason for this behavior is 
that the value at stake in negotiations rises with longer duration, whereas the costs of delay remain 
unaffected. The value at stake is the sum of the benefits and costs from cooperation that are to be 
distributed in negotiations. The costs of delay correspond to the foregone gains from cooperation, 
resulting from the benefits minus the costs from cooperation and minus possible transaction costs of 
bargaining.  
This link between value at stake, costs of delay, and toughness of bargaining strategy is even more 
pronounced in games of incomplete information. Fearon (1998, 283) infers that, “Willingness to hold 
out, bearing the costs of non-cooperation, acts as a costly signal in the bargaining phase that credibly 
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reveals as state’s ‘power’ of the issue in question.” For an infinite number of enforceable agreements, 
bargaining theory cannot provide robust answers if the same results prevail. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonable to expect the positive correlation between the value at stake compared to the costs of delay, 
on the one hand, and the difficulty of the bargaining problem, on the other hand, to apply in a real-
world setting with many, instead of only two, available policy proposals.324 
 Expected duration of agreements 
Since the expected duration of agreements drives the toughness of bargaining, we need to consider 
whether we can observe changes in the expected duration of agreements. An important determinant of 
expected duration is the duration which actors intend when designing the agreement. Intended duration 
refers to the duration for which an agreement is set into force, to the frequency of scheduled 
renegotiations, and to the ease with which spontaneous renegotiations can be resumed. The greater the 
intended duration of an agreement, the less frequent negotiations with distributional implications 
become. Actors can be assumed to aim at optimal duration of agreements, which maximizes their 
gains from cooperation, when they design agreements. Therefore, I first look at what determines 
optimal duration. Then, I turn to those factors that drive a wedge between optimal and expected 
duration. 
Optimal duration is a function of (at least) three factors.325 One factor is the costs of maintaining rules 
that are not optimally attuned to given circumstances. These costs depend on many difficult-to-predict 
aspects, such as how dynamic the environment is, to what extent actors can bypass inadequate rules, 
and which costs they incur if they cannot sidestep inadequate rules that fit their needs poorly.  
A second factor is bargaining costs. Here, we can observe two mechanisms pointing into opposing 
directions. The lower the bargaining effectiveness is, the greater the incentive for actors is to reduce 
the value at stake, in order to come to an agreement at all. One way to do so is opting for short 
durations. On the other hand, increasing difficulty of the bargaining problem leads to longer durations, 
since actors want to avoid the costs of frequent bargaining. This increases the value at stake, which 
further diminishes bargaining effectiveness.  
The third factor is connected to learning about the effects of an agreement. When negotiating an 
agreement, actors are partially uncertain about its efficiency and distributional properties. Once the 
agreement is working, actors acquire previously lacking information. Yet, learning is impeded by 
noise in the environment, that is, changes in factors that lay outside the international institution and 
whose effects intermingle with the effects of the international institution. Thus, actors cannot be sure 
whether effects are caused by the international institution or by other sources. The combination of 
uncertainty and noise determines optimal duration for the purpose of learning. 
With greater uncertainty, actors choose shorter durations. The reason for this is twofold. First, the 
greater uncertainty, the less agreements are suited to external circumstances. Thus, actors benefit more 
from being able to react to new information. Secondly, when uncertainty increases, the actors can 
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more efficiently acquire new information. Telling the effect of an agreement and that of noise apart 
simply becomes easier with greater variation in agreement outcomes. With greater noise in the 
environment, actors prefer longer durations. Long durations give actors time to compile a reasonable 
stock of new information, despite the noise, before bargaining anew. 
While the trends have shown uncertainty to be increasing, noise can also be expected to rise, in 
particular, due to increasing linkages within global governance. Tracing back outcomes to specific 
design aspects of specific institutions becomes increasingly difficult. As uncertainty and noise is 
rising, actors face opposing incentives in the design of agreement duration.  
Since I cannot establish a trend for any of the three factors that determine optimal duration, I can 
abandon the attempt to establish an overall trend for optimal duration without looking how the three 
factors interact. 
What actually matters for actors in negotiations is not intended, but expected, duration. While intended 
duration and expected duration may converge in stable environments, expected duration is less than 
intended duration when actors carry doubts about institutional stability. 
Several trends affect institutional stability. The increasing scope and relative effectiveness of global 
governance raise the costs of break-down. The greater the systemic interest of actors to maintain 
distressed institutions, the more stable international institutions become. Linkages can be stabilizing if 
fear of negative spill-overs enhances the systemic interest in the WTO and if other institutions can 
lend capabilities to the WTO. However, linkages can also destabilize global governance if problems in 
one international institution infect other international institutions.326 
Escalation of disputes into a trade war requires high resolve on a disputed issue, so that the target of 
threats does not cave in despite of incurred costs, and so that the sender maintains threats despite of 
costs the resisting target causes. The increasing relevance of norms in the WTO adds to such resolve in 
two ways. In normatively charged conflicts, negotiating compromises can be difficult.327 Additionally, 
defections based on normative disputes, relating to deep integration, are more likely to trigger drastic 
consequences, boosting the value at stake. For instance, suspension of future approvals of genetically 
modified crops by the EU in 1998 led to a 90 percent reduction of U.S. crop exports to the EU.328  
The effects of trends on the stability of the WTO are, thus, indeterminate. The multitude of 
counteracting effects also prevents conclusions from structures on stability at my level of analysis. For 
instance, regionalization makes actors less dependent on global governance. This stimulates the use of 
threats and lowers stability. On the other hand, regionalization enhances decision-making flexibility, 
so that stability increases.   
In addition to instability, a further reason why formally intended and actually expected duration may 
differ hinges on path dependency. The greater the path dependence is, the more important the current 
decisions become for future institutional design. If future structures are partly determined in advance, 
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bargaining becomes more difficult.329  
The effects of path dependency differ according to the endogenous determinants, which cause the path 
dependency. The design of precision, exemptions, and punishment formally pertains solely to the 
content already agreed upon. Yet, these designs serve as focal points for future negotiations. In 
particular, it is likely that future content of global governance, passed in following negotiations, will 
be subject to the same rules on exemptions and punishment that are in place after the current 
negotiation.  
The design of decision-making and judicial delegation, by contrast, formally influences how future 
global governance agreements are made. Importantly, majority voting and judicial delegation lessen 
the relevance of today’s decisions on precision, exemptions, and punishment for upcoming 
negotiations.  
 Heterogeneity 
Analogous to Fearon’s observation about the impact of duration on bargaining behavior, heterogeneity 
can increase the toughness of bargaining. The more heterogeneous actors are, the less benefits from 
cooperation accrue and the more costs need to be distributed in addition to the benefits. Therefore, 
material and ideational heterogeneity of actors drives up the distributional effects of agreements 
compared to the gains from cooperation.330 Since the value at stake corresponds to the costs and 
benefits of cooperation, whereas the costs of delay consist only of the benefits from cooperation, the 
value at stake in comparison with the costs of delay rises.331 
The trends show increasing relevance of material and ideational heterogeneity. The ideational 
heterogeneity can be reduced through learning. Thus, the remaining ideational heterogeneity depend 
on the degree of ideational heterogeneity at the outset of negotiations and on the effectiveness of 
learning throughout the negotiations.  
Another factor that intensifies the effect of heterogeneity, increasing the distributional effects of 
agreements compared to the gains of cooperation, is the waning national capacity to cope with global 
governance policies which are not optimally attuned to the actor’s specific needs. The less actors can 
avoid ill-suited global governance policies, the more they have to fear that negotiations among 
heterogeneous actors lead to agreements which appeal to actors with needs fundamentally different 
from their own. Exemptions offer actors the option to escape particularly ill-suited global governance 
policies. In this way, exemptions significantly lower value at stake, beyond the minor effect of 
lowering average scope of global governance.332  
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5.2.4   Reservation value 
The reservation value, also labeled outside option, is the best alternative actors have to a negotiated 
agreement. An actors’ reservation value marks the minimum threshold of gains from cooperation 
which she demands in exchange for her consent to cooperation. It is important not to confuse tough 
bargaining behavior, resulting from relatively high value at stake, with claims on a large share of the 
benefits of cooperation, based on a high reservation value. A rising reservation value, stemming from 
an attractive outside option, shrinks the zone of agreement, which is at stake in negotiations. But 
reservation values do not change the value at stake compared to the costs of delay and, thus, do not 
affect the toughness of bargaining for the distribution within the reduced agreement zone. Put simply, 
reservation values determine who gets what but they do not determine the difficulty of reaching an 
agreement, as long as a zone of agreement remains.  
However, Odell (2000) makes the empirical observation that actors possessing high reservation values 
do not only claim most of the benefits, but also tend to invest little effort into integrative bargaining. 
Lacking a rationale for the latter, I assume that rising reservation values make bargaining, at most, 
only slightly tougher.  
Accordingly, regionalization, which enhances the effectiveness of autonomous governance, leads to 
slightly tougher bargaining strategies because it raises the reservation value of actors. With rising 
numbers of actors, on the contrary, the reservation value deteriorates. The reason is that if actors 
liberalize unilaterally, or in negotiations among subsets of actors outside of regional integration 
agreements, the concessions are multilateralized under the Most-favored-nation (MFN) clause. 
Therefore, we can think of liberalization under the MFN principle as similar to a non-excludable, less 
than entirely rival good. If contributions to the production of a public good are voluntary, groups 
encounter a collective action problem in the supply of the public good. With greater numbers of actors, 
the free rider incentive for every actor increases and the actual supply of public goods increasingly 
falls behind the optimal supply.333 
5.2.5   Norms of appropriate bargaining behavior 
Norms of appropriate bargaining behavior expect actors to heed overall gains in negotiations. 
Accordingly, governments feel intrinsically obliged and externally pressured by domestic and 
international society to bargain integratively.334 In particular, peer pressure leads resenting actors to 
agree to proposals that are supported by a wide majority. A rough rule of thumb exists, based on the 
decision-making rules, about how many and which actors have to agree for a substantive consensus to 
be assumed. Then, the bandwagon rolls and it becomes difficult for any actor to resist formal 
consensus since actors want to evade the political costs of being the cause of failure, particularly after 
tenuous negotiations. Furthermore, norms provide focal points and action levers for civil society to 
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pressure isolated nay-sayers into agreement.  
The greater the legitimacy of the WTO, the more the actors feel compelled to conform with norms of 
integrative bargaining and the more inclined actors and civil society are to exert pressure on those who 
do not comply with the implicit norms of appropriate bargaining. Uncertainty makes it difficult to 
exert pressure on actors to bargain integratively and to abandon blockades of policy proposals that 
enjoy broad support.335 If the costs of policy proposals for resenting actors are not clear, instances 
cannot be identified when actors strategically block agreements, which imply only minor costs for 
them, so that reputational pressure could be legitimately brought to bear. 
5.3 Internal complexity 
Toughness of bargaining strategies, the first set of factors that determine bargaining effectiveness, 
accentuates the adversarial aspects of bargaining. To the extent that actors approach international 
bargaining with the logic of consequences, they bargain softer if they emphasize absolute gains, if they 
share collective identities, and if they do not know in which future position they will be concerned by 
the agreement. Also, they bargain softer if the value at stake falls compared to the costs of delay and if 
their reservation values decrease. In addition, norms of appropriate bargaining induce actors to bargain 
softly under the logic of appropriateness and under the logic of consequences. 
This second set of factors that determine bargaining effectiveness turns to difficulties inherent in the 
issues to be negotiated and in the environment of negotiations. These factors cause problems even if 
actors employ soft bargaining strategies. I discern among four factors that comprise internal 
complexity: the uncertainty about the implications of agreements, linkages, the number of relevant 
policy proposals, and communication.  
5.3.1   Uncertainty 
Risk-averse actors fail to negotiate agreements that maximize global welfare if they are uncertain 
about efficiency and distributional effects of agreements. The importance of uncertainty for risk-averse 
actors depends on how well actors can predict the outcomes of agreements, on how severely actors are 
hurt if they err in their prediction and fulfill their obligations, and on the costs which actors have to 
pay in order to escape their obligations, in case they become intolerable. 
We have seen that the trends bring about increasing uncertainty about efficiency and distributional 
implications of agreements. Precision generally reduces uncertainty. However, the effects of precision 
depend on the type of uncertainty as identified by Knight (1921). Actors can know all possible states 
of the world but lack information about the likelihood that a given possible state of the world will 
come true. In this case, high precision lowers uncertainty; agreements can be written contingent on 
future states of the world. This demands high precision because numerous, possible states of the world 
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have to be considered and because obligations for each state of the world have to be specified. The 
situation is different with genuine, thick uncertainty, when even future states of the world are 
unknown to actors. Then, precision becomes pointless and even counterproductive.337 
As the scope and relative effectiveness of global governance rise, adverse, unexpected outcomes 
become more costly. While this does not change the ratio between gains from cooperation and costs of 
adverse, unexpected outcomes, the costs of adverse, unexpected outcomes increase compared to 
national determinants of actors’ welfare. Therefore, adverse, unexpected outcomes become more 
important for risk-averse actors. Reduced effectiveness of autonomous governance leaves actors with 
fewer capabilities to ameliorate adverse surprises. Regionalization enlarges domestic markets in 
comparison with global markets and strengthens autonomous governance, so that actors become more 
robust against adverse, unexpected outcomes. 
Collective identity and legitimacy moderate the importance of adverse, unexpected outcomes. Actors 
who share collective identity and consider agreements as legitimate are willing to accept that they 
receive a smaller share of the gains from cooperation than they had expected, for the collective sake 
and out of obedience to the agreement. 
Actors can escape adverse, unexpected outcomes by resorting to exemptions, by defecting, or by 
exiting from the international institution. These devices mark an upper threshold of damage which a 
country can suffer from adverse, unexpected outcomes.338 Yet, using exemptions, upon which 
international society imposes (usually low) reputational costs, defections, and exit is costly.  
Judicial delegation reduces the costs of defection which aims at evading especially substantial, 
unexpected, adverse effects. In such cases, actors can expect courts to recognize the exculpating 
circumstances and to treat defections leniently. Independently of judicial delegation, rules that cause 
massive, unexpected, adverse effects partly loose their legitimacy, weakening the enforcement of these 
rules. 
While actors may avoid their obligations, they cannot escape the indirect effects of agreements which 
may be overwhelming. If an international institution sets a global standard, the costs of continuing 
with an actor-specific standard can be prohibitive.339 Regionalization lowers the direct and indirect 
costs of exemptions, defection, and exit. 
So far, I have argued that current uncertainty about future effects of agreements complicates 
bargaining among risk-averse actors, and I have shown which factors determine the importance of 
uncertainty for bargaining. Now I extend my argument to actors who are not risk averse and to past 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is even more cumbersome and affects even actors who are not risk averse if 
information is asymmetric. Actors can usually predict the effects of global governance on themselves 
better than they can gauge how other actors will be affected. Furthermore, actors have an incentive to 
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misrepresent their benefits and costs of global governance in order to extract a better bargain. While 
actors can update their information about other players during negotiations, the distribution of 
information remains asymmetric. Cautiousness, in order to avoid detrimental bargains, and attempted 
concealment of private information can make bargaining inefficient.340 
The second extension of my argument is that bargaining suffers not only from current but possibly 
also from past uncertainty surrounding an agreement. When the vanishing of initial uncertainty reveals 
a highly asymmetric distribution of gains and losses, future negotiations are confronted with claims for 
compensation. Complaints that industrialized actors had not implemented their obligations, though 
they had enormously profited from the Uruguay Round, were brought forward at the ministerial 
meeting in Seattle by the developing countries. These implementation issues rank as one major source 
for failure in Seattle.341 
5.3.2   Linkages 
A further difficulty of deal-making lies with substantive linkages that require internal coherence for 
efficiency. If tariff concessions have to be re-adjusted in one part of a policy proposal, in order to 
offset distributional effects of an agreement in another part of the same proposal, efficiency 
implications are relatively easy to understand (i.e. mostly trade creation and trade diversion). In 
negotiations on deep integration, distributional and efficiency aspects are intertwined. Change in one 
part of a proposal may sabotage the efficiency properties of other parts.  
Let us assume that industrialized countries were to make a concession to developing countries within 
property rights negotiations and decided to reduce the burden of implementation by easing the 
requirements on domestic enforcement. Then the substantial rules on property rights would be less 
valuable and not optimally attuned to the changed enforcement regime. More generally, Esty (2002, 
12) underlines the growing need for coherence of negotiating proposals, ‘While there have been many 
rounds of trade negotiations over the past 50 years, the central focus of the process has shifted from 
tit-for-tat reductions to the identification of rules and procedures to manage economic 
interdependence. In important respects, the next round of negotiations will resemble a Global 
Constitutional Convention. The process of global constitutionalism – defining core principles, 
establishing international standards, and creating institutions to manage interdependence – is likely to 
involve decades or even centuries of discussions and refinements.” 
A further problem of linkages concerns deal-breakers. If one issue cannot be resolved in negotiations 
and if this issue is linked to less divisive issues, negotiations on all issues may fail, though partial 
agreement could have been reached if the trouble-making issue could have been isolated.342 Sjöstedt 
(1994, 64) observes in the Uruguay Round that “negotiation work in relatively manageable areas was 
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severely restrained by the outstanding politically sensitive problems in other areas. Part of the reason 
is that some negotiation problems can be resolved only in a final and decisive exchange of 
concessions. The dilemma is that negotiating parties will not engage themselves fully in bargaining 
over such outstanding matters until they are certain that negotiations are, in fact, in the process of 
being terminated once and for all.” Therefore, even linkage to issues that are highly contested but do 
not thwart agreement in the final phase of negotiations hinders negotiations of more consensual issues. 
5.3.3   Number of policy proposals 
The obvious effect of large numbers of policy proposals submitted in negotiations is to congest the 
bargaining process. In particular, high numbers of reasonable policy proposals sabotage information 
collection. Putting forward proposals to trigger a response is an important instrument for actors to 
collect information in bargaining.343 Actors who disapprove of proposals have an incentive to reveal 
their disapproval as ‘estoppel by acquiescence’ is practiced in the WTO. If an actor does not reject 
proposals that enjoy considerable support, other actors assume that she consents. Introducing new 
arguments, in order to justify disapproval at late stages, is sanctioned with reputational costs. Early 
presentation of interests and arguments allows actors to verify whether arguments are strategic or 
sincere. As the number of proposals and reasoned disapprovals grows, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to evaluate the arguments and to infer on genuine preferences. Evaluating arguments becomes 
even more intricate as arguments are increasingly complex and increasingly based on normative 
grounds, so that the common method of comparing an actor with other countries in similar situations 
fails. 
Moreover, it becomes harder to exert reputational pressure for integrative bargaining with more 
reasonable policy proposals. If an actor refuses liberalization, in order to protect ailing industries, the 
other actors can often make a convincing claim that the resisting actor would fare better by 
liberalization, in combination with domestic measures for promoting economic structural change and 
for softening social repercussions. Also, the other governments can point out that a given policy 
proposal entails for them commensurate domestic political problems, stemming from structural 
change. By contrast, if the reason for disagreement lays in conflicting values and norms, a sound 
argument of resistant actors being better off by adopting the values and norms of other actors is hard to 
produce. Arguing that all actors face similar obstacles and bring similar sacrifices, becomes equally 
difficult. Therefore, a large number of policy proposals diminishes bargaining effectiveness by 
paralyzing the bargaining process and by weakening normative pressure for integrative bargaining. 
How many proposals actually are made in negotiations depends on the number of actors, on the 
heterogeneity among them, and on the number of possible, reasonable policy proposals. If many 
proposals are reasonably possible and if many, heterogeneous actors are involved, the number of 
actual proposals will be large. 
Generally, the trends raise the number and heterogeneity of actors. Only under special circumstances, 
the inclusion of additional agents into the WTO diminishes the number of actual proposals. In 
                                                     
343 See Steinberg (2002). 
 120
particular, strong resistance from civil society against certain policy approaches can reduce the number 
of proposals significantly. Regionalization and majority voting lower the number of actors whose 
proposals need to be acknowledged for decision-making. 
More linkages and greater depth in global governance augment the number of possible, reasonable 
agreements, while focal points based on tariff reductions can less and less anchor negotiations.344 The 
global governance architecture of the postwar period, such as the regimes for international trade and 
monetary affairs, critically rested on the idea of ‘embedded liberalism.’ This idea promoted 
multilateral liberalization while protecting actors’ sovereignty and maintaining their autonomous 
governance capacities, so that every actor could maintain a welfare state according to her 
preferences.345 This idea guided single negotiations and brought coherence among international 
institutions. Free trade as the final objective for the WTO was generally accepted, as well as the path 
to free trade via multilateral, reciprocal liberalization and via rules applicable to every member (with 
special and preferential treatment and plurilateral codes as temporary aberrations and with regional 
integration agreements as continuing exemption).  
The days when a shared paradigm provided orientation are over. Linkages and deep integration make 
broader concepts necessary. Embedded liberalism is too limited in application if development or the 
environment is concerned; neither does the paradigm of embedded liberalism contain answers to 
complicated issues of global economic regulation. Furthermore, growing interdependence and relative 
effectiveness of global governance undermine the focus of embedded liberalism on autonomous 
governance. 
No alternative, overarching, guiding principle stands ready to replace embedded liberalism. 
Sustainability is still too contested as it contains no agreement on priority objectives and priority 
means that would be deeply shared among actors. Consequently, diverse worldviews make their way 
into the WTO, so that different ideas about optimal degrees and configurations of global governance, 
as well as desirable paths, become normatively defensible and acceptable. For instance, there is not 
one competition policy unanimously considered the best for the world, but instead, many reasonable 
proposals. 
Therefore, structural mechanisms that can serve to narrow down the increasing number of policy 
proposals, which have to be seriously considered in negotiations, become more valuable. Deliberation 
and legal discourse both work as a filtering device. Only proposals that can be defended on normative 
grounds can pass the test.346 Furthermore, courts can set directions for following official negotiations 
based on their impartiality and expertise and they can create focal points, intensifying the reputational 
pressure on resisting governments exerted by international and domestic society.347 
                                                     
344 The concept of focal points stems from the theory of games, employing a mechanism to select among several 
possible equilibria. See Goldstein and Keohane (1993) on focal points in international relations.  
345 See Howse (2002a) and Ruggie (1992). Similarly, Jackson (1997) perceives ‘liberal trade’ as central 
paradigm though modified by non-economic goals, such as security and development. 
346 See Neyer (2002). 
347 Barnett and Finnemore (1999) show how international institutions can apply their communicative capacities 
and shape the discourse about issues such as development and security. 
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5.3.4   Communication 
Horse-trading in negotiations can only begin if negotiators share basic knowledge, as well as a 
discourse that embodies this shared understanding.348 For instance, once the basic principles of 
ecosystem science are acceptable to the members of specific regimes, actors can build on these 
principles in future negotiations.349 
In stable environments, negotiators develop such social capital that enhances bargaining effectiveness. 
In the past, WTO negotiations were led by trade officials with similar professional backgrounds, who 
were socialized by years of service in WTO networks away from public scrutiny. These unique 
organizational circumstances fostered not only shared knowledge and discourse, but they also imbued 
WTO negotiators with a diplomatic ethos and a set of shared norms.350 Beyond the WTO, the shared 
discourse of embedded liberalism assumed a comparable function in the past by providing a consensus 
worldview from which to start negotiations.351 
The trends devalue these established collective assets. The old ways are not suited to negotiating 
linked and deep global governance, and they are incompatible with advancing legalization, 
transparency, and civil society involvement in global governance.352 Negotiations are less often 
conducted solely between professional trade diplomats, but rather include a more diverse set of agents 
such as politicians and civil society activists.353 These diverse negotiators, often with strong domestic 
ties, are less used to a global outlook and share less organizational culture and language.354  
As a consequence, communication styles between negotiators become less compatible.355 In addition, 
negotiators who do not share basic knowledge interact with one another, we have seen in Chapter 4 
about ideational properties and learning that developing shared knowledge on the international level is 
generally difficult. For many issues in global governance, developing shared knowledge is especially 
difficult because few templates from domestic experience exist for synthesizing diverse policies 
towards coherent, sustainable global governance. 
The breaking-away of shared organizational culture is particularly devastating because normative 
disputes, arising from differences in domestic cultures, can be best solved if actors share an 
organizational culture. 
                                                     
348 See Frankel (2001), Haas (1992), Sjöstedt (1994) and Young (1999a, Ch. 8).  
349 See Young (1999a, Ch. 8). 
350 See Keohane and Nye (2001) and Weiler (2001). 
351 This is not identical to the function of embedded liberalism as a focal point. A focal point selects one among 
several possible equilibria, whereas embedded liberalism as shared knowledge enables actors to identify and 
compare possible equilibria in the first place.  
352 See Esty (2002), Keohane and Nye (2001) and Petersmann (2001). 
353 See Meerts (1999). 
354 See Cohen (1999). 
355 Safrin (2002) observes, for instance, that representatives from environment ministries are inclined towards 
more emotional discussions instead of detached analysis, which characterized traditional diplomatic discourse. 
Shaffer (2001) also notes different attitudes between ministries. 
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Shared rules is a special category of shared knowledge. Bargaining rules are essential for boundedly 
rational actors.356 The more experience boundedly rational actors have within a sufficiently stable 
environment, the more effective bargaining rules they will learn. Some of these rules become norms, 
when they are shared by many actors and display temporal stability. In traditional negotiations that 
aim at lowering tariffs, shared bargaining rules – such as trade in market access, reciprocity, or across-
the-board formulas – assist the actors in coming to an agreement. Yet, even for tariff negotiations, 
agreeing on an adequate measure of reciprocity is a delicate matter. Actors have to agree on how to 
assess conversion of tariff bindings into tariff cuts, how to reward past unilateral liberalization, and 
how to take account of current levels of protection.357 Applying these shared bargaining rules to 
negotiations about deep integration, or developing new shared bargaining rules for such negotiations, 
is daunting task, however.  
5.4 Number and nature of veto players  
This section looks at the influence of the number and nature of decision-making veto players on 
bargaining effectiveness. We can distinguish among two types of veto players. Power-based veto 
players assume their relevance independently of decision-making rules from options outside the 
institution. Institutional veto players are empowered by decision-making rules. Actors are the most 
important veto players. In addition, civil society may have enough external power to derail 
negotiations.358 
First, I address threats as the source of power. I distinguish between different types of threats and 
analyze the costs of stating and implementing threats for the threatening actor, as well as the damage 
inflicted upon targets by implementing threats. Comparing costs and damages allows us to gauge the 
power of threats in the light of trends and structures of global governance. Then, I present three 
possible designs for institutional decision-making. After these two preparatory steps, I analyze the 
effectiveness of the respective decision-making designs in solving the bargaining problem. 
5.4.1   Threats and power 
I abstain from a general definition of power that would necessarily require extensive justification.359 
Instead, I highlight only three aspects of my treatment of power. First, I understand power as 
adversarial: I consider power not as a general capacity to achieve desired ends but as the capacity to 
influence other actors towards preferred agreements. Secondly, power does not arise from the capacity 
to change ideational properties of actors. Deliberative capacity to convince other actors is, thus, not 
                                                     
356 The interaction of boundedly rational actors can be interpreted as a form of communication. 
357 See Finger, Reincke and Castro (1999). 
358 Brown et al. (2000, 29). I do not consider a possible world Supreme Court – endowed with the right of 
constitutional interpretations of foundational agreements with which ordinary bargaining outcomes would have 
to conform – as a further veto player. 
359 For a review of power definitions in negotiations, see Zartman and Rubin (2000). The specification of types, 
costs, and damages of threats draws especially on the experience of past negotiations presented by Fisher et al. 
(1997), Kahler (1992), Krueger (1995), Odell (2000), Singh (2000) and Steinberg (2002). 
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part of power. Thirdly, the capacity of powerful actors is not based on law, which reflects the genuine 
consent of all actors, but arises from actor-level properties. Powerful actors can use law as an 
instrument, but law is not considered to be a source of power. 
 Types of threats 
Power-based veto players rely on different threats. These threats can be structured along two 
dimensions. The first distinction concerns the breadth of a threat. Threats can be limited to a specific 
issue at hand, can comprise a broader issue area, or can extend to other issue areas. 
The second distinction pertains to what kind of behavior actors proclaim. If threats relate to non-
cooperation, actors threaten to maintain the status quo (or their existing plans for change in 
autonomous governance) unless global governance agreements are crafted according to their needs.360 
In most cases of international institutions, non-participation of actors is costly for the remaining actors 
as legitimacy and benefits of cooperation increase with the number of participating actors. Therefore, 
non-cooperation is a threat if it is extended beyond the scope of immediate disagreement to issues on 
which agreement would be possible. 
Alternatively, actors can menace aggressive behavior. This implies changes from the status quo that 
make other actors worse off than the current status. Threatening to increase tariffs if a certain scheme 
of tariff cuts is not agreed on is a case of narrow, aggressive behavior. Broader are threats that link 
behavior across specific issues within an international institution. If the U.S. threatens with unilateral 
protectionism authorized by their domestic laws, in order to compel developing countries to agree on 
trade-related intellectual property rights, this is a case in point. Furthermore, threats can pertain to 
issue areas outside the regulation of the international institution. For instance, threats to withhold 
financial assistance or to project military capabilities, in order to close a trade bargain, would be of 
such genuinely external nature.  
 Costs of threats 
The introduction and implementation of threats causes a host of direct and indirect costs to threatening 
actors.361 The direct costs are threefold. First, threats can be expensive in itself. Non-cooperation in 
efforts aimed at lowering trade barriers and at establishing standards, and aggressive behavior that 
constructs barriers, both generally decrease welfare. Secondly, stating and implementing threats is 
charged with reputational costs. Thirdly, actors can incur domestic audience costs for non-cooperative 
and aggressive behavior. Yet, domestic societies can also support threats that serve their interests or 
normative convictions. With globalization, more domestic companies have assets in target countries 
which they see endangered by threats. This raises the domestic audience costs of threatening.362 For 
                                                     
360 Furusawa and Wen (2002) argue that trade war – the ‘Nash equilibrium’ which game theory suggests – is an 
unrealistic disagreement point. They stress the importance of the status quo which is often maintained if no 
agreement is reached. 
361 These costs are similar to the self-inflicted, economic costs, the reputational costs, and the domestic audience 
costs of defections discussed in Chapter 6 about compliance. 
362 See Odell (2000, Ch. 6). 
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certain threats, particularly if aimed at developing countries, reputational and domestic audience costs 
rise with more active involvement of civil society that denounces threats.  
The indirect costs hinge on actors’ systemic interest in the effective functioning of the WTO. I speak 
of systemic interest to denote the interest which actors take in the preservation of the gains from 
cooperation in the long run.363 Even if never carried out, threats can make cooperation less effective as 
they harm legitimacy and poison the cooperative atmosphere. This means that actors forgo gains from 
(more effective) cooperation by stating, and even more so by implementing, threats. These costs rise 
with increasing relative effectiveness and scope of global governance. With increasing relative 
effectiveness of global governance, threats that prevent scope extension become increasingly costly. 
Equally, threats that prevent increases in relative effectiveness of global governance become 
increasingly expensive for greater scope.364 
Beyond sabotaging the effective working of international institutions, implemented non-cooperative 
and (far more) aggressive behavior can lead to a break-down in cooperation. Other actors can retaliate 
for strategic reasons, or they retaliate because the domestic political balance has shifted in response to 
the initial blockade or hostility. Unraveling of international institutions is a critical-mass phenomenon. 
An institution perseveres with few apparent signs of distress and then suddenly breaks down, once a 
certain amount of stress has been exceeded. Whether an international institution collapses depends on 
the number and significance of damaging acts and on the identity of the damaging actors.365 It is 
impossible to predict the blows an international institution can take before breaking down, in which 
direction harmful interaction dynamics between actors unfold, and the extent to which an international 
institution will have recuperated before the next stressful situation occurs. Therefore, actors always 
have to guard against damaging the WTO. 
The expected costs of a break-down, following from threats, result from the costs in case a break-
down occurs and the likelihood of a break-down which actors assign to threats. The greater the costs 
of break-down and the lower the stability of the WTO, the more wary actors are of threatening.366 In 
                                                     
363 In addition to harming global governance, threats may also have more imminent repercussions for threatening 
states. For instance, threats that destabilize a foreign economy are likely to also harm the threatening actors’ 
economy. With increasing interdependence, threats become thus less credible and advantageous. See Singh 
(2000). 
364 Note that threats harm the systemic interest of the threatening actor not only if they are intended to blockade 
proposals that would benefit the effectiveness or scope of global governance. The detrimental effects on the 
effectiveness of global governance arise even if threats aim not only at enhancing the benefits of the threatening 
actor but also at improving and extending global governance for the majority of actors. The discussion at this 
point is not about the circumstances under which threats are beneficial or detrimental to the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of global governance. My intention is to shed light on the costs of threats which influence the power 
and the frequency of threatening. 
365 See Chayes and Chayes (1995). 
366 Of course, this also makes the targeted actor less willing to resist and thus provides an incentive to threaten in 
the first place. However, I assume that the increase in costs generally outweighs the effect of anticipated 
decreased resistance. 
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the discussion about the duration of agreements, the effects of trends and global governance structures 
on the stability of the WTO have been said to be inconclusive. Given ambiguous effects on stability 
and significantly increasing costs of break-down, I conclude that actors become more averse to the 
systemic costs of threats. 
The costs of break-down arise from several factors. As the relative effectiveness of global governance 
and the scope of the WTO grow, the losses from a break-down mount.  Stronger linkages and greater 
scope of other international institutions increase the harm which implementation of threats in the WTO 
causes to these other international institutions.  
Furthermore, investments which are specific to membership in the WTO raise the loss caused by a 
break-down. Investments are specific to the WTO if their value depends on membership in the WTO. 
Usually, investments are not completely specific, but they retain considerable value even without 
membership. Yet, most investments conducted with regard to the WTO do not correspond to first 
priorities without the WTO.367 Prominent examples are the expenses of developing countries for 
upgrading domestic trade institutions, as required by the WTO. Surely, these investments are 
beneficial to trade and are thus in the interest of developing countries regardless of the WTO. 
However, the amount of resources allocated to trade facilitation, and the way they are spent, are not 
tailored to developing country needs. For instance, China shoulders massive specific investments, in 
order to gain access to the WTO.  
Regionalization lowers the costs of break-down. It increases the effectiveness of autonomous 
governance and reduces the specificity of investments that serve international cooperation in the 
WTO. 
 Power of threats 
Rational actors make threats only if the expected benefits from threatening more than compensate for 
the costs. When actors calculate the benefits and costs of threatening, they consider whether threats 
would be credible and whether credible threats would be advantageous.  
Threats only have a chance to influence outcomes if they are credible, so that the targeted actors 
expect the threat to be implemented (with a probability greater than zero), unless they compromise. If 
targeted actors know that threats are ‘cheap talk,’ because threatening actors are always better off by 
not implementing their threat, then targeted actors will make no additional concessions. 
Even if targeted actors make concessions to threatening actors, the benefits, which accrue from these 
concessions, may be smaller than the costs of threatening. This means that actors abstain from threats 
that are credible once made, unless they are advantageous.  
Expected benefits and costs of threatening, and of implementing stated threats, depend on the costs 
and damage which threats effectuate. The costs and damage caused by threats, thus, determine whether 
threats are credible and advantageous. The lower the costs the threatening actor incurs from 
implementing a threat, the more credible and advantageous the threat becomes. The more devastating 
the damage to the targeted actors if a stated threat is implemented, the greater the price becomes which 
                                                     
367 See Hoekman (2002a). 
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the targeted actors are willing to pay in order to avoid implementation of the threat. Accordingly, 
threats become more effective and frequent with falling costs and rising damage.  
The damage of implemented threats to targeted actors is similar to the costs of threats to the 
threatening actor. If threats are implemented, targeted actors suffer a direct damage from the non-
cooperative or aggressive behavior of the threatening actor. Furthermore, the systemic interest of 
targeted actors in the effective functioning of the WTO is harmed. The factors that determine costs and 
























Figure 3: Power of threats 
The amount of costs and damages strongly depends on whether targets give way or resist. If actors 
resist, an ensuing dispute may squander additional benefits from cooperation and possibly lead to a 
break down in cooperation. On the other hand, standing firm may serve long-term, stable and 
legitimate global governance as threats are discouraged. Resistance may, thus, be understood not only 
as self-serving but also as normatively appropriate behavior.368 In addition, reputational concerns favor 
resistance. Actors benefit from a tough reputation because actors unexpected of caving in become less 
easily the target of threats. Domestic audiences can support or oppose making concessions to 
threatening actors. Odell (2000, Ch. 6), for instance, contrasts how domestic societies in Brazil and the 
EU reacted to U.S. threats. While commercial interests in Europe feared escalation and favored 
                                                     
368 While I use systemic interest as a factor that works through the logic of consequences, we see that such long-
term consequentialist behavior that affects international society in general can also be formulated in normative 
terms. See also Fearon and Wendt (2002) on how many differences between rationalist and constructivist 
explanations are better understood as nuanced, empirical questions than ontological divides. 
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compromising, the Brazilian society turned with patriotic sentiments against what they perceived as an 
assault against their right to economic progress.  
Therefore, the incentives to resist are substantial and difficult to predict. Consequently, threats need to 
imply severe damage, in order to be credible and advantageous. However, we have seen the costs of 
threatening to be substantial, and these costs rise if more damage is to be attained. From this follows 
that aggressive, power-based bargaining by a single actor, such as threatening complete and formal 
withdrawal, is unlikely.  
Collectively shifting issues, or political emphasis, to alternative multilateral or minilateral institutions 
is a popular approach to reduce the costs of threats. Actors can frame a shift between institutions as a 
positive, justified development, and they can partly disguise its significance from the domestic public. 
A shift to a multilateral institution can be justified with the need to improve allocation of issues to 
institutions or to speed up decision-making. Transferring issues to minilateral institutions can be 
readily explained with more flexibility that allows every actor to select its preferred depth of 
integration. In any case, actors can lower reputational and domestic audience costs.  
If an agreement under the terms of the alternative institution is less desirable for the targeted actors, 
the threat to shift issues, or political emphasis, to the alternative institution strengthens the collective 
of threatening actors. Shifting issues to other multilateral institutions is likely to be less costly, while 
less damaging, than shifts to minilateral institutions.  
Looking at the history of GATT and the WTO, we see threats of institutional shifts frequently stated 
and occasionally implemented.369 When powerful actors moved their efforts to protect intellectual 
property rights from the WIPO to the WTO, hoping to find a more amenable stage for their proposals, 
relocation between multilateral institutions occurred. In addition, threats of industrialized countries 
surfaced periodically to establish deep integration regimes outside of the GATT/WTO, shifting policy 
priorities from the WTO to international institutions with minilateral membership. Thoughts circulated 
in the 70s around a GATT-Plus regime; in the 80s a Free Trade and Investment Area was considered. 
Furthermore, regionalization itself may be understood as a threat to spur multilateral negotiations. The 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is frequently interpreted as a U.S. threat for 
reaching concessions from the EU during the Urugay Round. 
When most developing countries stated their intention not to sign on to the agreements about Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), TRIPs, and GATS, the U.S. and EU joined the WTO and 
withdrew from GATT 1947. The U.S. and EU had constructed the WTO as a ‘single undertaking,’ so 
that all other actors had no choice but to accept all parts of the agreements if they wanted to join as 
well.370 Thus, by carrying through its threat, the two most powerful actors were able to close the 
agreement according to their preferences, independently of any voting rules. 
                                                     
369 See Landau (2000) and Steinberg (2002). See also Leigh-Phippard (1999), who relates how the Western bloc 
shifted issues from the UN to specialized agencies during the Cold War to increase its influence. 
370 See Steinberg (2002), who concludes that exiting GATT and creating the WTO involved little financial and 
limited political costs. Nevertheless, we will see that power-based minilateral decision-making looses appeal. 
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While the power of threats is influenced mostly by the trends, global governance structures also 
matter. Reputational and domestic audience costs of threats increase with the legitimacy of 
international institutions, and in particular, with expectations of legal discourse as appropriate form of 
interaction, as well as with judicial delegation, so that independent courts condemn implemented 
threats that are in violation of agreements. 
5.4.2   Decision-making designs 
Rules about participation and voting are the fundamental legal provisions that structure negotiations. 
Under multilateral participation, all actors are entitled to take part in the negotiations, whereas under 
minilateral arrangements, participation is limited to a smaller set of (powerful) actors.371 Voting rules 
state whether actors have to reach unanimity or whether decisions can be passed by majority voting.  
Based on these ideal types of participation and voting rules, I distinguish between three modes of 
decision-making: minilateral, consensus, and majority.372 The characteristics of the three approaches 
are summarized in Table 5.  
Table 5: Decision-making designs 






Under minilateral decision-making, no norms about participation exist. Powerful actors establish 
selective participation as they see fit. Decision-making rules either prescribe unanimity or they are 
absent. In the latter case, sovereignty warrants that no actor can be obligated without its consent. 
Effectively, this is equivalent to a unanimity rule. However, the unrestrained formation of minilateral 
groups shapes the character of internal decision-making among the powerful actors forming the 
                                                     
371 The juxtaposition of ‘multilateral’ versus ‘minilateral’ bargaining draws on Kahler (1992) and Ruggie (1992). 
To them, multilateralism conveys rich meaning associated with a particular historical practice rather than simply 
denoting the number of actors involved. Ruggie (1992) perceives multilateralism as based not only on broad 
participation but also on generalized principles leading to diffuse reciprocity. He sets this apart from bilateral or 
minilateral agreements characterized by opportunistic exploitation of current power constellations. Contrary to 
Ruggie, I do not consider additional multilateral norms which guide bargaining, like MFN and reciprocity, as 
constitutive for the decision-making designs. If these norms have desirable efficiency properties and if 
legalization promotes the application of these norms, a further case for legalization could be made. Indeed, 
Bagwell and Staiger (2000) forcefully argue that reciprocity and MFN enhance bargaining effectiveness. See 
Pahre (2001) for a skeptical assessment. 
372 I do not consider the combination of selective participation and majority decision-making. Such a mode 
seems both undesirable and unlikely for global governance. 
 129
minilateral set of participants. Minilateral groups form with a certain objective in mind and they are 
driven more by effectiveness than legitimacy considerations – otherwise they would multilateralize. In 
addition, they can generally be re-created in slightly different form. Unrestrained formation and the 
focus on effectiveness both undermine claims that point to the formal unanimity requirement, in order 
to resist power-based bargaining. Therefore, minilateral decision-making leaves participation and 
internal decision-making among the participants to power.373 
I distinguish among two modes of legalized, multilateral decision-making under which actors 
negotiate agreements within multilateral institutions based on the institution’s decision-making 
procedures. Under consensus decision-making, the law prescribes unanimity to pass decisions. Under 
majority decision-making, the law prescribes majoritarian voting. 
The ideal of legalized bargaining confers that influence on outcomes is channeled solely through the 
institutional decision-making system. As Steinberg (2002, 342) formulates, “In a law-based approach, 
bargaining power in international organizations is derived from substantive and procedural legal 
endowments. Decision-making rules determine voting or agenda-setting power, which shapes 
outcomes.” This does not preclude strategic voting. Actors can promise or threaten to vote in certain 
ways, in order to influence the voting behavior of other actors. Yet, the announced actions have to be 
voting behavior and not extra-institutional actions, such as financial aid or exit from the institution.  
In reality, actors do not move entirely from power-based bargaining to legalized bargaining. Instead, 
power-based bargaining resting on extra-institutional options influences the working of institutional 
decision-making. This intertwined nature of law and power makes it difficult to categorize our 
experience with past negotiations. Few institutions are clearly minilateral by formally and effectively 
excluding weak states. If powerful actors negotiate important aspects of agreements among themselves 
and if they dominate outcomes, decision-making should be considered minilateral.374 
Even to the extent that the ideal of legalized bargaining is attained, this does not imply, in the real 
world, that the influence of extra-institutional power is eradicated. For a genuine rule of law, decision-
making rules need not only to be observed, but they also have to correspond to the spirit of law. This 
means that decision-making rules have to be coherent. They have to be formulated in general terms, 
giving all members equal say or differentiating their influence along general and fair criteria. The 
more the rules are tailored to the needs of the powerful, the more the distinction between multilateral 
and minilateral decision-making wanes in significance. 
The principal supplier rule in the WTO highlights how difficult this distinction is in practice. This rule 
                                                     
373 Recall that the decision-making designs are ideal types. Of course, legitimacy plays a role in minilateral 
institutions and costs of effectively excluding resenting actors limit the power of threats within the group. We 
can think of the ‘Green Room’ negotiating process dominated by the U.S. and the EU or the Group of 8 (G8) as 
examples of real-world, softened, minilateral decision-making. The free-wheeling coalition formation of 19th 
century European great powers is an illustration of less restrained minilateralism.  
374 In this sense, Steinberg (2002, 365) summarizes that, “The GATT/WTO decision-making rules based on the 
sovereign equality of states are organized hypocrisy in the procedural context.” See also Drahos (2003) on the 
persistence of threatening power in the WTO. 
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gives actors with a high market share in one product a preferred position in negotiations about this 
product. While the rule is formulated in general terms and can be justified on economic grounds, it 
privileges large economies that tend to be more often involved as principal suppliers than smaller and 
less developed countries.  
In summary, I assume that in multilateral decision-making law considerably affects outcomes and that 
law does not mainly reflect the distribution of power. Accordingly, law is understood to be a restraint 
on power rather than an instrument of power. 
5.4.3   Effectiveness of decision-making designs 
Number and heterogeneity of veto players, and the size of their individual win sets, are key 
determinants of the effectiveness of decision-making. The win set of actors comprises all proposals 
that actors prefer to no agreement. Larger numbers of veto players, greater heterogeneity among them, 
and smaller individual win-sets make it increasingly difficult to develop proposals that make every 
veto player better off. Therefore, the chances for cooperation decrease with increasing number and 
heterogeneity of veto players and with shrinking win-sets.375 
For several reasons, the win sets dwindle. First, with more linkages and greater depth of global 
governance, negotiations increasingly concern norms. Increasing ideational heterogeneity implies that 
disagreement is to be expected when negotiations affect norms. Therefore, normative disagreements 
will become more frequent. An agreement about a standard not affecting norms usually improves the 
welfare of a given actor, even if the standard is not optimally attuned to her needs. However, if the 
standard contradicts norms in which actors believe, the emotional tensions for the government detract 
from the benefits of cooperation. And if governments are willing to withdraw from their domestic, 
normative commitments, in order to facilitate international agreement, domestic societies may impose 
domestic audience costs. Furthermore, facing normative disagreements, governments may be 
unwilling to sacrifice normative claims on one issue for gains in another issue. Finally, domestic laws, 
and, in particular, constitutions, may tie the hands of governments that are willing to compromise.376 
Secondly, strong disputes within domestic society often diminish the win-set for governments.377 One 
reason is that governments are averse to significantly harming any politically relevant domestic group. 
Furthermore, the win-set shrinks if domestic societies expect governments to advocate the outcomes of 
domestic discourses. In the extreme, internal deadlock can paralyze actors, so that the individual win-
set turns empty.378 With increasing depth and linkages, the WTO affects more issue areas that are 
                                                     
375 See Putnam (1988) and Tsebelis (2000). 
376 See Goldstein (1989), Goldstein (1993) and Jackson (2000a). 
377 See Shaffer (2001). He furthermore notes that the adverse effect of domestic disagreements may be more 
pronounced than immediately apparent as governments pretend to support proposals for domestic political 
advantage. Since governments are aware that they will be blocked and as they do not harbor the intention to 
break the blockade, governments at the same time avoid confrontations with domestic interests that oppose the 
proposal. On the other hand, Putnam (1988) notes that domestic heterogeneity can allow forming coalitions 
flexibly. 
378 See Young (1991). 
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contested domestically. Since many governments become more accountable to their domestic 
audiences for their behavior on the international stage, they find it increasingly difficult to disrespect 
standards of domestic, legitimate decision-making, and the policies formulated in these processes, in 
order to achieve international compromise.379 Moreover, since the discretion of negotiators shrinks, as 
we have seen in Chapter 4 about learning, disputes in domestic society and their influence on 
governments increasingly matter to trade policy formulation and bargaining. 
Thirdly, governments can normatively commit themselves, in order to improve their bargaining 
position. Governments that are under pressure to cede grounds in normatively charged, international 
negotiations may construct an identity based on their opposition to the internationally proclaimed 
norm.380 Greater transparency of global governance increases domestic audience costs of 
compromising and, thus, makes normative commitments more powerful. With greater transparency, 
domestic society can better observe how their governments act in negotiations, so that governments 
cannot adopt soft bargaining strategies and then explain painful concessions by overwhelming external 
pressure. Alternatively, governments commit themselves to disputed norms for domestic reasons. 
Transparency then encourages actors to “play to the gallery”.381 Whether governments choose to 
commit themselves for reasons related to the international or domestic sphere, it is difficult to assess 
the costs of revoking commitments, in particular, because political dynamics may carry actors further 
than intended. Minor differences may grow into matters of principle, leading to incompatible 
commitments that result in failure to agree.  
Fourth, even if governments do not commit themselves strategically, civil society challenges those 
actors who withdraw from normative commitments which civil society champions. Thus, civil society 
involvement makes it more difficult to compromise if certain normative positions are to be 
abandoned.382 Finally fifth, involvement of different ministries may lead to internal stalemate.383 When 
discussing internal complexity, we have seen that increasingly linked, deep global governance indeed 
involves more ministries.  
For all these reasons, the trends reduce the individual win-sets, causing decision-making to become 
more difficult. Strategic linkage of issues into comprehensive bargains is a common measure to widen 
win sets. Yet, this only shifts the problem towards increased complexity.  
Now we turn to the number of veto players. Under majority voting, coalitions would be able to form 
freely in the WTO, so that no institutional (single or compounded) veto player would exist.384 Under 
consensus decision-making, all actors become institutional veto players. With more actors, the number 
of veto players increases automatically. Regionalization lowers the number of veto players and, thus, 
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makes consensus decision-making more effective.  
Compared to consensus decision-making, minilateral decision-making rests on fewer veto players. For 
minilateralism to be effective, agreement only among powerful actors is required as a starting point. 
Once they have reached internal agreement, powerful actors have to decide whether they attempt to 
impose their decisions on excluded actors and, thus, to achieve multilateral implementation. 
Alternatively, they can be content with minilateral implementation which only covers the minilateral 
group. In the following, I first show that minilateral, as well as multilateral, implementation of 
minilateral decisions becomes increasingly unattractive. I then argue that attaining minilateral 
agreement becomes increasingly challenging. 
This contradicts Gruber (2000) who suggests that mainstream opinion underestimates the 
attractiveness of minilateral decisions that remain constrained to the minilateral group. Gruber stresses 
that actors who have a unilateral or minilateral option enjoy ‘Go-It-Alone-Power’ that transfers 
significant power to set the terms of cooperation with those actors who would not be included in the 
unilateral or minilateral option. Gruber perceives this power to be so strong that those actors without 
an attractive minilateral option frequently loose from cooperation in absolute terms. While they gain 
from cooperation compared to non-cooperation with the minilateral action executed, they loose 
compared to the status quo of non-cooperation without the minilateral action executed.385 
 Multilateral implementation 
As we have seen when discussing the trend of increasing actor participation, developing countries 
were marginalized in multilateral trade negotiations throughout GATT. An important reason for this 
was the special and preferential treatment to which developing countries were entitled. This rule eased 
the obligations of developing countries, set by WTO agreements, to such an extent that developing 
countries could not substantially commit themselves to liberalization. Thus, they had little to offer in 
exchange for industrialized countries’ liberalization. As a consequence, WTO negotiations were 
mostly exchanges of concessions between industrialized countries, with developing countries free-
riding but gaining only moderately. The Uruguay Round rigorously curbed developing countries’ 
privileges and made developing countries full members of the WTO. The introduction of the ‘single 
undertaking’ extended WTO obligations in particular to developing countries as they had participated 
reluctantly in the ‘plurilateral agreements’ that committed only signatories instead of all members of 
the WTO. Hence, the significance of the WTO has risen for developing countries beyond the increases 
in relative effectiveness and scope of global governance that raise the significance of the WTO for all 
actors. 
The institutional disempowerment of the past was complemented by a cultural dimension. Developing 
countries had adopted the role of protectionist free-riders, and the regime’s modus operandi did not 
expect developing countries to translate commitments into action. This culture has changed, 
particularly during the Uruguay Round. Governments and domestic audiences in developing countries 
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have learned about the importance of participation in global governance and about the costs of 
absence. Domestic audiences now exercise pressure on their governments for more active 
safeguarding of their interests.386 
Developing and newly industrialized countries do not only take more interest in global governance, 
but their capacities to influence outcomes have also improved. Developing countries’ governments 
and negotiators have upgraded their bargaining skills, such as formulating a position ahead of 
negotiations, influencing agenda setting, and linking issues strategically. In particular, developing 
countries have noticed how cooperation with other developing and developed countries can effectuate 
results.387 
More fundamental is that economic growth in (former) developing countries has strengthened their 
position. Market size is a key determinant of bargaining power in the WTO.388 The damage to the 
targeted actors of reduced market access increases with the size of the market. The costs of non-
participation and exit both fall as the home market provides better opportunities. Also, the costs of 
aggressive behavior shrink as relatively lower barriers to trade need to be erected for the same level of 
damage. Improved bargaining skills, dynamic economic growth, and generally declining power of 
threats, which we have noted above, make developing countries less vulnerable to threats.389 
In addition, new entrants join the WTO. These countries include giants like China, who entered in 
2001, and Russia, who is engaged in advanced accession talks by 2004. Moreover, civil society builds 
up pressure to better integrate developing countries into WTO decision-making.  
Overall, more actors will resist extension of minilateral agreements with more resolve and greater 
capacities, assisted by civil society.390 Therefore, multilateral implementation becomes harder to 
achieve. And even if minilateral decisions can be multilateralized, decreasing power of threats and 
increasing resistance against minilateral decisions drive up transaction costs. The more the threats are 
implemented or only announced, the more the costs and damages pile up. 
 Minilateral implementation 
If powerful actors forming a minilateral group cannot extend minilateral decisions to excluded actors 
at tolerable costs, they can limit the implementation of minilateral decisions to the minilateral group. 
However, such minilateral implementation lacks appeal for two reasons. First, the value of developing 
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countries’ participation, which minilateral implementation forgoes, is increasing.391 Secondly, 
excluded actors can be expected to increasingly militate even against minilateral implementation, not 
only against the multilateral extension of minilateral decisions.  
To understand growing opposition to minilateral implementation, it is helpful to consider the benefits 
and costs that minilateral agreement, which is not completely extended to all actors, can extend to 
excluded actors. Under the old GATT, industrialized countries traded concessions that were then 
granted to developing countries based on the MFN principle. Yet, industries in developing countries 
have become increasingly competitive, so that powerful actors are less ready to expose their import-
competing industries to developing country competition without commensurate benefits to their export 
industries. And as market access to those traditionally excluded actors is increasingly valuable, 
powerful actors are less willing to give away bargaining chips, which they could trade for market 
access. Therefore, powerful actors are less willing to give away concessions that benefit excluded 
actors. 
Moreover, WTO policies shift with deeper integration from market access concessions to standards. If 
standards spread through the market, excluded actors are automatically affected by minilaterally 
implemented decisions in which they had no say. This means that developing countries do not only 
benefit less from minilateral implementation, but they can incur losses if the standards are ill-suited to 
their needs. Even if they are better off with a minilateral standard than without, they are likely to 
compare the benefits under the minilateral standard with the benefits which they expect if multilateral 
decision-making would lead to a standard that would suit them better. 
We have seen that the beneficial aspects of minilateral implementation for excluded actors decline, 
whereas the detrimental aspects increase. Since developing countries will, thus, resist more strongly 
and as the exclusion of developing countries increasingly forgoes gains from cooperation, minilateral 
implementation looses appeal.  
 Minilateral agreement 
A minilateral group needs to combine sufficient market size to either coerce excluded actors into 
accepting the minilateral decisions at bearable costs or to keep the losses of minilateral, as compared 
to multilateral, implementation modest and to shoulder the damage of possible resistance to minilateral 
implementation.  
Given waning power of threats and increasing resistance, maintaining a small minilateral group and 
overcoming resistance by employing more severe threats is difficult. The minilateral group, thus, has 
to expand, in order to lower its own costs of threats and to increase the damage to the remaining 
actors.392 Yet, this increases the number of veto players within the minilateral group. This is critical 
since internal cooperation is increasingly hampered by ideational heterogeneity among the veto 
players, particularly between the EU and the U.S..  
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5.5 Risk of decision-making 
When cooperation in international institutions, and with legalized, institutional decision-making in 
particular, is effective, this suggests that actors are open to institutionalization and legalization. 
However, actors take the effects of institutionalization and legalization on their individual welfare as 
basis for their choice rather than global welfare effects. The individual welfare effects of global 
governance depend not only on the effectiveness of global governance but also on the distribution of 
the benefits and costs of cooperation. Therefore, we have to consider how institutionalization and 
legalization change the distribution of welfare. 
In the context of the EU, Moravcsik (1993, 509) suggests that “the decision to adopt qualified majority 
voting or delegation to common institutions is the result of a cost-benefit analysis of the stream of 
future substantive decisions expected to follow from alternative institutional designs. For individual 
Member States carrying out such a cost-benefit calculation, the decision to delegate or pool 
sovereignty signals the willingness of national governments to accept an increased political risk of 
being outvoted or overruled on any individual issue in exchange for more efficient collective decision-
making on the average.” We can infer from this experience with the EU that, first, actors compare 
different governance scenarios in order to assess whether institutionalization and legalization are 
individually beneficial. Secondly, this understanding emphasizes the uncertainty of outcomes under 
different governance scenarios and, thus, justifies the term ‘risk.’ Actors do not know under which 
global governance structure they will benefit most, but they can form expectations about the effects of 
alternative structures. 
Whenever the pay-offs of a certain global governance scenario fall short of the benchmark which 
actors apply, I speak of deviations. I discern among three types of deviations. In the first case, actors 
compare consensus decision-making with minilateral decision-making. Consensus voting deviations, 
thus, refer to the degree by which outcomes under consensus voting are less favorable for a given actor 
than outcomes resulting under minilateral decision-making. Correspondingly, majority voting 
deviations describe the degree by which outcomes under majority voting are less favorable for a given 
actor than outcomes resulting under minilateral decision-making. 
Institutionalization deviations are different because actors do not compare global governance 
outcomes produced by different decision-making designs. Instead, actors compare the outcomes under 
global governance for any kind of institutional decision-making with the outcomes of autonomous 
governance.  
Powerful actors generally prefer global governance with minilateral decision-making over autonomous 
governance. If minilateralism is fairing poorly, they can still minilaterally agree to (partially) return to 
autonomous governance. Therefore, consensus and majority voting deviations largely exhaust their 
concerns.  
Institutionalization deviations consequently pertain (mostly) to weak actors who have little influence 
on global governance but depend on its results as they can do little to escape or offset the effects of 
detrimental global governance constellations. While weak actors may loose considerably through 
global governance, they generally gain by legalization which replaces minilateral decision-making 
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with consensus or majority voting. Accordingly, the fundamental concern of weak actors is deviations 
stemming from institutionalization. 
For all three types of deviations, risk is determined by the degree of deviation in global governance 
policies and by the costs of deviations.393 The degree of deviations depends on the specific type of 
deviation. Accordingly, I address the three types of deviations separately in the following sections. 
What will become apparent after this discussion, but will not be mentioned explicitly again, is that all 
three types of deviations increase with the heterogeneity of objectives.394 Consensus voting is more 
likely to be deadlocked, majorities are more likely to exploit minorities under majority voting, and 
powerful actors are more likely to disregard weak actors in international institutions with greater 
heterogeneity. Hence, increasing material and ideational heterogeneity aggravates risk, whereas 
effective learning reduces risk.  
By and large, the costs of deviations equal the costs of unexpected, adverse outcomes which we have 
already discussed in the context of uncertainty in the section about internal complexity. Note in 
addition that costs arise even if actors who have voted against a decision can file a reservation 
exempting them from all obligations flowing from the decision, as practiced in the WTO. Beyond 
minor reputational costs of exempting themselves, actors can face indirect costs of exemptions. These 
costs are caused by majority voting if, in the absence of institutional decision-making, a minilateral 
decision had not arisen. Even if a minilateral decision had occurred otherwise, the costs of exemptions 
tend to be intensified by majority voting because more actors are likely to follow a majority decision, 
due to their legitimacy and for reputational concerns, than a minilateral decision. If the costs of 
exemption-based non-participation increase with the number of other actors adhering to a decision, 
majority decisions cause costs for dissenting actors. This is particularly salient for a standard setting. 
Nevertheless, exemptions decrease majority risk as they give actors the choice to select the less costly 
alternative. 
5.5.1   Risk of consensus voting 
We have defined consensus deviations as the unfavorable difference between outcomes under 
consensus voting compared to outcomes under minilateral decision-making.395 For three reasons, 
powerful actors can be worse off under consensus decision-making than under minilateralism. First, 
threats become more costly. Institutional veto players hold on to their formal rights and they resist 
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threats more vigorously than they would without formal veto power. Also, reputational and domestic 
audience costs of threats increase if they contradict legitimate decision-making rules.  
Secondly, reduced power of threats may enable institutional veto players to successfully block a 
decision that could have been passed under minilateral decision-making. The costs of possible 
blockades depend on the circumstances of bargaining. If negotiations take place frequently and under 
circumstances that are conducive to agreement, the bargaining problem may be surmounted even 
under consensus voting. However, value at stake, complexity of issues, and number and nature of veto 
players increasingly form a difficult background for bargaining. Under these circumstances, unanimity 
is very hard to reach. 
Thirdly, powerful actors may have to accept a distribution of gains that is less favorable for them than 
under minilateral decision-making, in order to overcome blockades without inordinate costs of 
threatening. 
We can conclude that the greater the power of threats and the greater bargaining effectiveness for a 
given global governance structure, the lower the risk of consensus voting becomes. Moreover, judicial 
delegation can substitute for deadlocked bargaining. Courts either issue rulings with legislative 
function out of their own commitment to progress in global governance or powerful actors attain such 
rulings through pressure on courts. Thus, judicial delegation lowers the costs of possible blockades.  
5.5.2   Risk of majority voting 
Actors agree on rules for majority decision-making behind a veil of uncertainty.396 Overall gains 
through improved decision-making effectiveness stand against losses to changing, unknown 
minorities. Nevertheless, actors may resist majority voting for two reasons. First, actors are risk-
averse. Secondly, the veil is somewhat transparent.397 Actors know whether their interests tend to be 
better served by changes or by the status quo. They also have an estimate about how majority voting 
would affect their ability to influence changes. In particular, the possibility for weak actors to pass 
decisions against the will of powerful actors partly offsets the power of extra-institutional threats. 
Powerful actors, therefore, need to incur higher costs, in order to bias agreements in their favor, or 
they have to accept less beneficial distributions of the gains from cooperation.  
The following analysis of the risk of majority voting first centers on the influence of consensus voting 
as a supplement to majority voting, based on experience with multi-level governance in the EU and 
the U.S.. The analysis then shows that determinants of legalization other than decision-making design 
influence the risk of majority voting. Finally, the analysis considers the impact of these determinants 
and the trends on self-restraint and external restraints that keep the majority from exploiting the 
minority. 
Analysis of the struggle of lower-level authorities to control higher-level authorities in multi-level 
governance is similar, whether actors delegate authority to the WTO, whether countries delegate 
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authority to the EU, or whether states delegate authority to the federal level in the U.S..398 Therefore, 
lessons from other instances of multi-level governance can be applied to risk in the WTO. 
Coglianese and Nicolaidis (2002) discuss four mechanisms related to decision-making that allow 
principals to maintain control over agents to whom they have transferred authority: delineation of the 
scope of delegated authority, supervision of the agent, direct involvement in the affairs of the agent, 
and maintenance of the option to reverse the delegation of authority.  
Monitoring and reversal of authority are key factors in judicial delegation risk to which we turn in the 
next section. Most important for majority voting deviations is delineation of the competency of higher-
level authorities, which is in this case the decision-making body of the WTO. This technique requires 
a constitutive agreement that is protected from simple majoritarian changes. Majority risk is, thus, 
much reduced if it is combined with consensus decision-making that delineates a boundary for 
majoritarian decisions. 
Before we can ask how precision, judicial delegation, exemptions, and punishment influence majority 
risk, we have to consider the general validity of the argument that any determinant of legalization 
other than decision-making design matters. If the endogenous determinants could be changed easily 
and without costs under majority decision-making, we could not consider the working of different 
structures under majority voting as the structures could be changed by a majority that feels restrained 
by them. 
But changes in structure are costly. Actors may refrain from changing structure in order to maintain 
the institution’s legitimacy and to avoid permanent changes in structure which lower effectiveness. 
Risk-averse actors avoid structural changes whose effects are difficult to predict. The institution as an 
agent may resist change. Additionally, certain structures are likely to be protected by particularly high 
majority requirements. Hence, structures display considerable stability despite majority voting. The 
endurance of constitutions in domestic settings can serve as an analogy.  
Now we can search for structures that curb majority voting deviations. Here, the problem occurs that 
effective decision-making and risk appear to come together. Generally, legalized bargaining under a 
majority rule stands for effectiveness, whereas power is detrimental. However, not every global 
governance structure that lowers majority risk reduces bargaining effectiveness to a corresponding 
degree. Different structures, which include majority decision-making, can display more or less 
advantageous combinations of bargaining effectiveness and risk. 
Key to advantageous combinations are mechanisms that prevent abusive voting. I speak of abusive 
voting if majority voting leads to massively skewed distributions that significantly disadvantage 
powerful actors. Abusive voting implies use of duly transferred authority to resistant actors’ 
disadvantage, beyond what their ‘system consent’ to the decision-making design warrants. A moderate 
deviation from the minilateral outcome in favor of weak and poor actors cannot be considered an 
abusive exploitation of decision-making rules. Accordingly, if structures prevent only abusive 
majority voting, decision-making proceeds unimpeded by power in all but rare, abusive cases. 
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Generally, we can distinguish between internal or self-restraint and external restraint on abusive 
majority voting.399 One reason for practicing self-restraint is that actors anticipate that minorities will 
employ threats to prevent abusive voting and that they will resort to exemptions, defections, and exit, 
in order to avoid the obligations stemming from abusive voting. Despite incentives for 
misrepresentation, all actors have some knowledge about this limit. The majority has an incentive not 
to cross this line, which triggers costly reactions. Therefore, structures that allow for more effective 
threats, which offer more generous exemptions, and which display weak enforcement mechanisms 
imply a narrowly drawn line of acceptable deviations and high costs of crossing this line. Thus, such 
structures experience low majority risk. 
Avoiding employment of defensive measures by minorities is one aspect of the systemic interest that 
speaks against abusive majority voting. Further motives are related to norms prescribing that an 
international institution cannot be governed with narrow majorities, like in the EU.400 With strong 
collective identity, actors do not enrich themselves at the costs of others. However, in the EU, 
collective identity is insufficient to grant legitimacy to majority decisions with considerable 
distributional implications. EU members do not need to suppose that decisions were made with 
collective well-being in mind and that they should, thus, be respected.401 Under the logic of 
consequences, actors comply with the norm requiring sound majorities in order to preserve 
institutional legitimacy and in order to avoid the possibility of being outvoted themselves. Moreover, 
actors can comply with self-restraining norms driven by the logic of appropriateness. Even lower 
collective identity in the WTO delegitimizes majority decisions with considerable distributional 
implications. Accordingly, even greater self-restraint is required out of systemic self-interest and for 
normative reasons.  
Maintaining legitimacy is a particularly convincing argument for self-restraint in the WTO. We will 
see that enforcement rests essentially on compliance pull, domestic audience costs, and reputational 
costs that all hinge, at least to a considerable extent, on the legitimacy of the international institution. 
Abusive voting weakens legitimacy and, thus, erodes the capacity of the WTO to enforce agreements 
against powerful actors. Indeed, governments may feel that appropriate behavior towards abusive 
voting is non-compliance, and they are likely to be supported by domestic society.  
In the case of actors’ self-restraint failing to prevent abusive decision-making, courts can protect 
harmed actors. Even without constitutional authority, which is most effective in warranting minority 
rights, courts can limit abusive majority voting. Courts are interested in institutional stability and they 
do not benefit from skewed distributions. Therefore, they can be expected to use their discretion 
against abusive voting.402 They can do so, for instance, by strengthening the role of fundamental 
agreements against continuous decision-making, which may be subject to lower majority 
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requirements. Courts in the WTO consider the rights of the complainant and of the defendant under 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), as well as the decisions of political bodies on the 
disputed issue.403 If political bodies vote abusively, we can expect courts to give more weight to the 
rights stemming from fundamental agreements under the DSU. 
Abbott and Snidal (2000, 431) observe that, “Even when directly negotiated solutions are permitted, 
the existence of legal institutions means that states will bargain ‘in the shadow’ of anticipated legal 
decisions.” Roessler (2001, 320) highlights that “reaching a consensus takes place in the shadow of the 
procedural alternatives available in the absence of a consensus. These alternatives can effectively 
dictate the outcome of that process.” Therefore, less abusive voting should occur in anticipation of 
minority right protection through courts. 
5.5.3   Risk of institutionalization 
What I have not considered so far is the risk of institutionalization. We have defined 
institutionalization deviations as the loss to weak actors created by the move from autonomous 
governance to global governance for any decision-making design. In theory, global governance can 
become less effective than autonomous governance, in particular if blocked by disagreements under 
unanimity voting. The more realistic case is that minilateral global governance produces extremely 
uneven distributions, so that weak actors are made worse off through participation in global 
governance. While it is unlikely that weak actors loose through participation in global governance in 
absolute terms, this can be expected to apply from a marginal perspective. From a certain point 
onwards, the extension of global governance at the costs of autonomous governance becomes too 
risky. Then actors resist widening the ambit of global governance. They also refuse strengthening the 
hold of global governance on those issues already within its domain, for instance, by objecting to more 
precision or tougher punishment.  
Institutionalization can undermine the standing of weak actors against powerful actors. Unilateral or 
minilateral decisions which adversely affect excluded actors face normatively motivated resilience. 
Yet, if minilateral decision-making is commonly practiced in global governance, if powerful actors 
find a sufficient majority under majority voting, or if they find an overwhelming majority under 
consensus voting, then powerful actors have the normative pressure of an institutionally legitimated 
decision on their side. Within international institutions, the sovereignty norm protects less against 
intrusions, so that reputational pressures grow stronger. This is critical because the influence of weak 
actors on global governance may remain weak in the face of extra-institutional power. 
Besides for formal decision-making, institutionalization affects the creation and significance of 
customary law. If customary rules strongly reflect the interest of the powerful, legalization, which 
gives additional weight to customary rules, disadvantages weak actors through the back door. In 
practice, the bias of customary law in favor of the powerful is limited, since the formation of 
customary law is directed by existing customary and formal law which takes balanced distributional 
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implications as a determinant of compliance into account.404  
Global governance can be made more enticing to weak actors on two accounts, beyond those measures 
that lower the costs of deviations. First, deviations can be reduced. Global governance structures that 
require multilateral decision-making, make threats costly, and induce deliberating improve the 
standing of weak actors. Regionalization combines the power of weak actors, so that they can better 
withstand threats. Independent courts oppose attempts by powerful actors to use the law as an 
instrument of power. Secondly, positive side effects of agreements can off-set disadvantages of 
institutionalization. In particular, compliance mechanisms that enforce obligations also against strong 
actors level the playing field to the advantage of weak actors. 
5.6 Judicial delegation 
WTO rules are imperfect in many regards. They are imperfectly state-contingent. This means that they 
do not contain optimal provisions for every state of the world. They are legally incomplete as they do 
not prescribe obligations for every situation within their scope. Furthermore, rules may be 
ambiguously formulated or conflicting. 
These imperfections are partly unintentional. Actors cannot foresee every future contingency. 
Language is inherently ambiguous and cross-cultural communication breeds misunderstandings. 
Furthermore, if thousands of boundedly rational negotiators formulate thousands of rules, gaps and 
conflicts between rules are inevitable. However, imperfections can also be intentional.405 If actors 
accept imperfections, less precision is needed. Thus, actors save transaction costs of bargaining that 
increase with precision. The transaction costs of operating an agreement can furthermore increase with 
high precision, because handling overly precise legal arrangements requires costly expertise. Not least 
of all, unresolved conflicts may be buried under vague formulations.  
Imperfect agreements are especially attractive if combined with judicial delegation. Judicial legislation 
may be more flexible than ordinary rule-making and, thus, produce rules that are better attuned to 
changed circumstances. Moreover, low precision and extensive judicial delegation create an artificial 
veil of uncertainty. Actors expect rulings to be efficient, but they are uncertain how court rulings in 
future disputes will distribute benefits and costs of cooperation. Under this perspective, actors delegate 
authority to courts until their appreciation of the average gains from judicial delegation is balanced by 
their aversion to the uncertainty of the distribution of benefits and costs. Finally, leaving agreements 
imperfect and empowering courts to clarify rules by judicial legislation may both be politically more 
opportune for actors than spelling out all implications of their agreements themselves and in advance.  
A main disadvantage of imperfect agreements is that they evoke disputes. Actors face incentives to 
defect from incompletely state-contingent agreements. Furthermore, actors disagree how to interpret 
ambiguous rules, how to fill legal gaps, and how to resolve rule conflicts. To settle these disputes, 
courts need to interpret and expand existing legislation. Though court rulings are primarily particular 
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and retrospective, that means, they resolve existing disputes among disputing parties, rulings also 
indicate how judges intend to settle future similar cases. In this sense, rulings are general and 
prospective. This endows courts with a legislative function.406 
Let us summarize the ways in which judicial delegation contributes to the extension of global 
governance scope. First, judicial delegation contributes to legal discourse and, thus, social capital 
formation in international society. Social capital formation, in turn, allows negotiating more scope of 
global governance.  
Secondly, judicial delegation enhances bargaining effectiveness. Judicial delegation creates a veil of 
uncertainty, it reduces the domestic political costs of agreements, and it sets focal points. By 
containing decision-making risk, judicial delegation indirectly adds to bargaining effectiveness as it 
allows more effective, though risky, majority voting.  
Thirdly, judicial delegation lowers the costs of conflicts that arise from imperfect agreements. 
Consequently, actors agree on broader scope with lower precision if judicial delegation is extensive.  
Fourth, judicial delegation implies judicial legislation which tends to increase the scope of global 
governance. While judicial legislation is unlikely to extend global governance to new issues, it 
intensifies the regulation of issues already covered by agreements.  
5.6.1   Risk of judicial delegation 
While judicial delegation offers many benefits to global governance, transferring power to courts 
involves risks for weak and powerful actors.407 If we define judicial delegation risk in analogy to our 
definition of decision-making risk, then judicial delegation risk is the deviation of outcomes under 
judicial dispute resolution compared to the settlement of disputes through negotiations without judicial 
delegation for a given actor. Two types of judicial delegation risk can be discerned: a principal-agent 
risk and a collective-principal risk. 
In the case of principal-agent risk, courts can pursue their own agenda, thereby violating interests 
which are broadly shared within international society.408 Indeed, we can observe a tendency among 
international institutions to develop towards the rule of law.409 The basic impetus of law appears to 
oppose the current state-based international system. Held (2002, 38) links legalization to the 
cosmopolitan project which aims at fundamentally reconfiguring the international system, “The core 
of the cosmopolitan project involves reconceiving legitimate political authority in a manner that 
disconnects it from its traditional anchor in fixed territories and instead articulates it as an attribute of 
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409 See Reich (1996). 
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basic cosmopolitan democratic arrangements or basic cosmopolitan law”. Petersmann (2001) calls for 
far-reaching reform of the WTO in accordance with the human rights revolution in international law. 
His ideas about human rights as the central concept for reshaping the WTO substantially devalue 
actors’ sovereignty.410 And while more limited in his aspirations, even the former Chairman of the 
Appellate Body Bacchus (2003, 548) believes that “much that can be done for the end of freedom 
through the means of trade simply will not be done unless politics yields to law, and unless diplomacy 
yields to jurisprudence in the important work of WTO dispute settlement.”  
The second type of judicial delegation risk arises from the circumstance that international institutions 
contract with a collective principal. Whereas the principal confronts the courts externally as a single 
entity, which speaks with one voice through only one collective decision-making system, the principal 
is internally composed of the many actors who make up the membership of the WTO.411 As the 
interests diverge which actors take as participants or observers of lawsuits, courts have to navigate 
between opposing interests. Even if courts conform to the majority will of the collective principal, 
they still conflict with a share of the membership. I speak of a collective principal deviation if 
outcomes of judicial dispute resolution are systematically less beneficial for a given actor than the 
results that would be attainable if bargaining was not substituted by judicial decision-making. 
Interests systematically diverge over many cases in particular according to the power actors hold. If 
courts maintain equality before the law and protect the rights of weak actors, they upset powerful 
actors, who prefer bargaining instead of impartial courts. Weak actors, on the other hand, fear that 
courts cave in to the demands of the powerful. If the law is transformed into an instrument of the 
powerful, weak actors can be worse off under judicial decision-making than under bargaining. 
Whether actors prefer bargaining or judicial delegation depends on the decision-making design in 
place. Powerful actors are more open to judicial delegation if decision-making is legalized, so that 
their power is restrained in any case. Weak actors are more willing to accept judicial delegation risks if 
they can, thus, avoid minilateral bargaining. 
The difference between the principal-agent risk and collective principal risk is fluid. I speak rather of a 
principal-agent than a collective principal risk the more actively courts pursue their own agenda and 
the greater the majority of actors is which opposes a ruling.  
More important than any single case is the legal dynamic which can emerge from precedent. This can 
develop the rules of the WTO in a direction that conflicts with the interests of a set of actors or of the 
principal as a whole.412 Courts can strategically construct precedents in order to extend their 
independence, mandate, and accessibility. For instance, courts can embed decisions with possible 
long-term consequences in comparatively uncontroversial cases.413 In the EU, the ECJ has empowered 
                                                     
410 See, however, Trachtman and Moremen (2003, 224) arguing against “conclusory assertions of the rightness, 
fairness, democracy, or legitimacy of private participation in WTO dispute settlement.” 
411 See Nielson and Tierney (2003). 
412 See Alter (2000), Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998), Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz (1998) and Keohane, 
Moravcsik and Slaughter (2000).  
413 See Garrett, Kelemen and Schulz (1998). 
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itself, and European law in general, by establishing new obligations for actors. For instance, the ECJ 
granted direct effect to large parts of European regulations and largely achieved supremacy of EU law 
over national law.414  
Even if courts do not intentionally lay the groundwork for more authority, their independence can rise. 
Courts can gain strong legitimacy that elevates their standing beyond what actors had in mind in their 
agreement. Moreover, accumulating case precedent strengthens courts. The legal situation gains clarity 
with precedents, so that it becomes more expensive for courts to succumb to powerful actors and even 
to demands of the collective principal if those are inconsistent. 
Like decision-making risk, judicial delegation risk depends on the size and the costs of deviations. 
Judicial scope and independence determine the size of deviations. Judicial scope reflects the number 
and significance of rulings, which courts issue. In the definition of Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter 
(2000, 460), judicial independence “assesses the extent to which adjudication is rendered impartially 
with respect to concrete state interests in a specific case.”  
Judicial scope delineates the potential for judicial delegation deviations, whereas judicial 
independence determines how this potential is realized. The more independent courts become, the 
greater the collective-principal risk becomes for powerful actors, who cannot apply their extra-
institutional means. Naturally, this implies a small risk for weak actors, who fear that the powerful 
might capture the judicial system. Obviously, the principal-agent problem becomes more severe as the 
courts gain more independence. 
5.6.2   Judicial scope 
The degree of imperfection in agreements is an important determinant of judicial scope. The more 
imperfect agreements are, the more disputes arise and the greater discretion courts enjoy in resolving 
the disputes.415 While precision is endogenous, the trends point towards growing imperfections as 
optimal completeness declines with uncertainty and complexity of the issues that are to be 
regulated.416  
Judicial scope also depends on the design of judicial delegation. Breadth of legal mandate, legal 
proceedings, and accessibility of courts each influence the number and significance of rulings. The 
legal mandate delineates the competency of courts. If courts are entitled to add or diminish 
obligations, their rulings become more significant than if they are narrowly bound to determining 
compliance with existing obligations. Accordingly, litigating becomes more attractive. Justifications at 
court become more difficult with more intrusive standards of review. Consequently, plaintiffs have 
better chances of winning a lawsuit in more cases, so that more cases will be brought to court. If 
standards of interpretation give courts broad discretion, their rulings are less restrained by legal text 
and become more significant on average. 
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The more automatic the legal proceedings go, the fewer the cases blocked by resenting actors. As 
automaticity increases, even significant cases cannot be dropped from the judicial track, so that the 
average significance of cases also grows. 
To assess the relevance of access, the following definition by Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter 
(2000, 462) is helpful, “From a legal perspective, access measures the range of social and political 
actors who have legal standing to submit a dispute to be resolved; from a political perspective, access 
measures the range of those who can set the agenda. Access is particularly important with respect to 
courts and other dispute-resolving bodies because, in contrast to executives and legislatures, they are 
‘passive’ organs of government unable to initiate action by unilaterally seizing a dispute … access can 
be viewed as measuring the ‘political transaction costs’ to individuals and groups in society of 
submitting their complaint to an international dispute-resolution body.”  
In the WTO, accessibility is designed restrictively with states as gatekeepers. Lobbying governments 
to bring cases is costly for private agents as governments have to pay costs for litigating themselves. 
Transaction costs of going to court, and the danger of being confronted with suits brought up by the 
litigated actor in revenge, render governments reluctant litigators.417 The broader the access is, the 
more cases are brought to court. However, access that is limited to actors does not simply lower the 
number of cases but it gives actors the possibility to select the cases they bring to court. Since actors, 
for fear of systemic repercussions, are more reluctant than private agents to legislate on important 
issues through courts, the significance of cases rises with easier access for private agents. 
The selection of cases through actors does have a side effect on the legitimacy of courts. Actors can 
ignore tensions between their respective actor-level policies and they can negotiate remedies that are 
different from those courts would prescribe. Access for private agents implies that all tensions 
between actor-level policies become subject to court rulings and that courts rule even on matters where 
the concerned actors could settle conflicts peacefully by political remedies. Limited access, thus, 
lowers the pressure on courts to issue rulings that are possibly damaging to their legitimacy – while it 
preserves the right for actors to resort to law instead of power for solving conflicts. 
5.6.3   Judicial independence 
Pollack (1997, 129) notes that independence is “a function of the efficacy and credibility of the control 
mechanisms established by the member states [of the EU] to monitor and sanction agency activity.” In 
addition, internal factors influence courts rulings. The main internal factors which judges take into 
consideration in their rulings are the repercussions of their rulings on their professional recognition, on 
their legitimacy, and on the stability of the WTO.418 I do not consider how civil society influences 
courts as control works mostly through authoritative institutional channels, that is, from actors as 
                                                     
417 Nevertheless, actors are strongly influenced by potent private agents to bring cases so that access is in the end 
moderately open. See Keohane, Moravcsik and Slaughter (2000). 
418 See Ehlermann (2003) and Garret, Kelemen and Schulz (1998). 
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proximate principals to international institutions.419  
 External control 
External control mechanisms can be divided according to whether they offer ex-ante or ex-post 
control.420 Ex-ante (or administrative) mechanisms allow preventing deviations from occurring. 
However, they restrain the flexibility of agents, so that the benefits of judicial delegation suffer. 
Moreover, many administrative control measures offered by the principal-agent literature, such as 
control over personnel or budget control, are difficult to apply in real-world situations.421 This is 
particularly true for controlling courts. The heterogeneity of preferences among actors makes an 
efficient screening process impossible which would warrant that the preferences of judges correspond 
to the preferences of the collective principal at the point of inauguration. In addition, judges are likely 
to change their preferences during their long tenure. Furthermore, screening and selecting personnel, 
in order to employ agents with preferences similar to those of the principal, would contradict the 
necessity to employ judges with excellent professional expertise and political sensitivity. Hence, 
administrative control mechanisms are ill-suited for international courts.422 
A different type of ex ante control concerns access to courts. Contrary to private agents, actors are able 
to collectively limit the inflow of cases to courts if courts systematically deviate from actors’ 
preferences. 
Ex-post (or oversight) procedures leave more flexibility to agents. However, ex-post mechanisms 
require principals to effectively monitor agents and to threaten with credible sanctions if they discover 
deviations. The greater the complexity of legal reasoning, the more difficulty actors face in monitoring 
courts activity. If courts base their rulings on a high number of legal criteria, comparison of single 
cases becomes difficult as every case becomes unique in its combination of characteristics. Pollack 
(1997, 121) speaks of “informational asymmetries in favor of the Court resulting from the technical 
and legal obscurity of the latter’s decisions”. Thus, weak actors cannot easily assess whether their case 
was ruled in accordance with the law or whether political pressure played its part. Moreover, 
monitoring whether courts pursue their own agenda or slowly extend their authority becomes difficult 
if courts can hide their intentions under opaque layers of legal reasoning.  
The case of subsidies illustrates the complexity of WTO rulings.423 Courts have to establish whether a 
subsidy has been paid and whether the subsidy violates WTO regulations. To assign disputed subsidies 
to classes of subsidies that are allowed or forbidden, courts cannot work with rules of thumb. Instead, 
                                                     
419 See Nielson and Tierney (2003). The principal-agent theory of international institutions is weakly developed. 
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423 See Hoekman and Kostecki (2001), Jackson (1997) and McGuire (2002). Bronckers (1999) discusses the 
complexity of disputes in intellectual property and telecommunication services where different perspectives can 
reasonably be adopted which make a difference for rulings.  
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courts have to perform a fine-grained, contextual analysis of the nature and the effects of a subsidy 
under dispute. To rule, for instance, that a prohibited export subsidy has been paid, courts first have to 
show that companies have received a benefit. This requires that the subsidy was granted on terms that 
are more favorable than those terms which the company could have achieved on the open market. 
Then courts have to prove that subsidies are de facto export contingent, for instance, because sales 
targets could be met only through significant exports. These intricacies arise because courts need to 
distinguish between subsidies that are intended to confer a competitive advantage, as opposed to 
subsidies that are justified by market failure or aim at non-economic objectives.  
With increasing linkages and deep integration, courts have to take more values and more domestic 
political necessities into account. Courts can no longer simply assume that there is a first-best, 
domestic measure available for non-economic objectives that does not affect trade. Instead, courts 
have to look more realistically at the available tool-kit of governments and they have to leave 
governments an adequate margin of appreciation.424 All this makes it hard to come by with clear 
instances of judicial deviation.  
If actors nevertheless observe judicial deviations, they can pass decisions to reverse individual rulings 
or they can modify judicial delegation design to restrain legal expansion in general.425 Modifying 
judicial delegation structure can be costly if actors have to forgo a share of the aforementioned 
benefits of judicial delegation. Since global governance has to regulate increasingly complex issues, 
actors become dependent on the sophisticated performance of courts. If actors are willing to pay the 
price of modifying judicial delegation design, or if they are content with reversing a particular ruling, 
they have to be able to pass corresponding decisions. With greater bargaining effectiveness, and lower 
majority thresholds to reverse judicial rulings especially, threats of ex-post control become more 
credible.426 
As the example of the EU shows, actors who are not party to the dispute but who are interested in 
legislative response to legal deviations assist the party that has lost a law case. Garrett, Kelemen and 
Schulz (1998, 161) speak of adverse decisions by the ECJ if the ECJ rules that an actor is in violation 
with EU rules. They conclude that, “The greater the potential costs of a case, the larger the number of 
governments potentially affected by it, and the larger the number of adverse decisions the ECJ makes 
in similar areas of the law, the greater the likelihood that the EU member governments will respond 
collectively to restrain EU activism.” More broadly, Alter (2000, 515) proposes that, “There is much 
to suggest that the forces for disintegration are created by the process of European integration itself. 
As European integration expands, it upsets more national policies. As more power is transferred to EU 
institutions, national actors (national courts, national administrators, national parliaments, and national 
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interest groups) find their own influence, independence, and autonomy undermined.” This means that 
ex-post control decisions become more likely as deviations aggregate over actors and time. Thus, 
unrestrained legal self-empowerment by courts is unlikely, even if bargaining is rigid. 
 Internal control 
While the internal factors which judges take into account are also contingent on global governance 
structures, they cannot be purposefully manipulated by the actors. Instead, they refer to broader 
considerations about professional recognition, legitimacy, and systemic stability in which judges 
engage and which depend on a complex interplay of many endogenous and exogenous determinants. 
Judges aim at recognition within the legal community. Legalization and, in particular, judicial 
delegation promote legal culture and professional ethos among judges. The introduction of the 
Appellate Body, for example, increased the incentive for panels to get it legally right rather than 
paying attention to the political situation in order to avoid appeals and possibly reversals by the 
Appellate Body.427 Judges who are socialized to legal culture furthermore strive for legitimacy, which 
increases their recognition and which they deem fundamental for effective global governance. They 
feel less like conflict managers, who assist actors in diplomatic dispute settlement, than like 
champions of law. 
Therefore, courts take the effects of their rulings on their legitimacy into account. If actors do not 
comply with rulings, or if courts are perceived to succumb to power, judicial legitimacy suffers. This 
poses a dilemma for courts. On the one hand, courts have to consider the political situation to avoid 
defection, but on the other hand, they have to adhere to the agreement and maintain legal 
consistency.428 From this we can first conclude that independence increases with better enforcement 
capacity as courts need to be less concerned about non-compliance. In particular, independence rises 
with legitimacy. Strong legitimacy not only makes defection less likely but also makes the legitimacy 
costs of occasional defections more bearable for actors.  
Secondly, with high precision courts find it more difficult to deviate from the principal’s intention or 
to give way to power since courts are perceived as legitimate if they resolve disputes along principles 
stemming from agreements. The more clearly courts deviate from the agreement, the greater the 
legitimacy costs they incur.429 Courts are also less likely to succumb to power with ample precedent, 
produced by broad judicial scope, which contributes to legal clarity.430  
How strongly agreements bind courts depends, besides for legal clarity, also on the legal mandate. The 
more leeway courts enjoy in interpreting agreements and the more aspects of actors’ behavior they can 
scrutinize, the further the courts can deviate from actors’ intentions without flouting their mandate. 
Therefore, we can thirdly conclude that a broad legal mandate backs judicial independence. 
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While I have argued so far that effective bargaining restrains the independence of courts, it also 
empowers courts. Roessler (2001, 325) proposes that, “Creating the possibility of a legislative 
response would confer democratic legitimacy, and greater normative force, upon the decisions of the 
WTO judge.” Without this possibility, courts have to be cautious in determining the scope of their 
authority and they have to avoid creative interpretations. Also, they have to take political acceptability 
more strongly into account. Non-acceptable rulings cannot be simply corrected, but they lead to non-
implementation that damages the WTO and may trigger a trade-war. According to Roessler (2001, 
323), the provision that any one actor could block the adoption of rulings under the old GATT gave 
legitimacy to rulings, including those “based on creative interpretations advancing the objectives of 
GATT”. Flexible decision-making on a more continuous basis than trade rounds does not only 
contribute to judicial legitimacy by regular ex-post control but also offers recent political guidelines 
upon which courts can base their rulings. This lowers the strain on judicial legitimacy. 
In addition to the effects on their legitimacy, courts also consider in their rulings the repercussions on 
the stability of the WTO. The more stable the WTO is, the more freely courts can deviate from the 
interests of powerful actors, without having to fear that non-compliance leads to a break-down.431 
Avoiding tensions is particularly difficult for courts if agreements have been formulated in 
deliberately nebulous terms like in the Uruguay Round. If disagreements are not solved during 
negotiations, the basis for future conflict is laid. If courts have to rule on these contested issues, they 
have to be particularly careful not to damage the WTO.432 Therefore, courts will have to continue 
heeding the political repercussions which their rulings exert on the WTO. 
5.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented theories of bargaining as background for analyzing the bargaining problem. 
Toughness of bargaining strategies, internal complexity, and the number and nature of veto players 
have been identified as the main determinants of bargaining effectiveness, and the role of the 
exogenous and endogenous determinants within these determinants have been discussed. Also, the 
possibility to ease bargaining by lowering precision and extending judicial delegation has been 
addressed. Moreover, the risks associated with decision-making and judicial delegation design have 
been analyzed. 
Even if structures solve the bargaining problem effectively, actors will negotiate agreements only if 
they expect them to be enforceable. Furthermore, the value of adopted agreements hinges on 
compliance. This is the topic of the next chapter, which is the last piece missing in the analytical part 
of the study. 
                                                     
431 Roessler (2001) warns that legislative activity of the panel may lead via non-implementation of rulings to 
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6 Compliance 
Completely contingent agreements are always optimally attuned to external circumstances and always 
share the gains of cooperation in a way that no gains are wasted through defections.433 However, we 
have seen that friction is ubiquitous in bargaining, so that agreements fall well short of being perfectly 
state contingent. Judicial delegation and exemptions improve state-contingency. Judicial delegation 
empowers courts to adapt rules to changing circumstances, and exemptions give actors flexibility in 
handling their obligations. Despite judicial delegation and exemptions, WTO agreements remain 
incompletely state-contingent, so that their efficiency and distributional properties are imperfectly 
suited to the environment. Therefore, actors face diverse incentives to defect from agreements.  
While actors may benefit individually from defections, they harm global welfare because defections 
detract from the scope and predictability of current global governance. Moreover, actors will only 
expand the scope of future global governance if they expect obligations to be honored. Therefore, 
compliance mechanisms are needed to prevent violation of agreements. 
In standard game theory, an agreement can be enforced if the discounted benefits of defection, 
accruing to the defecting actor, are smaller than the discounted losses the defector incurs from the 
punishment following defection. The gains from defection are understood to arise until the defection is 
discovered and punishment sets in, which then makes the defector worse off than she would have been 
if she had cooperated. 
While my line of argument is informed by game theory, I depart from traditional game theoretic 
analysis as I do not expect defectors to benefit first and pay the price later. Benefits and costs may 
coincide. It is even possible that governments first suffer the costs of defections and benefit in the long 
run from less domestic opposition or an improved bargaining position.  
A more fundamental deviation from standard game theoretic analysis, in which the costs of defection 
are exclusively determined by the punishment strategy, is that I consider a host of costs which actors 
incur by defecting. In addition to punishment-induced costs, domestic audience costs, reputational 
costs, self-inflicted costs arising from protectionism, and the costs of systemic damage to the WTO all 
determine compliance. Although these factors change the interest calculus of governments that are led 
by the logic of consequences, most of these factors also depend, to a differing degree, on legitimacy. 
In addition, legitimacy directly influences compliance because norms exert a compliance pull on 
governments. Figure 4 provides an overview of the factors driving compliance.  
 
                                                     


























Figure 4: Compliance 
In the following sections, I turn to those factors that keep actors from violating agreements one by one, 
beginning with compliance pull and working my way down to factors that are less influenced by 
legitimacy. I define these factors and I show how they are affected by structures and trends. 
Afterwards, I address the incentives to defect. I contemplate how the trends change these incentives 
and what this implies for the capacity of structures to effectively solve the compliance problem.  
The relative brevity of this chapter does not indicate that ex ante enforcement is less relevant to the 
WTO, but it results from the extensive preparations in the preceding chapters. In comparison with 
earlier chapters, I disaggregate actors more frequently into governments, domestic societies, and 
domestic institutions. 
6.1 Compliance pull 
As argued in Chapter 4 about ideational properties and learning, governments partly follow the logic 
of appropriateness. They feel obliged to comply with rules which have been created and operate in 
legitimate processes, and which produce valuable and reversible outcomes. Moreover, actors desire to 
comply with norms for self-esteem and to remain an esteemed actor of international society. The more 
that determinacy originates from rules and authoritative interpretations, the better the actors know 
what constitutes appropriate behavior and the less they are able to account for violations. 
Resonance with domestic and international norms further strengthens legitimacy, whereas conflicting 
norms can cause non-compliance. For instance, norms calling for protection of human rights or the 
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environment can weaken the commitment to the MFN principle in the WTO.434 Increasing depth and 
linkages make it more likely that WTO regulation affects powerful domestic norms. 
Another type of compliance pull is based on routinization. Routinization means that actors follow 
routines of standardized behavior to save transaction costs instead of specifically contemplating every 
action.435 Since actors comply with WTO rules most of the time, the routines prescribe compliant 
behavior. Moreover, Chayes and Chayes (1995, 119) point out, “It is almost always a good argument 
for an action that it conforms to the applicable legal norms, and against, that it departs from them. The 
argument may not persuade, but there is no doubt where the burden of proof lies.” While the burden of 
proof is irrelevant to perfectly rational actors, it biases actors in favor of compliance if strategizing 
processes incur friction. 
6.2 Domestic audience costs 
Now we change our perspective and consider those factors that influence governments under the logic 
of consequences. Governments no longer feel normatively obliged to comply, but they “confront the 
standards of legitimacy as an external institutional fact which impacts upon their cost-benefit 
calculations.”436 As we will see later, actors who violate norms damage their reputation in the 
international sphere. On the domestic level, governments who violate norms risk suffering from 
domestic audience costs. I understand domestic audience costs to arise from political measures, such 
as voting or protesting, with which domestic societies and domestic institutions sanction their 
governments for violating international norms. 
6.2.1   Domestic society 
Domestic society appreciates compliance for numerous reasons pertaining to the domestic and the 
international level, related to the act of violation and the specific rule that is violated, and based on 
normative obedience and self-interest. In combining these different motives, I present several 
mechanisms that encourage civil society to impose domestic audience costs. 
Domestic society expects its government to behave consistently, and it holds its government 
accountable to normative statements. Consistency can be expected for normative reasons if domestic 
society adheres to norms of truthfulness and reliability. Alternatively, benefits of reliable governance 
provide a reason to insist on consistency out of self-interest.  
According to Schimmelpfennig (2001), governments endorse norms for three reasons despite the risk 
of being held accountable to them. First, governments may refer to norms out of sincere belief in their 
rightness. Secondly, governments may relate to norms strategically to gain support from domestic 
society. In liberal societies, appeals to market economy and multilateralism make an argument sound 
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coherent and normatively motivated, thus, increasing its legitimacy in front of an internal audience. 
Thirdly, norms can also be used strategically to shame other actors into compliance, or into 
compromise in bargaining.  
Whether in a domestic or international setting, reference to norms is, therefore, omnipresent. Risse 
(2000, 17) asserts that, “Even rhetorical arguments that try to justify egoistic interests must normally 
refer to some universalistic values or commonly accepted norms.” Actors are particularly inclined to 
engage in ‘rhetorical action,’ the strategic application of normative communication, when the 
corresponding costs on the domestic and international level are low. When the costs of norm 
compliance rise, governments have trapped themselves by their own normative statements.437 Given 
increasing normativity of global governance, actors can be expected to succumb to self-entrapment 
more frequently. 
Even stronger than the expectation of consistent normative proclamations is the belief in the rule of 
law. Rule-of-law societies appreciate if governments abide by domestic and international law.438 The 
ultimate rule of recognition – “Pacta sunt servanda” – is not only part of the Vienna Treaty but often 
even national law. With the expansion of Western culture, appreciation of the rule of law is 
spreading.439 Appreciation of international norm-compliance does not need to be normatively 
motivated but can also arise from consequentialist thinking. Domestic society is increasingly aware of 
the importance of international reputation making the international standing a criterion for domestic 
legitimacy of governments.440 With growing awareness of globalization and of the significance of 
international institutions, we can assume that domestic societies increasingly fear the systemic damage 
from defection to the WTO as well.  
The argument above rests on the inappropriateness or adverse consequences that the act of defection 
implies per se, independently of the international rules that are violated. Yet, the feeling of normative 
obligation in domestic society to warrant that its government obeys international obligations also rises 
with the legitimacy of the specific rule that is at stake. Furthermore, compliance with international 
rules can entail government policies that are in the utilitarian interests of private agents. If private 
agents cannot cheaply monitor government behavior directly, they take the judgment on compliance, 
provided by international institutions, as an easily observable signal of whether governments pursue 
the preferences of domestic society.441 In this case, domestic society has a rational incentive to impose 
political costs on defecting governments. This mechanism gains importance, since domestic society 
becomes increasingly aware of international institutions and as international institutions more 
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intensively monitor whether actors adhere to standards of ‘good governance.’  
Given that domestic society cares about compliance with international agreements, the question arises 
whether domestic society can influence its government’s decision on compliance. Indeed, domestic 
society can inflict substantial costs upon defecting governments through diverse channels like voting, 
lobbying, and ‘naming and shaming.’442 The more difficult it is for governments to excuse their 
defections with accounts, the greater the domestic audience costs become.  
Another determinant of the size of domestic audience costs is whether the dispersed and 
heterogeneous private agents can coordinate their actions. The better they cooperate, the more 
effectively they will project their disapproval into domestic audience costs for defecting governments. 
Without getting into the intricacies of the domestic political process, we can make the general 
observation that with more precision and judicial delegation, domestic society is better able to 
coordinate and exert political pressure.443 In particular, the mass electorate, that can impose the largest 
audience costs, lacks the information to evaluate defections on its own. Organizations, such as NGOs, 
are needed to focus its expectations and assist it in exercising its power diligently. With precise 
agreements and court rulings they can fulfill this function more effectively.  
6.2.2   Domestic institutions 
Domestic bureaucracies that administer international agreements can become proponents of 
compliance for a number of reasons.444 Civil servants can feel normatively committed to the ends of an 
agreement. They can take a personal career interest in compliance with an agreement. Bureaucracies 
can rely on international institutions for expertise or political shielding. Furthermore, bureaucracies 
champion the status quo, once they have institutionalized compliance as standard operating procedure, 
to avoid the costs of constantly recalculating the costs and benefits of defection. Koh (1997, 2654) 
notes that “institutional arrangements for the making and maintenance of an international commitment 
become entrenched in domestic legal and political processes. Domestic institutions adopt symbolic 
structures, standard operating procedures, and other internal mechanisms to maintain habitual 
compliance with the internalized norms. These institutions become ‘carriers of history,’ and evolve in 
path-dependent routes that avoid conflict with the internalized norms. These institutional habits lead 
nations into default patterns of compliance.”  
Since more domestic bureaucracies become involved in WTO affairs due to increasing depth and 
linkages of global governance, they play an increasingly significant role for compliance. Like in the 
case of pressure from domestic society, bureaucratic resistance gains strength with increasing 
precision, judicial delegation, and legitimacy of global governance. Against their governments, 
bureaucracies can argue for compliance best if they can base their case on legitimate and precise 
agreements and on legal precedent created by legitimate courts. 
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The domestic audience costs that governments incur who defy international law rise dramatically if 
domestic courts defend international law.445 In liberal democracies, domestic court rulings are backed 
by domestic society and are protected from governmental infringements by constitutional means. 
Judicial internalization of international law may occur directly if individuals can sue for rights 
stemming from international law at domestic courts. A ‘softer’ point of entry for international law into 
the domestic legal system rests on courts who construe domestic law consistently with international 
law. As the experience from the EU shows, courts enjoy considerable discretion to endorse or act as a 
break on international law.446 They use this discretion according to the legitimacy they perceive in 
international law. If international law is legitimate, courts promote compliance at the costs of defecting 
governments. 
Given the close social ties between governments, bureaucracies, courts, and domestic society, these 
entities do not only impose costs on each other but they also teach and learn.447 Therefore, precision, 
judicial delegation, and legitimacy of global governance are further validated as important drivers of 
learning, once we move from a unitary actor perspective towards more fine-grained analysis. 
6.3 Reputational costs 
Non-compliance with agreements damages reputation. The amount of reputational costs depends on 
the circumstances of the breach. Since agreements are incompletely state-contingent, the breaking of 
agreements can enhance global welfare. This possibility of ‘efficient breach’ is understood at the time 
of contracting and vindicates defecting actors. Moreover, agreements can serve further objectives than 
creating obligations, and they can maintain value despite violations. Therefore, actors excuse 
defections at moderate reputational costs as long as defectors can provide convincing accounts, so that 
they are not perceived as contradicting the spirit of the agreement and its generally binding quality.448  
The more determinate a rule, the more severely violations damage reputation. Abbott and Snidal 
(2000, 427) stress the significance of legal discourse and authoritative interpretations, “Because legal 
review allows allegations and defenses to be tested under accepted standards and procedures, it 
increases reputational costs if a violation is found.” It is widely recognized that reputational costs 
within international society are an important mechanism for compliance and that structures and trends 
that affect the possibility to give credible accounts significantly influence compliance.449 
In addition to determinacy, deliberations link reputational costs to structures. When deliberating, 
actors shoulder the cumbersome task of explaining their positions, of listening carefully to other actors 
to understand their concerns, and of finding a satisfactory solution together. If an agreement is the 
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outcome of genuine deliberations, we can, therefore, expect that defections will upset international 
society most and that trustworthiness and international standing of defecting actors will suffer most.  
Besides reputation within international society, actors care about their reputation on global markets. If 
an actor has a reputation for violating international law, a premium is charged on investments within 
its territory and on transactions with its government and its citizens under the jurisdiction of this 
actor.450 With increasing market integration and transparency, the disciplining force of global markets 
gains strength. On the contrary, regionalization enlarges domestic markets and, thus, weakens the 
disciplining force of the global market. 
This points to a second link how overall quality of compliance affects the individual actor’s decision 
to comply or not. We have seen in Chapter 4 about ideational properties and learning that wide-spread 
compliance intensifies actors’ desire to enjoy the esteem of being a law-abiding member of 
international society. We can now add that the reputational costs, which defecting actors incur in 
international society and on global markets, rise with the level of overall compliance. The reason is 
that international society and markets can single out and sanction a small number of defectors but not 
a majority of actors.451 
6.4 Self-inflicted costs 
According to standard trade theory, protectionism (and trade-related subsidies) always decreases 
welfare of small countries, so that they benefit from abolishing tariffs (and trade-related subsidies) 
even unilaterally.452 By raising trade barriers, large countries, however, may influence the terms of 
trade in their favor, so that they may be best off under optimal tariffs greater than zero. If WTO 
agreements bind their tariffs below this optimal tariff, actors gain from defection. 
Strategic trade theory justifies trade restrictions also for small countries. It upholds that under 
imperfect competition, unilateral liberalization fails to be the dominant strategy because governments 
can shift gains from foreign suppliers to domestic suppliers. In particular, the ‘infant industry’ 
argument has achieved significant attention, even in non-academic thinking. It suggests that weak 
industries with great potential should first be nourished and protected to learn and to grow, so that they 
benefit from increasing returns to scale. This shall prepare them to later succeed in global competition 
and to reap extraordinary gains in imperfectly contested markets.  
After an initial excitement, the prevalent opinion among economists goes that strategic trade 
management can do little good and considerable harm.453 Strategic trade policies are beset with 
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information and rent-seeking problems, which aggravate practical implementation. Even if strategic 
trade management is efficiently implemented, the size of the global market and of the investments 
required for competing on the global market, as well as the pace of global competition and innovation, 
lower the value of protected home markets. At last, the object of strategic trade management, the 
national firm, fades into global players and global virtual networks. 
In particular situations, actors who defect for terms-of-trade benefits and gains from strategic trade 
management may increase their welfare. In most cases, however, defection implies economic losses 
for the defecting actor.  
The economic costs outweighing the benefits becomes the more likely, the more standards are 
involved in global governance. Indeed, deeper integration makes standard setting in international 
institutions more frequent. At the same time, deviating from standards becomes more expensive with 
increasing relative effectiveness of global governance. Thus, the economic costs of defection become 
prohibitive for an increasing share of global rules. Only actors with a strong market demand position 
and a strong dislike of certain standards can consider adopting individual standards, which are not 
compatible at low cost with international standards. By enlarging domestic markets, regionalization, 
thus, lowers the self-inflicted, economic costs of defections. 
6.5 Punishment-induced costs  
Punishment-induced costs arise to defecting actors from sanctions with which other actors, directed by 
utilitarian interests and feelings of normative obligation, react to defections. Punishment serves to 
coerce defecting actors back into compliance and to deter future defections. The current WTO practice 
concerning sanctions is authorization of actors who have been harmed by violations to withdraw 
equivalent market access concessions, in order to re-establish reciprocity between actors. Since gains 
usually accrue before sanctions are authorized and implemented, withdrawing equivalent concessions 
alone is often insufficient to achieve compliance.454 Sophisticated punishment strategies, such as 
targeting vulnerable and politically influential industries, selecting industries in politically critical 
constituencies, and rotating between industries, can intensify the political costs for defecting 
governments. In principle, any incentive to violate WTO rules can be matched with sufficiently severe 
sanctions. 
Nevertheless, sanctions are ineffective as a main pillar of compliance management.455 One reason 
against massive sanctions is that tough punishment implies higher levels of risk for a given level of 
enforcement than legitimacy-based mechanisms.456 Further problems with a punishment approach to 
compliance are connected to actual implementation of decentralized sanctions. Under a system of 
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decentralized sanctions, only those actors are authorized to implement sanctions that have litigated, 
whereas all other actors must abstain from punishing the defector independently of whether they have 
been harmed by the defection or not.  
The first problem with this decentralized approach is that tough punishment leads to selective and 
unequal enforcement.457 Weak states are unable or unwilling to implement massive sanctions against 
powerful actors. Fearing retaliation powerful actors are more hesitant to sanction other powerful actors 
than weak actors. Moreover, decentralized sanctions are inconsistently applied, depending on domestic 
political factors. Secondly, sanctions do not only change behavior in single instances, but they also 
contribute to the general level of compliance with an international institution. Decentralized 
sanctioning by harmed actors, thus, leads to a lack of sanctions. The sanctioning actors gain only a 
fraction of the systemic benefits, but they shoulder all the economic costs. These costs are especially 
high if the punished actor can substitute sales to sanctioning actors with sales to non-sanctioning 
actors.458 
Centralized punishment, which obliges all actors to sanction deviations, independently of their 
individual harm, levels the playing field between powerful and weak actors. Furthermore, it allows 
optimal provision of sanctions. Since trade substitution is no longer feasible under centralized 
punishment, the target’s terms of trade deteriorate more strongly. Therefore, centralized punishment 
increases the costs for the targeted actor in comparison with the sanctioning actors. However, 
multilateral implementation of sanctions faces problems with internal bargaining between sanctioning 
states and with possible backsliding of actors from sanctioning coalitions, which may lead to a break-
down of all sanctions.459 While these cooperation problems may be solved by international institutions, 
centralized enforcement, managed by strong international institutions, worsens risk further.  
An additional reason against sanctions-based enforcement follows from its negative side effects on 
learning and legitimacy.460 It is true that sanctions may put pressure on actors to submit to legal 
discourse in the first place.461 However, tough punishment is less and less needed, since alternative 
mechanisms for making actors comply with legal discourse become increasingly potent. Rather than 
contributing to deliberating, tough punishment damages deliberative processes. Tough punishment 
renders the communicative culture more adversarial and it may evoke resentment by those who feel 
unjustly targeted.  
Sanctions are especially adequate for defections which are motivated by pressure of special interest 
groups on governments. Export interests within the defecting country are harmed by sanctions because 
their access to foreign markets is restricted. Therefore, sanctions mobilize export interests to lobby 
against import-competing industries on the domestic level. With increasing normativity and civil 
society participation, political pressure from industrial interests is only one among many factors, 
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which governments take into account in deep integration agreements. If sanctions are directed against 
governments that defect in correspondence to the genuine preferences of their populace, the WTO 
looses legitimacy. This means that tough sanctions are less important to correct domestic, political 
distortions, induced by the lobbying efforts of import-competing industries, while they increasingly 
evoke protest that enjoys broad public support within domestic societies. 
Finally, defecting actors may resist even tough sanctions, thus provoking even tougher sanctions. They 
may retaliate against the sanctioning actors and eventually may trigger a trade war. Such tensions 
directly waste gains from cooperation and they damage legitimacy. 
Taken together, all these negative side effects make punishment-based enforcement unsuitable for 
assuming a central function in future global governance, for which avoiding risk and promulgating 
social capital formation is vital.  
6.6 Systemic costs  
We have noticed in Chapter 5 about bargaining that actors may refrain from employing threats, in 
order to avoid systemic damage to the WTO. Out of the same mutual interest in the effective 
functioning of the WTO, actors may abstain from defecting.462 Increasing scope, linkages, and relative 
effectiveness of global governance, as well as specific investments, make effectiveness and stability of 
international institutions more desirable. Therefore, the costs of systemic damage to the WTO act as 
an increasingly significant barrier to defections. 
Regionalization counteracts these trends, since it enhances the effectiveness of autonomous 
governance and as it increases the value that remains of WTO specific investments if global 
governance breaks down. The more that actors share a collective identity, the less willing they are to 
sacrifice stability and effectiveness of the WTO for their particularistic gains from defection. 
Moreover, actors refrain from self-serving interpretations of rules for fear of finding themselves at the 
other end of the stick in the future. If an actor succeeds in accounting for a behavior that is currently 
considered a defection and should be considered a defection for the proper working of the system, the 
altered meaning of the rule will be applied to everybody and will allow other actors to defect with 
impunity as well.463 
6.7 Overview of compliance mechanisms 
Table 6 provides an overview of the compliance mechanisms. What catches the eye is the pervasive 
influence of the logic of appropriateness. The logic of appropriateness influences compliance directly, 
through the compliance pull, and indirectly, by motivating domestic and international society to 
impose costs on defectors. 
Table 6: Compliance mechanisms 
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costs Domestic society Domestic society Consequences
Reputational costs International society, global markets International society Consequences
Self-inflicted damage Consequences
Punishment-induced 
damage International society International society Consequences
Systemic damage Consequences
Led by which logic do 
governments decide on 
compliance?






Compliance pull, domestic audience costs, and reputational costs are those compliance factors which 
rest particularly strongly on legitimacy. Though it is difficult to empirically establish the significance 
of these legitimacy-based compliance mechanisms, manifold research indicates that compliance pull, 
domestic audience costs, and reputational costs are powerful mechanisms for compliance.464 
Legitimacy appears as a relevant factor throughout times and cultures.465 However, this also suggests 
that domestic norms, which arise in more densely socialized domestic societies, become strong 
incentives to defect if they contradict international rules (and that they can also constitute resilient 
impediments to effective bargaining). 
Besides their strength in achieving compliance, legitimacy-based compliance mechanisms are 
advantageous levers for managing compliance in that they are susceptible to changes in structure and 
in that they have advantageous properties for controlling risk. 
This sets legitimacy-based compliance mechanisms apart from the other mechanisms. Structures 
cannot be purposefully manipulated in order to influence self-inflicted and systemic costs of 
defections. And while the severity of punishment-induced costs can be freely set by designing 
sanctions, their detrimental side effects forbid extensive usage.  
                                                     
464 See Franck (1990), Guzman (2002), Koh (1997), Onuma (2003), Shelton (2000), Simmons (2000) and Young 
(1999a). 
465 See Hall (1997), who prods into legitimacy in medieval times, and Snyder (2002), who conducts a 
comparative study on the culture of war that shapes how different civilizations lead war. 
 161
6.8 Incentives for defection and optimal compliance 
In order to conclude the preparations for recommending structures that solve the compliance problem 
effectively, we need to understand which level of compliance is optimal for the WTO. The degree of 
compliance is optimal if the marginal gains of defections for international society equal the marginal 
costs of defections for international society. In this situation, increases and decreases in the power of 
compliance mechanisms lower global social welfare. In the WTO, defections generally harm 
compliant actors, while they may benefit defecting actors. The higher the gains to defecting actors in 
comparison with the damage caused for compliant actors is, the lower optimal compliance becomes.  
In the WTO, the economic harm of occasional violations to compliant actors is limited in comparison 
with the benefits which actors derive from global governance. Neither is complete compliance 
necessary to sustain the legitimacy and stability of the WTO. Possible gains for the defecting actor 
depend on the benefits and costs that accrue to her from defection. Governments may gain politically 
from defection though defection lowers the social welfare of their countries. Yet, the social welfare of 
actors may also rise through defections. The various incentives for defection and their consequences 
for the social welfare of defecting and compliant actors are discussed in the following. Overall, the 
optimal degree of compliance for the WTO is less than complete.466 
6.8.1   Changes in the incentives for defection 
In order to shed more light on the optimal level of compliance, let us consider the following questions 
about the incentives which motivate defections: Which are these incentives? How important are they? 
How does their importance change in the future? And what difference does the changing relevance of 
incentives make for the optimal degree of compliance? To answer these questions, I consider seven 
different incentives for defection: strategic trade management, terms-of-trade effects, political-
economy effects, expected gains from renegotiations, domestic opposition to agreements, changes in 
government, and unexpected effects of agreements.  
We have seen in the discussion of self-inflicted costs of defections that strategic trade management is 
an increasingly unlikely candidate for frequent and substantial defections. While the size of terms-of-
trade effects is debated in general, defections seem usually to be too small to offer considerable gains 
from changes in the terms of trades, particularly when compared to the disruptions which 
protectionism causes in an increasingly integrated world economy. 
Even if protectionism does not work to the benefit of the national economy, governments may be 
enticed by political advantages to promote certain companies or industries, in violation with 
international commitments and at the costs of consumer and export-industry interests.467 While these 
political-economy motives were a major reason for defections in the past, their significance will 
decrease in the future. The more that economic globalization proceeds, the more uncompetitive 
companies are driven out of the market. As a consequence, fewer companies and workers with less 
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resources lobby for protectionism. In addition, we have seen that trade policy formulation is 
politicized and the influence of special interest groups is weakened with increasing normativity and 
civil society involvement. On the other hand, political pressure for protectionism will rise if social 
welfare systems are massively cut back in the face of global competition.468 I expect effective global 
governance structures to preserve the option of choosing a welfare state model and, thus, conclude that 
political-economy incentives for protectionism will slowly abate.  
Now I turn to anticipated gains from renegotiations, domestic opposition, changes in government, and 
unexpected effects of agreements as motives for defections. In the case of anticipated gains from 
renegotiations, actors do not defect for the direct benefits of defection but for long-term bargaining 
advantages. By defecting, actors can credibly signal the costs they have incurred from integration, in 
order to ask for compensation in upcoming negotiations. By defecting, actors can also discourage 
further integration on the issue concerned, since the international society will not push for non-
enforceable contracts. The more value is at stake in future negotiations, the more such strategic 
considerations weigh. 
Another incentive for defection occurs if governments face domestic opposition to agreements they 
did not expect. Domestic audiences can call for defection if global governance directly restrains actors 
in the pursuit of their preferences within their territories. For instance, domestic audiences may favor 
strict traceability requirements for genetically modified organisms, which impose high costs on 
suppliers from countries that lack corresponding regulation and which may be in violation with 
agreements.469 Alternatively, domestic audiences support defections which aim at changing policies of 
other actors or at neutralizing policy differences between actors.470 This can help actors indirectly in 
the pursuit of their preferences within their own territory. If, for instance, country A has more stringent 
social and environmental standards than country B, and if producers in country A and B are competing 
intensively, then country A may only be able to maintain its standards and its industry if it installs a 
barrier against imports from country B. An alternative motive for changing foreign policies arises if 
domestic audiences take a genuine interest in the conditions in other territories. For instance, they may 
care about child labor and the extinction of species abroad.  
With greater depth, global governance is more likely to restrain actors in the pursuit of their 
preferences, whether directly or indirectly. Furthermore, globalization invigorates the motive to alter 
policies of other actors, in order to protect domestic policies or to change conditions abroad for its own 
sake. Therefore, it becomes increasingly difficult for governments not to err in predicting domestic 
preferences for the long durations of agreements. Misleading expectations of governments become 
more likely to lead to defections as domestic audience costs become more influential. 
Changes in government are rather a cause than an incentive for defection. They are especially likely to 
lead to defection if governments attempt to bind their successor governments by entering into 
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international agreements.471 Current governments design agreements in a way that restrains 
consecutive governments, yet within acceptable limits. If current governments go wrong in 
anticipating how severe restrictions future governments will tolerate, their successors are induced to 
defect from agreements. Since deep integration covers more issues where current governments are 
interested in binding their successors and as increasing enforcement capacity of the WTO makes 
binding successor governments more attractive, this practice is likely to spread, together with the 
corresponding miscalculations. 
Finally, actors can fail to correctly anticipate the outcomes of their agreements. As we have seen, 
uncertainty about the effects of agreements is increasing. Moreover, as the value at stake rises, 
unexpected effects imply greater costs. Hence, the incentive to defect in order to avoid unexpected, 
adverse outcomes will grow in the future. 
6.8.2   Effects of different incentives for defection 
Let us now assess the welfare effects of violations according to the different incentives. With strategic 
trade policy and optimal tariff policy, which manipulates the terms of trade, one actor may gain at the 
costs of other actors, while attainable benefits from integration are wasted.  
Protectionism that is driven by political-economy motives reduces the social welfare of all actors. 
Only import-competing industries and politicians benefit from the opportunity for defections, which 
works as an insurance against unanticipated national distributional effects and resulting political-
economy problems. If governments re-establish trade barriers in violation with agreements, they grant 
(temporary) protection to capital owners and workers in import-competing industries from particularly 
rapid structural change in the wake of liberalization. This also benefits governments themselves, as 
they can alleviate the political pressure directed at them. However, this comes at overwhelming costs 
for consumers, as well as for domestic and foreign export industries.472  
Anticipation of gains from renegotiations is an apparently competitive motive. Actors tolerate 
transaction costs and damage to legitimacy, in order to increase their share of overall gains from 
cooperation. Defections that are led by motives pertaining to strategic trade, optimal tariff, political 
economy, and anticipated gains from renegotiations are, therefore, harmful to global social welfare 
and tend to trigger protectionist countermeasures.  
Domestic opposition, changes in government, and unexpected effects of agreements are different. In 
the case of political-economy motives, uncertainty concerns domestic, distributional effects and the 
strength of special interest groups. By contrast, if governments misinterpret the preferences of 
domestic society, resulting in domestic opposition, and if they miscalculate the outcomes of 
agreements, they err in the effects which global governance has on domestic, social welfare. 
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International society may expect that actors accept some unpleasant surprises from agreements, in 
exchange for their consent to the agreements and for the sake of global social gains. Yet, the greater 
the unexpected, adverse effects, the better the governments can justify defections by their democratic 
responsibility towards their domestic societies. The opportunity of defections serves as insurance for 
actors and, thus, broadens optimal scope of global governance. Defections can even be directly welfare 
improving, for any reasonable social welfare function, if one actor gains clearly more from avoiding 
inadequate policies than the other actors loose together. 
Generally, international society appreciates if governments bind their successors because binding 
liberal policies to WTO rules stabilizes market access. If governments bind their successors overly 
tightly, international society needs to punish the defecting successor government to maintain the 
WTO’s value as commitment device. However, international society can understand the successor 
government’s desire to free itself from certain commitments. Defections are, thus, not interpreted as 
breach of trust or as a sign of dwindling legitimacy and do, therefore, relatively mild harm to 
legitimacy. In summary, defections that are motivated by domestic opposition, unexpected effects and 
changes in government are less pernicious.473 
6.8.3   Implications for optimal compliance 
When we piece the severity of damage, which defections cause depending on the incentives for 
defection, together with the changing prevalence of incentives, we receive interesting implications for 
optimal compliance. In the past, defections were motivated more by strategic trade, terms-of-trade, and 
political-economy considerations, which are all strongly detrimental to the purpose of the WTO. In the 
future, incentives for defections will shift towards the desire to influence the results of negotiating, to 
better correspond to domestic preferences, to escape from overly binding agreements previous 
governments entered into, and to ameliorate unexpected effects of agreements. On the average, 
defections which are guided by these incentives are more benign. This means that they lead to less 
costs to compliant actors in comparison with the gains accruing to defecting actors than defections 
which are motivated by the traditionally dominant incentives. 
This does not mean that no costs should be imposed on defecting actors. Expecting gains from 
renegotiations is a harmful motive for defections. And independently of the motive, governments have 
to pay a price for defecting if WTO rules are to be stable and reliable. This is in particular true because 
governments can influence domestic political processes.474 If defections, which can be justified with 
                                                     
473 In this list, I do not include risk-related incentives to defect. In general, these cases are especially tricky to 
evaluate because a majority of actors is likely to disapprove of defections while the minority nevertheless holds a 
right to defect under certain circumstances. Concerning judicial principal-agent risk, however, a strong argument 
can be made. To the extent that WTO courts are less legitimate than governments and that governments are 
motivated by legitimate concerns such as offsetting principal-agent deviations, overriding illegitimate rulings by 
defecting tends to increase global governance legitimacy. See Trachtman (1999a). 
474 Jackson (2000b, 4) comments, “Political leaders in some countries or sub-federal regions often feel helpless 
to ‘deliver’ for their constituents in the face of external trade and monetary pressures, and some succumb to the 
temptation to play upon similar frustrations of their constituents.” See also Hay and Rosamond (2002). 
 165
high domestic audience costs of living up to international obligations, are costless, governments 
engage less in arguing in favor of international agreements and they are even tempted to inflame 
domestic discontent with international obligations.  
Hence, the degree of optimal compliance falls due to changing incentives for defection, albeit only 
moderately. Telling the different incentives apart – in other words: correctly evaluating accounts – 
and, thus, tailoring costs to the severity of violations once again becomes increasingly important. 
The same argument supports more extensive exemptions. In the past, incentives to resort to 
exemptions were beneficial only for politicians and special interests. In the future, exemptions will 
increasingly benefit actors at whole and promote legitimacy. Exemptions should be sufficiently 
extensive to warrant that most behavior which is not in line with substantive obligations is covered by 
exemptions. Using exemptions damages legitimacy less than violating agreements. 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented domestic audience costs, reputational costs, self-inflicted costs arising from 
protectionism, punishment-induced costs, and the costs of systemic damage to the WTO as 
mechanisms that counteract the actors’ incentives to defect. These incentives hinge on strategic trade 
management, the terms of trade, the political economy, expected gains from renegotiations, domestic 
opposition to agreements, changes in government, and unexpected effects of agreements. We have 
seen that changing incentives for defection cause optimal compliance to fall, easing the compliance 
problem.  
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Let us pause for a moment and contemplate on Figure 5, which visualizes the tasks accomplished in 
















Figure 5: Analytical framework: Review of Part II 
In Chapter 4, the impact of exogenous and endogenous determinants on the ideational properties has 
been explained. Actors behavior depends on the decision-making logic they employ and on the 
ideational properties they hold. Pursuing the logic of consequences, actors behave strategically in 
order to maximize their utility as defined by their interests. Alternatively, actors can attempt to make 
right decisions under the logic of appropriateness, guided by norms. Values, norms, perception, causal 
beliefs, the perspective on relative versus absolute gains, and collective identity are ideational 
properties that shape how actors define their utilitarian interests and their normative obligations. 
Ideational properties can change through interaction at the international level. If actors deliberate, 
attempting to find the best solution to a problem at hand led by the best argument, they are especially 
prone to learning. Global governance structures can foster deliberation; structures that reduce the 
number of actors through regionalization, that require consent of every actor through unanimity 
voting, and that promote legal discourse through extensive judicial delegation engender deliberations. 
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Legitimacy is the feeling of obligation which a rule or international institution can invoke through the 
logic of appropriateness. Actors feel obliged to comply with rules which have been created and 
operate in legitimate processes, and which produce valuable and reversible outcomes. In addition, 
actors desire to comply with norms for self-esteem and to remain an esteemed actor of international 
society. The more that determinacy originates from rules and authoritative interpretations, the better 
the actors know what constitutes appropriate behavior and the less they are able to account for 
violations. 
In Chapter 5, we have considered three sets of factors that determine bargaining effectiveness. The 
first set, toughness of bargaining strategies, accentuates the adversarial aspects of bargaining. To the 
extent that actors approach international bargaining with the logic of consequences, they bargain softer 
if they emphasize absolute gains, if they share collective identities, and if they do not know in which 
future position they will be concerned by the agreement. Also, they bargain softer if the value at stake 
falls compared to the costs of delay and if their reservation values decrease. Furthermore, norms of 
appropriate bargaining induce actors to bargain softly under the logic of appropriateness and under the 
logic of consequences. 
The second set of factors, internal complexity, turns to difficulties inherent in the issues to be 
negotiated and in the environment of negotiations. Uncertainty about the implications of agreements 
makes actors reluctant to commit for fear of striking an unfavorable bargain. Linkages complicate 
bargaining as internal coherence of policy proposals has to be heeded if agreements are to be efficient 
and as linkage to deal-breaking issues can spoil agreement. Large numbers of relevant policy 
proposals congest the bargaining process and aggravate information collection. Finally, 
communication problems hamper bargaining as the traditional organizational culture of the WTO 
breaks away.  
The third set of factors concerns the number and identity of veto players. Agreement becomes more 
elusive with rising number and heterogeneity of actors whose consent is needed and with declining 
individual win-sets, which embody all proposals that improve the welfare of an individual actor in 
comparison with no agreement. 
Although majority voting and judicial delegation ease the bargaining problem, actors are hesitant to 
delegate authority to the WTO as they take their individual welfare as basis for their choice rather than 
global welfare effects. How delegation of authority for decision-making and judicial dispute resolution 
affects individual welfare depends not only on the effectiveness of delegation but also on its impact on 
the distribution of the benefits and costs of cooperation. I have defined risk as the costly difference 
between two global governance scenarios of varying global governance scope, decision making 
design, and judicial delegation design.  
In the case of consensus voting risk, powerful actors fear deadlock of global governance that leaves 
them worse off than they would be under minilateral cooperation. Concerning majority voting risk, 
powerful actors fear being outvoted and being less able to apply threats as main source of extra-
institutional power. Institutionalization risk affects primarily weak actors who worry that the benefits 
of expanding global governance, dominated by powerful actors, do not outweigh the losses in 
autonomous governance capacity. 
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In the case of principal-agent risk, courts pursue their own agenda, thereby violating interests which 
are broadly shared within international society. Collective principal risk arises if outcomes of judicial 
dispute resolution are systematically less beneficial for a share of the actors than the results that would 
be attainable if diplomatic dispute resolution was not substituted by judicial decision-making, while 
another share of the actors benefits from judicial dispute resolution. 
In Chapter 6, we have discussed several compliance mechanisms. On the one hand, governments 
follow the logic of appropriateness by attempting to behave normatively right. Thus, governments are 
inclined to conform to legitimate rules, whereas they are tempted to violate rules that are in conflict 
with other norms on the domestic or international level. On the other hand, governments consider the 
following factors under the logic of consequences in their decision whether to abide by WTO rules. 
Domestic audiences impose political costs on governments who defect from the WTO, partially 
because they perceive a utilitarian interest in compliance – as they appreciate political reliability, 
international reputation, and openness to trade – and partially because they consider the WTO 
legitimate. Violation of WTO rules also damages the international reputation of actors, harming their 
standing in the WTO, in other international institutions, and on global markets. Punishment by other 
actors, such as withdrawal of equivalent market access concessions, serves to coerce defecting actors 
back into compliance and to deter future defections. Furthermore, governments harm their country’s 
economy as the costs of protectionism generally outweigh gains from improvements in the terms of 
trade and from strategic trade management. Finally, defections undermine the stable working of the 
WTO in which actors have a systemic interest. 
In addition, we have observed that optimal compliance with WTO rules is less than complete, 
depending on the incentives for defection. In the past, the incentives were mostly competitive between 
actors or they served special, import-competing interests. In the future, defections will be more likely 
to enhance global social welfare and to correspond to the democratic responsibility of governments. 
Hence, the level of optimal compliance decreases. 
In the introductory chapter, I formulated four objectives for this study: underpinning the need for 
reforms in the WTO, recommending structures for the future WTO, developing and assessing an 
innovative research design, and developing general design rules for global governance structures. 
Chapter 7 demonstrates the inevitability of reforms and recommends a global governance structure. 
Chapter 8 contemplates whether my recommendations for the WTO can be generalized to other 
international institutions. The concluding Chapter 9 evaluates the present research design, draws 
attention to its limitations, and suggests improvements in future research.  
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7 Recommended global governance structure 
Based on the analysis conducted in this study, I recommend the following governance structure for the 
WTO: Regional integration of nation states should be promoted. All nation states and integrated 
regions should be involved in decision-making for global governance. Decisions of fundamental 
importance should require consensus voting, whereas ordinary decisions and, in particular, decisions 
to reverse rulings should be subject to majority voting.  
Furthermore, actors’ collective decision-making should be assisted, supplemented, and controlled by 
independent and adequately empowered courts. To this end, legal proceedings should advance with 
automaticity unless a dispute is settled peacefully. The legal mandate should be broad, involving 
courts in disputes and enabling adequate rulings. Actors should refrain from interference with the 
judicial system by means of administrative control mechanisms. The access of private agents to courts 
should be handled restrictively, so that state actors maintain their gatekeeper roles.  
Finally, precision of specific obligations should be low, exemptions should be extensive, and 
punishment should be soft. Exemptions and punishment should be endorsed and disciplined by highly 
legalized implementation procedures. 
Table 7 summarizes these suggestions for convenient reference. 
Table 7: Recommended structure for the WTO 
Determinants Recommended degree of legalization
Decision-making Combination of consensus and majority voting
Delegation Weak administrative control, automatic legal proceedings, broad legal mandate, restrictive access
Precision Low precision of specific obligations
Exemptions Extensive exemptions, strict application procedures




In the following, I discuss the performance of the recommended global governance structure for 
bargaining, compliance, risk, and social capital formation in separate sections.475 Afterwards, I 
compare the performance of the recommended global governance structure with the performance of 
alternative global governance structures. This strengthens the case for the recommended structure and 
highlights the contribution which this study makes to diverse political and scientific debates. Finally, I 
touch upon the status quo of the WTO in comparison with the recommended structure. 
Before proceeding with this line of argument, I would like to justify the form I have chosen for the 
presentation of my reasoning. The analysis in Part II has revealed how complex the influence of the 
determinants on the effectiveness of global governance is. Accordingly, a linear presentation of the 
findings is impossible. In particular, the ideational properties and the cooperation problems are 
interdependent. To manage this interdependence, I first turn to the cooperation problems and assume 
that the recommended structure effectively fosters social capital formation. With this assumption, the 
recommended structure effectively solves the cooperation problems at tolerable risk. Then, I show that 
social capital formation is indeed effectively fostered given the effective solution of the cooperation 
problems. 
Exhaustive reasoning would require evaluation of all possible combinations of the endogenous 
determinants to arrive at the most effective structure. Realistically, the number of possible 
combinations prevents such an undertaking. An alternative approach would be to sequentially fix the 
values of the determinants. This would be viable if we could argue that a certain design of one 
determinant is beneficial independently of the design of the other determinants. However, while 
regionalization appears to be a dominant strategy, I cannot make a case for any determinant of 
legalization without fixing the values for the other determinants. Moreover, such a sequential 
proceeding would entail exhausting redundancies in my line of argument. Therefore, I propose and 
analyze in detail only the one global governance structure which I deem most effective.  
In addition, I contrast this recommended structure with alternative design choices that enjoy scientific 
or political support. This proceeding does not guarantee that indeed the most effective global 
governance structure is suggested. For every endogenous determinant, however, I can show that a 
design which strongly differs from the design implied in the recommended structure makes the entire 
global governance structure ineffective, independently of the design of the remaining endogenous 
determinants. This strongly supports the case for the recommended structure. Furthermore, this 
demonstrates that the good performance of the recommended structure is not simply a product of the 
approach, taken in this chapter, to bracket aspects of global governance and to assume good 
performance for the bracketed aspects. 
The discussion of how the recommended structure affects the cooperation problems is accompanied by 
a review of the trends. This is necessary as we have to be aware of the significance and specific nature 
                                                     
475 In order to integrate the comprehensive analysis, I strongly rely on the earlier chapters and employ a compact 
line of argument. Note that the following sections are structured similarly to the analytical part of this study; this 
makes conferring with more elaborated explanations convenient. 
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of the cooperation problems and of the different risks that follow from the trends. Individual design 
characteristics can have opposite effects in bargaining, compliance, and risk. For instance, structures 
can be beneficial to bargaining and detrimental to compliance. Thus, the relative significance of the 
problems and risks has to be known to make trade-offs between opposing effects wisely. The same 
reasoning applies within the cooperation problems and within the risks, requiring knowledge of their 
specific nature. In other words, different aspects within bargaining, compliance, and risk pose different 
needs, so that it is important to see which aspects are most relevant. 
Experience from the WTO and other international institutions gives an additional clue to which extent 
structures need to be tailored to tackling bargaining versus compliance problems. Empirical work 
indicates that compliance rates are generally high.476 However, some scholars suggest that compliance 
is highly problematic. Downs, Rocke and Barsoom (1996) caution that a selection effect 
systematically distorts optimistic empirical accounts of compliance. This selection effect implies that 
serious negotiations take place only if agreements are considered enforceable. Thus, enforcement is a 
more important impediment to cooperation than the number of observed defections would indicate. 
Concerning the WTO, Peters (2003, 18) believes that “the compulsory character of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is mitigated by the fact that the dispute settlement institution’s 
recommendations are not centrally enforced and that compliance is currently the weak spot of the 
system. Arguably, the Member States’ veto power has simply been shifted to the enforcement stage”.  
I agree with those who interpret the experience with WTO negotiations as indicating minor 
compliance problems in comparison with bargaining problems. Fearon (1998, 289) finds that “the 
major obstacles to the conclusion of each of the last three GATT rounds were not intractable problems 
of monitoring, commitment, enforcement, or information flows to make enforcement possible. Instead, 
negotiations have regularly stalemated on questions of who would make the concessions necessary to 
conclude an agreement.” Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001a, 776) consent that in the last three 
GATT rounds, “The critical issue was who would make what concessions, not whether the resulting 
agreements would be enforced.” The fact that developed countries pushed for an uneven distribution 
of gains and losses in the Uruguay Round indicates that they anticipated compliance mechanisms to be 
strong enough to suppress developing countries discontent. 
7.1 Solving the bargaining problem 
In this section, I first review how the trends impact the effectiveness of bargaining, in order to expose 
the challenge which the recommended structure has to cope with. Then, I consider how the 
recommended structure influences the toughness of bargaining strategies adopted by the actors, the 
internal complexity of negotiated issues, and the number and nature of veto players. In concluding, I 
add the contribution of extensive judicial delegation to the performance of the recommended structure. 
                                                     
476 See Chayes and Chayes (1995), Koh (1997) and Simmons (2002). Onuma (2003) suggests that enforcement is 
more effective than often thought by international relations scholars because they are mostly from the U.S. and 
focus on the U.S., which is among the least constrained actors. 
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7.1.1   Effects of trends on the bargaining problem 
The impact of trends on the toughness of bargaining is mixed. On the one hand, the trends amplify the 
significance of having a good reputation and, thus, augment the power of norms calling for integrative 
bargaining. On the other hand, norm-guided bargaining is weakened by several developments. First, it 
becomes more difficult to assess the costs which actors incur who resent agreements and to discern 
opportunistic and justified motives for blockades, since the effects of global governance become more 
uncertain and, in particular, concern more domestic norms. Secondly, the number of reasonable policy 
proposals is growing. Thirdly, the trends devalue existing bargaining rules and aggravate the creation 
of new bargaining rules. All this impedes the collection of a majority for a proposal and the 
application of reputational pressure on resistant actors.  
Beyond this, devalued bargaining rules make it more difficult for actors who are driven by the logic of 
appropriateness to define what constitutes appropriate bargaining behavior. Also, devalued bargaining 
rules can give less guidance to boundedly rational actors.  
Finally, increasing heterogeneity and reduced autonomy for actors increase the value at stake in 
negotiations and lower the gains from cooperation. Therefore, the value at stake rises in comparison 
with the costs of delay, favoring distributional bargaining. Overall, those factors that induce actors to 
bargain tougher dominate. 
Internal complexity rises comprehensively. Uncertainty about efficiency and distributional 
implications of agreements increase with the trends, so that outcomes become harder to predict. At the 
same time, the costs of erring and suffering from adverse, unexpected outcomes rise with increased 
scope and relative effectiveness of global governance and with decreased autonomy for actors. 
Furthermore, the costs of avoiding unexpected, adverse outcomes mount with growing costs of exiting 
the WTO. Since increasingly deep global governance sets more standards, the indirect costs of 
escaping obligations, whether through exemptions, defection, or exit, also grow. In their attempt to 
avoid adverse, unexpected outcomes and to bargain strategically under asymmetric information, actors 
will, therefore, increasingly fall short of reaching globally optimal scope in their agreements. 
Moreover, increases in the level of uncertainty, in the costs of adverse, unexpected outcomes, and in 
the costs of escaping obligations indicate that actors are confronted with more unexpected costs from 
previous agreements. Thus, claims for compensation originating in existing agreements increasingly 
burden negotiations. 
Growing linkages overtax boundedly rational negotiators who have to consider not only distributional 
effects, in order to make proposals acceptable to all relevant actors, but also internal coherence, in 
order to draft efficient proposals. Furthermore, it becomes more likely that negotiable issues are 
inseparably linked to deal-breakers. 
With the loss of embedded liberalism as a focal point, the number of reasonable policy proposals rises. 
Due to the growing number and heterogeneity of actively participating actors, a growing share out of 
the growing number of possible proposals will actually be presented in negotiations. Since proposals 
become more complex and affect more norms, they are, in addition, harder to evaluate.  
The WTO has outlived not only embedded liberalism but also its traditional organizational culture. 
The former diplomatic culture dissolves into a varied set of negotiators with incompatible 
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communication styles and incongruent basic understandings. 
In summary, problems related to uncertainty, linkages, the number of policy proposals, and 
communication all add to internal complexity. 
Regarding the number and nature of veto players, we have seen that agreements become harder to 
reach as the heterogeneity of actors grows and as their individual win sets shrink, independently of the 
decision-making design in place. Individual win sets dwindle for several reasons: Agreements 
increasingly concern norms, bargaining is increasingly affected by domestic disputes within society 
and between ministries, governments increasingly commit themselves domestically, civil society 
punishes normatively flexible actors, and domestic laws increasingly bind governments. Apart from all 
this, civil society may blockade global governance decisions under all decision-making designs. 
Further implications of the trends on the number and nature of veto players have to be differentiated 
according to the decision-making design in place. The perspective for minilateral decision-making is 
gloomy on all counts. Minilateral decision-making is particularly affected by the weakened power of 
threats. The trends devalue threats in several ways. First, the direct costs of protectionism and non-
participation in standards rise with economic integration. Secondly, the reputational costs of 
threatening increase with the growing value of having a good reputation and with a bolder civil society 
that ‘shames’ threatening actors whose objectives it opposes. Thirdly, the systemic interest in the 
effective and stable working of the WTO rises with increasing relative effectiveness, scope, and 
linkages of global governance, as well as with more specific investments.  
Weaker threats fail to overcome resistance against multilateral extension of minilateral agreements by 
more actors, with greater resolve, and with enhanced capacities. The pressure from excluded actors on 
minilateral implementation is mounting, as well, because minilateral implementation extends less 
benefits and more costs to excluded actors. In addition, the gains from cooperation, which powerful 
actors forgo if they implement their decisions only minilaterally, are increasing. Finally, increasing 
heterogeneity and the inclusion of more actors into the minilateral group, necessitated by weaker 
threats, complicate minilateral agreement in the first place. 
Consensus decision-making is beset with growing actor participation because every actor 
automatically is an institutional veto player. Since minilateralism as the most powerful threat against 
resistant actors is on the decline, it becomes, in addition, more difficult to pressure resistant actors into 
agreement. 
Overwhelmingly, the trends aggravate future bargaining. Actors will bargain with tougher bargaining 
strategies and on more complex issues. Furthermore, minilateral and consensus decision-making 
become more problematic, whereas only majority voting is not significantly impeded by rising actor 
participation and heterogeneity, shrinking individual win sets, and falling power of threats. 
7.1.2   Toughness of bargaining strategies 
Now we look at the performance of the recommended structure in counteracting the trends. Effective 
social capital formation implies relatively strong collective identity and an emphasis on absolute gains, 
so that actors are more interested in integrative bargaining. Effective social capital formation also 
strengthens legitimacy, so that normative considerations and reputational pressures entice actors to 
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bargain integratively. Furthermore, low precision, combined with judicial delegation, creates a veil of 
uncertainty that stimulates the interest in overall gains. 
Moreover, bargaining effectiveness and extensive judicial delegation reduce path dependence. Thus, 
the expected duration of agreements falls and the value at stake compared to the costs of delay 
decreases. Effective learning diminishes ideational heterogeneity among actors. Therefore, the value at 
stake falls, whereas the gains from cooperation and, accordingly, the costs of delay rise. Exemptions 
leave more flexibility to actors, further reducing the value at stake in comparison with the costs of 
delay.  
In summary, the recommended structure motivates actors to bargain more integratively on all 
accounts. This occurs, in particular, indirectly through social capital formation, which reduces 
heterogeneity and fosters absolute gains and collective identity. Yet, even with improved learning, 
heterogeneity will increase. Especially in cases of important and deeply held norms that conflict in 
negotiations, the generally optimistic assessment does not hold. In these cases, learning is likely to be 
ineffective and the normative dispute is likely to override the willingness to bargain integratively. 
Hence, we have to expect tough bargaining strategies in these instances. 
7.1.3   Internal complexity 
The significance of uncertainty depends on the difficulty to accurately predict the implications of 
agreements, the costs of adverse, unexpected outcomes, and the costs of escaping obligations. 
Containing low precision, the recommended structure does not attempt to reduce uncertainty by 
writing more state-contingent agreements. In the face of complexity and thick uncertainty, precisely 
spelling out provisions in advance confronts obstacles in curbing uncertainty, in any case. 
Furthermore, actors are particularly concerned with large adverse, unexpected outcomes. Precision 
cannot forestall this danger as exhaustively as the opportunity to avoid obligations. If actors go 
entirely wrong in their assessments, even highly precise, contingent provisions cannot avoid 
substantial adverse effects. 
The costs of adverse, unexpected outcomes are diminished through regionalization. Furthermore, 
collective identity, fostered by the recommended structure, makes those adverse, unexpected outcomes 
that at least benefit other actors more tolerable.  
In the case of large surprises, the recommended structure allows actors to avoid obligations at 
moderate costs. Extensive exemptions and the opportunity of defection in case of unbearable, 
unexpected outcomes mark upper thresholds. Legitimacy-based compliance mechanisms impose only 
low costs on defecting actors in such situations.477 Strong judicial delegation facilitates clarification of 
whether adverse, unexpected effects are really that costly and surprising, so that domestic audience 
and reputational costs are moderate if actors sidestep obligations with justified accounts. Furthermore, 
low precision leaves actors with leeway to interpret obligations generously, and courts are likely to 
tolerate lenient interpretations. Finally, regionalization lowers the direct and indirect costs of resorting 
to exemptions, defection, or exit.  
                                                     
477 On legitimacy-based compliance mechanisms, see section 7.3 about risk in this chapter. 
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Overall, the recommended structure appears to be suited to cope with increasing uncertainty-related 
problems.  
Regionalization provides a remedy against the rising number of policy proposals by reducing the 
number of actors who can contribute proposals. Majority voting allows disregarding proposals from 
actors who are not required for attaining a formally sufficient and politically viable majority. 
Deliberation and legal discourse exclude proposals from consideration that cannot be defended on 
normative grounds. Considerable judicial delegation eases the problem of many reasonable policy 
proposals further as courts create focal points for negotiations. 
Overall, the performance of the recommended structure is positive. However, structures can ease the 
adverse effects of the trends only moderately and only with regard to uncertainty and the number of 
policy proposals. Since linkage and communication problems remain unmitigated, internal complexity 
constitutes a serious challenge to bargaining. 
7.1.4   Number and nature of veto players 
Regionalization increases home markets, thus lowering the costs of protectionism and non-
participation in standards. Regionalization also weakens the systemic interest in the WTO which is 
harmed by threats. In addition, regionalization appears to enhance the power of threats by uniting the 
markets of several actors. However, if regionalization is comprehensive, then the targets of threats 
have larger home markets at their disposal, as well, so that the power of threats does not necessarily 
rise. Since regionalization tends to increase the power of weak actors by more than the power of 
already powerful actors, the playing field is leveled and the power of threats may fall overall. 
Besides, extensive judicial delegation, and expectations of legal discourse as appropriate form of 
communication, make it more difficult to account for threats. Together with strong legitimacy, this 
increases domestic audience and reputational costs of threats. Therefore, the structures further weaken 
the power of threats. 
In light of the trends, consensus decision-making, which the recommended structure designates for 
major decisions, is extremely complicated. Since the recommended structure reduces the power of 
threats even further, consensus decision-making becomes even less effective; resenting actors cannot 
be pressured into agreement. On the other hand, regionalization significantly lowers the number of 
veto players. This makes consensus decision-making a viable option in the first place.  
Majority decision-making, prescribed for decisions of low or moderate importance, is effective 
independently of the number of actors involved. The reduced power of threats makes majority 
decision-making even more effective, since powerful actors can less easily block majority decisions. 
7.1.5   Conclusion 
The recommended structure considerably softens the tough bargaining strategies which the trends 
elicit. The recommended structure also copes well with internal complexity, albeit the influence of 
structures on this aspect of bargaining is regrettably poor given the adverse effects stemming from the 
trends. Regionalization, which strongly improves consensus decision-making, and majority decision-
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making moderate the growing problems associated to veto players.  
The positive performance of the recommended structure along all three factors, to the extent that 
structures can influence these factors, is favorable as we do not know how the factors aggregate in 
determining bargaining effectiveness. Improving bargaining effectiveness with regard to the toughness 
of bargaining strategies, the internal complexity, and the number and nature of veto players make it 
less likely that insufficient performance regarding one factor devalues good performance regarding the 
other factors. 
Moreover, we will see that the recommended structure leads to broad scope and strong independence 
of the judiciary. Since this enables courts to resolve imperfections in agreements, less precision needs 
to be achieved in bargaining. Hence, broader scope can be negotiated. Furthermore, judicial 
legislation, which accompanies judicial conflict resolution, broadens the scope of global governance. 
7.2 Solving the compliance problem 
In the following, I first review the strength of the single compliance mechanisms. I then consider 
whether the compliance mechanisms collectively are strong enough to achieve optimal compliance, 
given the influence of structure and trends on the incentives to defect.  
7.2.1   Compliance mechanisms 
Let me first address self-inflicted, punishment-induced, and systemic costs of defections which are 
not, or only moderately, influenced by legitimacy. The trends strengthen these compliance 
mechanisms. The self-inflicted costs of defections rise; the reason is, firstly, that the gains from 
strategic trade management decline and, secondly, that standards become more important in global 
governance, while deviations from standards become more expensive. Furthermore, increasing relative 
effectiveness, scope, and linkages of global governance, as well as more specific investments, elevate 
the systemic interest in the WTO.  
Regionalization makes actors more robust against all three compliance mechanisms. In addition, the 
sanctions contained in the recommended structure are soft. Hence, the recommended structure 
diminishes the strength of these compliance mechanisms, with the exception of relatively strong 
collective identity which makes the actors more reticent to damage the WTO.  
Now I turn to compliance pull, domestic audience costs, and reputational costs as strongly legitimacy-
based compliance mechanisms. These mechanisms benefit from legitimacy, which, as we will see, is 
high for the recommended structure, and especially from determinacy. Negotiating determinate 
agreements becomes increasingly difficult as implementation problems, ambiguity, and competing 
norms provide actors with arguments to account for their defections. This makes the broad legal 
mandate and the strong judicial independence especially valuable because they allow for authoritative 
interpretations that distinguish between justified and unjustified defections with adequate 
sophistication and impartiality. 
Due to the trends, domestic audience costs increase with regard to the domestic political setting. 
Governments are more likely to entrap themselves in references to international norms. Domestic 
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societies feel more committed to observing international law, and they perceive a greater interest in 
compliance, in order to avoid reputational and systemic costs. Since international institutions monitor 
actors increasingly in their promotion of good governance, domestic societies take non-compliance 
increasingly as a signal of poor governance performance. All this means that domestic society is more 
and more motivated to sanction defecting governments.  
With increasing transparency and civil society involvement in global governance, the distance between 
domestic and international politics shrinks and the capacity of domestic society to impose domestic 
audience costs grows. In addition to domestic society, domestic bureaucracies and courts increasingly 
support compliance.  
Furthermore, the reputational costs of violations rise, influenced by developments in the international 
political and economic structure. The importance itself of having a good reputation in international 
society grows. Deliberative decision-making, which is supported by the recommended structure, leads 
actors to expect compliance more strongly and raises reputational costs of defections further. In 
addition, the disciplining force of markets gains stronger hold on actors with advancing global market 
integration. Regionalization increases home markets, thus detracting from the force of global markets. 
7.2.2   Conclusion 
The recommended structure eases enforcement problems from the outset by tackling the gains from 
defection. Learning counteracts increases in heterogeneity, which is at the root of incentives to defect 
with the intention to escape from risk or adverse, unexpected outcomes. If heterogeneity is reduced 
after a treaty has been signed, the incentives to defect fall beyond what has been anticipated when the 
agreement was drafted.  
Extensive exemptions, and effective bargaining that allows for successful renegotiations, further 
reduce the strain on the enforcement system. If contracts are blatantly unsuited to the needs of an 
actor, she can temporarily modify her obligations herself or change them in accordance with 
international society. 
In order to deal with the remaining incentives for defection, the recommended structure achieves 
considerable force for compliance. Furthermore, I have concluded that lacking enforcement capacity is 
currently not the weak spot of the WTO. Finally, I have argued that the changing motives for defection 
lower the optimal degree of compliance.478 If all this is true, then the recommended structure provides 
sufficiently powerful compliance mechanisms to approximately achieve optimal compliance. 
The important point is that the recommended structure does not only solve the compliance problem 
but that its compliance approach, resting on legitimacy, and especially on process determinacy created 
through authoritative interpretations of broadly empowered and independent courts, comprehensively 
contributes to cooperation.  
This approach recognizes justified accounts of defections and treats vindicated defections leniently. 
                                                     
478 Recall the concept of optimal compliance. Compliance is optimal if the marginal benefits of defection for 
global welfare equal the marginal costs of defection for global welfare. As long as the benefits outweigh the 
costs, breach of agreements is efficient and optimal compliance is less than complete. 
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This reduces the costs of avoiding adverse, unexpected outcomes and, thus, eases the bargaining 
problem. Furthermore, we will find that the compliance approach reduces risk and strengthens social 
capital formation. This corresponds to the general notion that legitimacy as compliance mechanism 
leads to superior long term performance.479  
7.3 Managing the risks of global governance 
Risk has been defined to depend on the degree and the costs of deviations. In analogy to the costs of 
adverse, unexpected outcomes, the increasing relative effectiveness, scope, and depth of global 
governance, as well as decreasing autonomy for actors, exacerbate the costs of deviations. 
We have seen that the recommended structure implies relatively low costs of shouldering or avoiding 
obligations that cause adverse, unexpected outcomes. The recommended structure lowers the costs of 
deviations in similar ways. In particular, actors comply with rules that cause deviations with less 
reluctance because they accept the rules as legitimate and because they share relatively strong 
collective identity.  
Exemptions, legitimacy-based enforcement, extensive judicial delegation, and regionalization reduce 
the costs of avoiding obligations that arise from those decisions or rulings which constitute deviations. 
The reason that legitimacy-based enforcement decreases the costs of deviations is that substantial 
deviations erode legitimacy as the basis of enforcement. Governments do not feel normatively obliged 
to comply with illegitimate obligations, domestic audiences do not impose significant costs on their 
governments for violating illegitimate obligations, and reputational costs of defection are also smaller 
if obligations lack clear legitimacy. In particular, powerful actors, who are bound less by self-inflicted, 
punishment-induced, and systemic costs of defection can avoid obligations that constitute substantial 
deviations. This is the more so as excessive deviations damage the systemic interest in the WTO.  
Before turning to judicial delegation and decision-making deviations, we have to note the effects of 
the trends and the recommended structure on heterogeneity, which is influential in all types of 
deviations. Let us first consider judicial delegation risk, consisting of the principal-agent and the 
collective-principal risk. The greater heterogeneity is, the less able actors are to control courts that 
pursue their own agenda. Furthermore, the collective principal risk, which implies that rulings favor 
one group of actors above another, can only exist if actors differ.  
Let us now turn to decision-making risk, which comprises consensus voting, majority voting, and 
institutionalization risk. The greater heterogeneity is, the more likely consensus decision-making is to 
collapse. With greater heterogeneity, the incentive for majority voting deviations increases for several 
reasons. Developing policies that avoid substantial deviations for every actor becomes more 
challenging. Accordingly, deliberating until consensus is reached or an overwhelming majority is 
assembled becomes more difficult, so that on average smaller majorities pass decisions. Furthermore, 
policies that clearly favor the majority can be better justified as a necessity of consistency and they 
require less openly distributional mechanisms if heterogeneity is pervasive.  
                                                     
479 See Börzel and Risse (2002), Commission on Global Governance (1995), Eriksen and Fossum (2000b), Hurd 
(1999) and Wendt (1999, Ch. 6). 
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Institutionalization deviations grow with heterogeneity for similar reasons. Difficulties with 
deliberating make threatening more attractive in comparison with more consensual decision-making, 
and policies that favor powerful actors can be better justified as they do not need to entail openly 
distributional provisions. 
Therefore, the trend of increasing heterogeneity renders all kinds of risk more severe. Effective 
learning can offset this effect only partly. 
7.3.1   Judicial delegation deviations 
Judicial delegation deviations depend on the scope and independence of the judiciary. More 
uncertainty and rising complexity make increasing imperfections in agreements optimal. This 
engenders more cases and leaves courts more discretion in resolving them. Furthermore, broad legal 
mandate and automatic legal proceedings increase the number and relevance of lawsuits. Judicial 
scope, therefore, is broad, though restrictive access diminishes number and relevance of rulings. 
The degree of judicial independence hinges on whether we consider the ability of courts to rule 
independently in single cases or whether we consider the ability to rule independently and deviate 
systematically throughout many cases. Furthermore, judicial independence hinges on whether only a 
minority or whether a broad majority of actors opposes rulings. First, I assume that a broad majority 
resists rulings that systematically diverge from their interests; this is the case of principal-agent 
deviations. 
External control is based on ex-ante and ex-post control mechanisms. The recommended structure 
contains weak ex-ante (or administrative) control mechanisms because they perform poorly in 
controlling courts in comparison with their costs. Ex-post (or oversight) control mechanisms 
increasingly struggle with complexity that impedes the supervision of courts. If actors can nevertheless 
pinpoint judicial deviations, growing benefits of judicial delegation signify increasing costs of 
interfering with the independent working of the judicial system. Since the recommended structure 
warrants effective bargaining and entails particularly low majority thresholds for reversing rulings, 
actors can nevertheless reign in courts that cause high costs for actors in the pursuit of their own 
agenda.  
In addition, courts practice self-restraint. Influenced in their self-perception by extensive judicial 
delegation, judges strive for recognition in the legal community and for legitimacy. This motivates 
judges to rule independently and to strengthen the rule of law in the long run. Furthermore, the 
recommended structure supports independent rulings as a mean to enhance legitimacy. The good 
performance of compliance mechanisms assures compliance with independent rulings in most cases 
and high legitimacy allows weathering occasional defections. Low precision does not bind judges 
tightly to agreements. The broad legal mandate even covers judicial legislation explicitly under 
particular circumstances. And broad judicial scope produces ample precedent that can underpin 
judicial legislation.  
However, legitimacy-based enforcement implies that, once deviations accumulate, the enforcement 
capacity suffers, so that courts face frequent non-obedience which damages its legitimacy further. 
Since access is limited to actors, they also can diminish the inflow of cases to courts if discontent with 
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rulings is broadly shared. Moreover, courts need to continue to consider the repercussions of their 
rulings on the stability of the WTO. This limits their independence.  
Like in the previous case of systematic deviations, courts’ independence in single rulings is high due 
to weak administrative control mechanisms, monitoring difficulties, and the broad legal mandate. Low 
precision weakens the independence of courts against infringements by actors, but this is partly 
compensated by the ample precedent which requires legal consistency. If courts do not systematically 
deviate from the interest of the principal, it is therefore unlikely that actors reverse rulings.  
In summary, courts are highly independent in single rulings. Nevertheless, the principle agent risk is 
modest because actors can prevent systematic deviations. Actors pass controlling decisions, feel free 
to disobey rulings, tolerate non-obedience by others, and agree on reducing the inflow of cases only if 
courts deviate systematically. 
Independence in single rulings combined with the possibility to pass decisions in order to reign in 
systematically deviating courts allows courts creative rulings within the limits set by the principal. 
Unless a ruling is overturned by the collective principal, it has to be considered legitimate as it does 
not upset a large part of international society.  
The critical difference between principal-agent and collective principal deviation is that ex-post 
control does not work if the court favors a group of actors who can block decisions. In this situation, 
the disadvantaged actors cannot reverse rulings or reform judicial delegation design, even if they 
strongly disagree with courts. Furthermore, if international society is split, protest against and non-
obedience with court rulings do less damage to professional recognition of judges and legitimacy of 
courts less. 
Powerful actors, who are likely to execute administrative control mechanisms and whose opposition 
strongly hurts legitimacy and systemic stability, are less exposed to collective principal deviations. 
Therefore, it is important that the weak administrative control eases the fear of weak actors that 
powerful actors can subordinate courts.  
Overall, the influence of the recommended structure on the collective principal risk is mixed. 
Substantial scope of judicial delegation, broad legal mandate, and low precision increase the risk, 
whereas effective learning that reduces heterogeneity, weak administrative control, and low costs of 
deviations make it less problematic. 
7.3.2   Decision-making deviations 
Consensus voting deviations are moderate. While the trends worsen the bargaining problem, the 
recommended structure still achieves moderate bargaining effectiveness for consensus decision-
making. In addition, extensive judicial delegation lowers the risk of a complete standstill in global 
governance. In comparison with increasingly ineffective minilateral decision-making, which serves as 
base case for assessing multilateral decision-making deviations, consensus voting deviations will at 
least not increase. 
Deviations arising from majority voting are limited by delineation, self-restraint, and judicial 
protection of minority actors. Delineating the scope for majority decisions and, thereby, reserving 
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important decisions to unanimity voting substantially lowers majority voting risk. The combination of 
consensus and majority decision-making offers a beneficial combination of deviations. In essential 
issues, actors are more willing to accept standstill rather than a global governance policy that 
contradicts their norms and interests. In day-to-day business, actors value effective decision-making 
more highly than extremely low deviations. The reason is that in essential issues a single substantive 
deviation may be unbearable, whereas minor deviations in day-to-day business partly offset each other 
in the long run. 
Within the scope for which majority voting is assigned, the majority is strongly enticed to practice 
self-restraint in order to avoid defensive measures of the minority and to maintain the value of the 
WTO. Though the power of threats, which protects minorities consisting of powerful actors, is low, 
broad exemptions and the compliance approach that enforces illegitimate decisions only weakly allow 
minorities to avoid obligations stemming from abusive majority voting. Since abusive majority voting 
also harms the systemic interest of powerful actors in the WTO, powerful actors can be expected to 
violate rules which have been passed by abusive majority voting and to resist subsequent punishment. 
Hence, such decisions cannot be enforced and are unlikely to be passed in the first place. 
The systemic interest of the majority aims not only at maintaining legitimacy and compliance. Out of 
fear of being outvoted themselves in the future, actors recoil from establishing the practice that narrow 
majorities can decide disputed issues. Finally, the sense of collective identity nourished by the 
recommended structure slightly diminishes deviations as actors sympathize with the minority.  
If self-restraint fails, broad judicial scope and independence empowers courts to shield actors partially 
from abuses of majority voting. In comparison with minilateral decision-making, majority voting is, 
therefore, attractive. 
Concerning the risk of institutionalization, reduced power of threats, multilateral decision-making, and 
extensive deliberation strengthen weak actors in bargaining. Broad scope and strong independence of 
the judiciary, as well as enforcement of legitimate rules even against powerful actors, protect the rights 
of weak actors in disputes. Furthermore, regionalization improves the standing of weak actors 
concerning bargaining, compliance, and risk. All this makes the proposed global governance structure 
more attractive for weak actors than autonomous governance. 
7.3.3   Conclusion  
The majority of actors, enabled to pass decisions by majority voting, and courts, which are empowered 
by extensive judicial delegation, keep checks on each other. Therefore, the risk produced by majority 
voting and extensive judicial delegation, which both intrude into actors’ sovereignty, is relatively low 
compared to the benefits. 
Furthermore, the risk of the recommended structure is relatively low in comparison with the 
effectiveness and equality in rule creation and application. This is worth noting because generally 
structures that involve low risk for powerful actors happen to be weak in solving the cooperation 
problems and in equalizing power asymmetries. The reasons for this advantageous property of the 
recommended structure lies with its strength in social capital formation. Actors do not perceive 
learning as violation of their interests. Deliberation results in equality without involving risk. 
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Integrative bargaining, inspired by collective identity, lowers consensus voting and judicial delegation 
risks without affecting equality. Furthermore, collective identity inspires self-restraint, which curbs 
majority voting risk, again without affecting equality. Finally, legitimacy-based enforcement entails 
low degrees of risk while being similarly forceful towards weak and strong actors. 
7.4 Promoting social capital formation 
The influence of the trends on learning is ambiguous. On the one hand, the heterogeneity of values, 
norms and knowledge, together with high cognitive complexity of the issues, increasingly overstrains 
actors. The requirement of internal consistency for efficiency complicates incremental changes, while 
transparency makes learning and, in particular, substantive shifts in the position of actors less likely. 
Finally, less discretion for negotiators, and their decreasing ability to influence their negotiating 
mandates, reduce the effectiveness of learning. 
On the other hand, increasing uncertainty makes actors more willing to deliberate and to involve 
experts, who are inherently prone to deliberations. Furthermore, civil society attempts to persuade 
actors, it offers expertise to overcome diverging knowledge, and it assists actors with its universal 
perspective in overcoming normative divides. 
As regards collective identity formation, growing numbers of relevant actors make international 
society more anonymous and weaken processes of role taking and role casting. Furthermore, 
increasing difficulties in evaluating accounts harm the evolution of mutual understanding and diffuse 
reciprocity. By contrast, globalization connects the fate of actors. This motivates them to perceive 
themselves as one community of shared fate, thus supporting collective identity formation.480 
7.4.1   Deliberating 
Global governance structures can promote social capital formation, in particular by enticing 
deliberations. Deliberations have been shown to foster legitimacy of international institutions in three 
ways. As a supplement to representation, deliberating enhances process legitimacy. Also, actors nest 
specific rules in legitimate, broader norms when deliberating. Thirdly, deliberating reduces the 
heterogeneity of norms, so that conflicts with domestic norms become less frequent.  
Moreover, deliberations bring knowledge more into line and shift the focus from relative to absolute 
gains. Finally, deliberation fosters diffuse reciprocity while deliberation and legal discourse broaden 
mutual understanding. This contributes to collective identity formation. 
The structures wield strong influence on the frequency of deliberative interaction. Since deliberations 
are time-consuming and laborious, actors negotiate less if they are not compelled by structures to 
engage in protracted negotiations. For those decisions which can be passed by majority voting, actors, 
therefore, undertake less deliberative effort.  
Regionalization lowers the share of actors who are not involved in a disagreement. Therefore, fewer 
actors are open to being convinced by the better argument. Yet, regionalization also enhances 
deliberation. With fewer participants, interactions in negotiations become more personal and intensive, 
                                                     
480 See Wendt (1999, Ch. 7). 
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while social dynamics unfold more strongly over many negotiating sessions. Furthermore, the 
mechanism of role taking and role casting gains momentum with fewer actors. Overall, regionalization 
appears to be conducive to deliberating.  
Importantly, the recommended structure promotes legal discourse. Whereas precision, which enables 
actors to argue with strong reference to agreements is low, judicial delegation, the most important 
determinant of legal discourse, is extensive. Since the power of threats is weak and the enforcement 
capacity at the disposal of courts is strong, actors are additionally compelled to participate in legal 
discourse.  
Legal discourse facilitates deliberation based on the communicative capacity of law. Law provides the 
only globally valid language for negotiating international agreements and it is closely associated to a 
set of stable and well-defined practices. While law is not equally suited for every actor of the 
heterogeneous international society, law is an appropriate language for intercultural discourse and it 
can evolve into an even more polycultural direction. Besides this communicative function, legal 
discourse disposes interaction towards deliberating as it triggers competing justifications within 
particular rules and circumstances, dragging even actors who initially employ only rhetorical action 
into genuine deliberation.  
Deliberations that occur in disputes over existing agreements spill over into agreement-creating 
negotiations. Negotiators acquire skills in the demanding art of deliberating. Domestic and 
international society come to expect deliberating. In anticipation of legal disputes, actors involve 
experts in their reasoning, who are naturally inclined towards deliberations. Finally, actors avoid 
reputational and systemic costs in the case of legal disputes if they develop coherent agreements in 
deliberative negotiations. 
Taking these effects together, the recommended structure points to a high level of deliberation, albeit 
less than consensus voting for all decisions and high precision of obligations could attain.  
7.4.2   Legitimacy 
Let us now consider how the trends and the recommended structure affect process legitimacy, output 
legitimacy, norm resonance, esteem, and determinacy. The recommended structure enhances process 
legitimacy in the creation of agreements as it promotes equitable representation and deliberation. 
Multilateral decision-making design entitles all actors to actively participate in WTO decision-making. 
Reduced power of threats, and especially decreased attractiveness of minilateral decision-making, 
assure that powerful actors cannot overly hollow out these rights. To the extent that actors deliberate, 
weak actors are further strengthened as the better argument carries the day. Regionalization combines 
the resources of developing countries, so that they are better capable of making use of their voting 
rights and of forwarding proposals that have a chance of winning support in deliberations. 
Furthermore, legalized decision-making emphasizes the adherence of primary norms to the legalized 
global governance system and to the functioning of international society.  
Process legitimacy in the operation of agreements is considerable as well. The broad judicial mandate 
and the automatic legal proceeding subjugate most disputes to legal rulings, which apply the law 
coherently and according to its moral value. Strong judicial independence provides for equality in the 
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rulings, and strong compliance capacity, which also subdues powerful actors, warrants relatively equal 
implementation of rulings.  
The problem with extensive judicial delegation is that it is at cross-purpose with accountable 
representation. Yet, the recommended structure has been shown to effectively deal with principal-
agent problems, so that courts do not systematically and significantly deviate from the interests of the 
collective principal. 
Effective solution of the cooperation problems engenders high output legitimacy. Since the 
recommended structure solves the bargaining problem effectively, decisions can, in addition, be made 
flexibly, so that global governance policies can be reversed. Besides, extensive exemptions enable 
actors to partially reverse the effects of global governance within their territory; high reversibility 
further strengthens output legitimacy. 
With increasing heterogeneity of actors, global governance norms are more likely to conflict with 
domestic norms. Effective learning eases this problem. Extensive exemptions curb the repercussions 
that damage the legitimacy of global governance if international and domestic norms conflict. 
Deliberations nest specific global governance rules in broader norms. This lends additional legitimacy 
to the specific rules. 
Good compliance rates nurture actors’ desire to conform to international society and to abide by its 
rules, in order to receive esteem. Strong independence enables courts to condemn defections 
impartially and consistently, so that actors internalize appropriate behavior. Since exemptions are 
extensive and punishment is weak, coercive means, which would erode legitimacy, carry little 
significance. If governments are pressured into compliance with rules which they do not consider 
appropriate, this is mostly due to domestic audience and reputational costs. Since such pressure evokes 
less resentment than punishment, actors are more likely to bring their beliefs into conformity with their 
behavior. 
If actors can account for rule violations, they feel less compelled to comply with rules. The trends give 
actors more opportunities to credibly account for rule violations. Increasing depth requires more 
capacities for implementation. Increasing complexity leads to more ambiguity and to more disputes 
based on differences in knowledge. Increasing normativity and ideational heterogeneity cause more 
disputes stemming from normative differences. The broad legal mandate empowers courts to deal with 
these intricacies and to establish determinacy in an authoritative process. An emphasis on the 
procedural aspect of the standard of review supports judicial legitimacy and curbs risks in this delicate 
interference with actors’ sovereignty. 
7.5 Comparison with alternative structures 
So far, we have established that the recommended structure, based on integrated regions, a 
combination of consensus and majority voting, extensive judicial delegation, low precision, broad 
exemptions, and soft punishment, successfully handles bargaining, compliance, and risk. I now 
consider global governance structures which build on nation states as constitutive actors, which restrict 
judicial delegation, which contain highly precise obligations, or which entail narrow exemptions. We 
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have already seen in Chapter 6 about compliance that tough punishment is not necessary given 
declining optimal compliance and increasingly strong performance of legitimacy-based enforcement 
mechanisms. Tough punishment has been shown to be even detrimental due to its negative side effects 
on social capital formation and risk.  
Instead of exhaustively addressing the performance of the alternative structures in all aspects of global 
governance, I focus on those aspects of their performance that make them unsuitable for future global 
governance. 
7.5.1   Nation states 
Let us first address the performance of global governance if nation states are the constitutive actors. 
Different kinds of arguments are brought forward in favor of nation states and against regionalization. 
In Chapter 2, we have noted that integrated regions are criticized for distorting trade and investment 
flows, adding to protectionism, engendering transaction costs in administration and rent-seeking 
related to regionalization, and sabotaging multilateral liberalization in the WTO. I add one further 
criticism of integrated regions – that they harm the legitimacy of governance – before I demonstrate 
the overwhelming contribution which regionalization makes to global governance in the present study.  
The case that regionalization lowers the legitimacy of governance can be made along two lines. First, 
regionalization is claimed to be detrimental to the democratic legitimacy of governance within regions 
that integrate politically. Authority is drained from highly legitimate nation states and channeled into 
intransparent and unaccountable bureaucracies. I cannot make a judgment on this issue as I do not 
evaluate domestic and intraregional effects of global governance structures. However, I can contribute 
an argument about the repercussions of regionalization on a global level. Regionalization improves the 
legitimacy of global governance; this off-sets possible losses of democratic legitimacy within 
integrated regions. Thus, the democratically optimal degree of authority, which should be transferred 
from the national to the regional level, increases. Regrettably, the global level is usually ignored in 
accounts that consider the effects of regionalization on the legitimacy of governance.  
The second line of criticism looks at the dynamics of regionalization. This perspective shows that 
regionalization can annul the power-equalizing effect of the WTO. When actors negotiate regional 
integration agreements, powerful actors can exploit weaker actors and extract substantial concessions 
in linked issue areas by threatening to raise trade barriers.481 Furthermore, powerful actors are better 
able to form ‘hub-and-spoke’ systems.482 If actors are members in several integrated regions, some 
actors are in the center while other actors are at the periphery of the ensuing webs of overlapping 
regional integration agreements. Powerful actors at the hub have preferential access to more markets 
than weak actors at the spokes. Thus, producers located in powerful countries gain competitive 
advantages. 
                                                     
481 See Freund (2003), Limao (2002) and Perroni and Whalley (2000). 
482 See Ito and Krueger (1997). Note that the appreciation of regionalization derived from this study only extends 
towards such integrated regions that harbor the potential for deep integration. The study does not support shallow 
regional integration with ‘hub-and-spoke’ effects. 
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Possible adverse effects of regionalization on economic wealth and democratic legitimacy have to be 
compared with its contributions to global governance. To highlight this contribution, I now turn to the 
performance of nation states as actors of global governance.  
If nation states constitute the actors of global governance, consensus voting is overly hampered by the 
large number of heterogeneous veto players with small individual win-sets. The trends have also 
shown that minilateral decision-making will fail increasingly in the future. Powerful actors face 
mounting difficulties in reaching internal agreement within the minilateral group. Extending internal 
agreements to excluded actors becomes increasingly difficult, while minilateral agreements without 
multilateral extension become less attractive. Moreover, minilateralism carries for several reasons only 
low legitimacy, which has been demonstrated to be vital for effective global governance. First, 
minilateralism precludes equitable representation. Secondly, minilateralism as the rule of the powerful 
contradicts deliberating, which requires actors to cast aside their power positions and to rely on the 
force of their reasoning. Thirdly, if powerful actors threaten, in order to extend their minilateral 
agreement, these coercive means create resentment among the excluded actors. Finally, low 
effectiveness of minilateralism translates into low output legitimacy. 
Hence, majority voting is the only design that facilitates effective negotiations among a large number 
of nation states. However, majority voting is too risky to be accepted by powerful and weak actors 
alike because sizeable deviations are likely to occur and because the costs of deviations for nation 
states are high. 
To see this, let us first consider judicial delegation under majority voting. Effective majority voting 
curbs the principal-agent risk. Nevertheless, actors will accept less judicial delegation in a world of 
nation states than in a world of integrated regions. As argued below, legitimacy is weak, so that 
enforcement cannot be primarily based on legitimacy. The corresponding need for tough punishment 
invalidates an essential check against deviations and increases the costs of deviations. The costs of 
deviations are even higher as nation states are less able than integrated regions to circumvent 
obligations stemming from deviations.  
Let us take stock: We have a high number of actors, comprehensive majority voting, plus limited 
judicial delegation and accordingly restrained legal discourse. All this follows necessarily from the 
choice of nation states as actors of global governance – and all these factors detract from deliberating 
and collective identity formation. This diminishes the manifold positive effects of social capital 
formation on bargaining and enforcement.  
The problems in bargaining and enforcement, which weak social capital formation causes, further 
tarnish legitimacy. With low social capital, powerful actors are unlikely to implement obligations they 
did not consent to. As a consequence, powerful actors frequently defect, leading to riddled and 
unequal enforcement to the detriment of legitimacy. If actors are allowed to resort to exemptions if 
they do not consent to a majority decision, they will frequently employ this opportunity given low 
legitimacy and low collective identity. This undermines majority decision-making and demolishes 
output legitimacy. 
After we have established that the level of social capital in a world of nation states is low, let us now 
turn to the question of how substantial the decision-making deviations under majority voting will be. 
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Low collective identity does not entice actors to restrain themselves for the sake of minority actors. 
Neither will actors practice self-restraint for reasons of appropriateness given weak legitimacy. 
Furthermore, the inherent barrier of legitimacy-based enforcement is absent. Finally, limited judicial 
delegation cannot provide a strong external shield against abusive majority voting. Therefore, the risk 
of majority voting is overly high.  
Rare deliberations, only moderate judicial delegation, and weak legitimacy-based enforcement make 
the risk of institutionalization unacceptable to weak actors as well. 
In practice, this means that low effectiveness and low legitimacy of global governance with majority 
voting cannot reign in minilateral ambitions of powerful actors. Since weak actors are not attracted to 
multilateral decision-making designs either, they push less for institutional reforms, in order to 
strengthen international institutions, than attempt to weaken the hold of minilateral global governance. 
Hence, a world of nation states will live with ineffective and illegitimate minilateralism, regardless of 
the formally propagated decision-making design. 
7.5.2   Restrictive judicial delegation 
Proponents of restrictive judicial delegation worry about judicial legislation for different reasons.483 
Some critics emphasize that international courts are not the appropriate venue for important disputes 
on normatively charged issues. Therefore, judicial legislation is seen to tarnish the legitimacy of global 
governance.484 Other champions of restrictive judicial delegation sympathize with courts. They want to 
protect courts from overly political cases that compromise their standing.485 A third opinion fears 
judicial delegation risk, particularly principal-agent risk.486 
A general argument against all these skeptical voices rests on the benefits that result from extensive 
judicial delegation and that become increasingly essential with the trends. Judicial delegation 
improves social capital formation, bargaining, and compliance. It reduces decision-making risks. And 
it directly broadens the scope of global governance.  
Restricted access, effective bargaining, and low costs of deviations, implied in the recommended 
structure, keep checks on judicial delegation risk and counter especially the principal-agent risk. 
Moreover, several aspects of the recommended structure strengthen the legitimacy of courts, so that 
                                                     
483 See Trachtman (1999b). 
484 Barfield (2001, 408) expects judicial legalization to raise “intractable questions of democratic legitimacy.” 
Roessler (2001, 321) considers certain political decisions to be too delicate to be “submitted entirely to the 
rigidities of a judicial proceeding.” Keohane and Nye (2001) warn that difficult political decisions should not be 
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legitimacy. Esty (2002, 17) believes that, “By retreating from its current role as dispute resolution mechanism to 
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Esty recognizes that this possibility hinges on the functioning of other international institutions. 
486 See Delich (2002) complaining about the admission of amicus briefs, i.e. third party submissions, through the 
Appellate Body without authorization in the WTO treaty and despite the protest of the majority of actors. 
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there is no need to protect judicial legitimacy by restraining the mandate. First, the broad legal 
mandate entitles courts to moderate legislation within the mandate. Thus, courts do not stray off their 
mandate when legislating and they avoid subsequent harm to their legitimacy. Secondly, the good 
enforcement capacities of the recommended structure indicate that non-compliance with court rulings 
should be limited to strongly disputed, particularly salient issues. Thirdly, interference in actors’ 
sovereignty and instances of non-compliance can be further reduced if the legal mandate favors 
deference to actors in value trade-offs but maintains WTO dominance in certain substantive principles, 
for instance, non-discrimination, and in procedural principles, for instance, transparency. This means 
that not only the degree of authority counts, which is conferred to the judiciary, but also the pattern of 
rights.487 Fourth, if actors do generally not feel threatened by courts because the principal-agent 
problem is under control, if rulings are covered by a clear mandate, and if courts avoid excessive value 
trade-offs while they take all relevant aspects with their innate complexity into account, then we can 
expect that most actors and widespread public opinion condemns acts of non-compliance. In this case, 
non-compliance is significantly less damaging to courts’ legitimacy. Finally, the recommended 
structure promotes legitimacy in many ways, so that courts can endure occasional, wide-spread protest 
and rare non-compliance with rulings.  
7.5.3   High precision and restrictive exemptions 
High precision of obligations and restrictive exemptions close loop-holes in global governance. With 
highly precise obligations, involuntary defections become less likely and self-serving treaty 
interpretations become more difficult to sustain. Domestic audiences can argue more powerfully 
against their governments if governments are in breach with international obligations. All this 
improves compliance. Furthermore, precise definition of obligations lowers judicial delegation risk 
and contributes to the legitimacy of courts.  
However, the trends complicate bargaining thoroughly and bargaining itself remains critical though 
the recommended structure reduces the bargaining problem effectively. Therefore, resources that 
promote agreement are precious goods. It appears more effective to invest those resources towards 
substantive guidelines, which cover a broad set of issues, and into establishing sound institutions for 
extensive judicial delegation than to spend them on specific provisions governing a narrow set of 
issues. While lack of precision within the scope governed by the WTO may lead to disputes, the 
tensions within the WTO that origin from areas not covered by the WTO appear more unsettling. This 
applies especially to linked issue areas but also to economic issues such as competition law. 
At first sight, restrictive exemptions enhance the scope of global governance as global governance 
rules constrain actors with more regularity. However, exemptions return to actors part of the flexibility 
which they loose due to decreasing effectiveness of autonomous governance. This reduces the value at 
stake in negotiations and raises the gains from cooperation, thus leading to softer bargaining strategies. 
Furthermore, this lowers the incentive to defect. Even more important, exemptions play a vital role in 
controlling all types of risk. In the recommended structure, and in the alternative structure involving 
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nation states, risk has been identified as a critical factor. Achieving flexibility through exemptions is 
superior to less scope, less precision, and more defections.488  
7.6 Comparison with the current structure of the WTO 
While I have delineated an effective structure for the WTO, I have not pinned down the status quo of 
the WTO. Yet, this would be helpful for demonstrating the poor performance of current structures in 
the future. Furthermore, this is a precondition for spelling out direction and degree of necessary 
reforms, resulting from the difference between current and recommended structure. Finally, this would 
allow estimating the risk implied in the current structure, providing a guess about the level of risk 
which actors are ready to bear. 
However, measuring the degree of legalization within an institution is difficult.489 From a high-level 
perspective, determinants of legalization can show different degrees of legalization within one 
international institution. The Helsinki Final Act, passed by the OSCE in 1975, for instance, scores low 
on all determinants but precision where it ranks high.490 On a lower level of analysis, the different 
characteristics making up a design-driven determinant can show different degrees of legalization as 
well. For instance, courts can have a broad mandate but access for litigants may be tightly limited. 
Therefore, the degree of legalization has to be diagnosed independently for every determinant and 
every characteristic. 
Establishing the status quo is exacerbated by the circumstance that different parts of an institution can 
display different degrees of legalization. In the WTO, TRIPs is more legalized than institutions like 
national treatment.491 It is even possible that within one organization several sub-institutions exist that 
provide the same functionality, albeit with different degrees of legalization. For instance, several 
alternative dispute settlement mechanisms exist in NAFTA.492 Moreover, institutional form and 
practice diverge in many processes of the WTO.  
Even if we can cope with these problems of aggregation over institutional sub-entities that constitute a 
full-blown international institution and if we can deal with the gap between institutional form and 
practice, we are in want of a scale to measure legalization throughout international institutions. Hence, 
the assessment of the status quo of legalization is necessarily vague and ambiguous, resting on 
arbitrary comparisons between institutions. 
Personally, I consider the need to interpret the findings in order to arrive at concrete suggestions for 
reform as an adequate remedy against misled application of my recommendations; I cannot 
sufficiently substantiate my analysis to claim the right for clear-cut advice. Such advice would need to 
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rest on several integrated studies, which take a look that is closer than the bird’s eye view of this 
study. 
My expectations about the results of continued research, which pins down the need for reform in 
comparison with the status quo, are the following.  
1. Majority voting should be prescribed more often, majority requirements should be lowered, in 
particular for reversal of court rulings, and the institutional design should promote a shift from 
minilateral and consensual decision-making towards majority voting in practice. 
2. Courts should be strengthened against administrative control, for instance, by establishing a 
stable roster of judges and by allocating more resources to the courts. The high level of 
automaticity in legal proceedings should be maintained. With certain extensions, the legal 
mandate should be formalized in accordance with the lines developed by the Appellate Body. 
Private access should not be introduced. 
3. The bargaining capacity should be directed towards more precise formal procedures and 
towards substantive guidelines, in particular about the relationship to linked issue areas, 
instead of precisely formulating single obligations.  
4. Exemptions should be extended for those rules that restrain actors in their pursuit of linked 
objectives. Exemptions that serve economic objectives, such as anti-dumping and safeguard 
measures, should not be extended but rather be subjugated to stricter disciplines. 
5. Punishment should be integrated as part of a comprehensive compliance approach, 
contributing to legitimacy and limiting risks of global governance. This implies firstly clear 
specification of sanctions that avoids the trade-war spirit of current EU and U.S. attempts to 
invent more devastating approaches for implementing authorized sanctions. Secondly, this 
demands implementation routines that make implementation of sanctions more consistent and 
prevent stockpiling of authorized sanctions. Thirdly, this calls for establishing an upper 
boundary for sanctions. 
Concerning the risk implied in the status quo, the current WTO displays especially two characteristics 
that indicate a substantive potential for judicial delegation deviations. First, formal provisions that 
delineate mandate and proceedings for courts are imprecise or absent.493 Secondly, decision-making is 
rigid. Thus, actors cannot effectively control courts; instead, rigid decision-making entices actors to 
overburden the judicial system with lawsuits that require judicial legislation.494  
The degree of principal-agent deviations is difficult to assess in empirical terms.495 McRae (2003, 710) 
points to the “‘disappointed loser’ syndrome” that needs to be subtracted from proclaimed criticism, in 
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494 See Barfield (2001), Bronckers (1999), Ehlermann (2002), Jackson (2000b), Trachtman and Moremen (2003) 
and Roessler (2001). 
495 To which extent courts have deviated from the intentions of the member states is also contested in the EU. 
Whereas Tsebelis and Garrett (2001, 360) believe that “the institutional interactions … generally reflect the 
collective will of the member governments concerning their desired trajectory for the evolution of the EU,” Alter 
(2000) and Stone Sweet and Brunell (1998) see the ECJ promoting change against resilient governments. 
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order to arrive at justified criticism. And Durling (2003, 147) reassures that “appeals often reflect the 
political need to continue fighting, as opposed to any genuine argument about the legal merits of the 
claim.”  
The majority view is that the panels and the Appellate Body have overall ruled consistently with legal 
text and that they have shown reasonable deference to actors’ sovereignty.496 Yet, Greenwald (2003) is 
critical of an overly legislative practice of the Appellate Body and warns that the willingness of actors 
to accept judicial legislation is less than commonly thought. Dunoff (1999) also observes that non-
compliance with a number of recent rulings is caused by courts that reach beyond their mandate and, 
thus, damage their legitimacy. Overall, we can conclude that actors have accepted a structure that 
entails a massive potential for deviations which they cannot reliably assess. 
7.7 Conclusion 
In the future, the cooperation problems will become more severe in many regards. Wavering even 
under the pressure of current problems, the WTO will not succeed in the future without structural 
reforms. The recommended structure provides orientation where to head with fundamental reforms. 
Furthermore, the findings show which suggestions for reform contain pitfalls that have the potential to 
derail the WTO in the future. 
The recommended structure is effective and legitimate. Due to inherent and external restraints, 
however, we can neither expect to achieve an excellent level of effectiveness nor of legitimacy. 
Inherently, even the best structure is beset with trade-offs since structures exert an abundance of linked 
effects. If structures are nevertheless stable, actors expect cooperation to be more lasting and choose 
tougher bargaining strategies. Thus, it is inherently difficult to improve effectiveness, especially 
bargaining. Externally, the trends affecting global governance will undo many benefits of reforms. 
The risk which is associated with the recommended structure is substantial. However, taking the gains 
from global governance and the poor performance of alternative global governance structures into 
account, rational actors should tolerate this risk. We can assume that actors will indeed accept the level 
of risk implied in the recommended structure because actors are used to living with the substantial 
risks that flow from current structures. 
                                                     
496 See Davey (2001), McGuire (2002) and Oesch (2003). 
 192
8 Generalization to other international institutions 
In order to assess the possibility of generalizing the findings of this study, we can draw on studies that 
compare global governance throughout issue areas. Since Young (1999a) perceives problems as 
specific to regime tasks that are similar throughout issue areas, he is optimistic about the possibility to 
generalize throughout issue areas. Kahler (1992) finds comparable effects of high numbers of actors 
on bargaining for the Uruguay Round, the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and 
environmental protection agreements. Landau (2000) and Odell (2000) present particularities of 
multilateral economic negotiations. These particularities do not indicate that analysis of the WTO is 
strongly issue-area specific on my level of analysis. Yet, Börzel and Risse (2002) discover broadly 
diverging effectiveness of compliance mechanisms when comparing European environmental and 
international human right protection. Furthermore, Simonis (2002) notes differences between 
environmental and trade regulation that contradict transferring the WTO dispute settlement system to 
environmental agreements. The conclusions drawn in the literature are mixed, but overall supportive 
of careful generalization.  
Apparently, I cannot spell out for different issue areas which findings can be transferred with which 
modifications. Instead, I contemplate about the nature and severity of differences between the WTO 
and other issue areas in order to roughly assess the degree of generalization that is possible. Based on 
these considerations, I suggest certain findings from the analysis of the WTO that I expect to also 
apply to other international institutions.  
I begin with an abstract representation; Figure 6 shows core elements of the present analysis: the 
globalizing world as background, exogenous and endogenous determinants, effectiveness in solving 
cooperation problems, and achievement of objectives. These core elements remain of interest 
independently of the issue area for which governance structures are designed. Yet, it is unclear to 
which extent the present specification of the functions that connect the core elements proves adequate 
for other issue areas and other international institutions than governance of trade-related issues in the 
WTO. 
Beginning with the achievement of objectives, I work my way back to see where the generally 
applicable core elements are connected through specific functions that resist generalization. First, 
additional problems, which are not directly relevant to the WTO, may impede the attainment of 
governance objectives. In this case, the proposed global governance structure may solve the bargaining 

























Figure 6: Generalization from the WTO to other international institutions 
Secondly, the nature of problems that are relevant to the WTO, as well as to other international 
institutions, may differ. This means that the effectiveness of the recommended structure in solving the 
same type of problem may vary in different issue areas, though the exogenous determinants exert 
similar influence.497 Thirdly, the background of a globalizing world may adopt different shapes for 
different issue areas. In this case, the analysis of other issue areas would reveal varying exogenous 
determinants and different trends.  
A fourth possible obstacle to generalization exists that is influenced by the aforementioned three 
obstacles. Additional problems, different nature of problems, and diverging trends may shift the 
weight between WTO-relevant problems. With different weight of problems, the recommended 
structure may not provide sufficient problem solving capacity for problems that are particularly 
demanding in specific issues areas.  
                                                     
497 At times, it is difficult to distinguish whether the nature of a problem is different or whether the problem is 
altogether that different that it constitutes an additional problem, which is not relevant to the WTO. For instance, 
if monitoring is considered to be part of the enforcement problem, it changes the nature of the enforcement 
problem. Alternatively, monitoring can be treated as a problem in its own right, which is far more relevant in 
other issue areas than in the WTO. I take the latter perspective and treat those differences which can be treated as 
coherent problems on its own as additional problems. Only differences that affect the workings of lower-level 
mechanisms in WTO-relevant problems are considered changes in the nature of problems. 
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8.1 Different weight of problems 
Whatever the context and objective of cooperation, bargaining and compliance arise as generic 
challenges.498 Yet, their relative importance may differ. Different importance of bargaining and 
compliance problems makes the recommended structure only ineffective if a trade-off between 
effective bargaining and effective compliance exists. Otherwise, differing importance is irrelevant, 
since the recommended structure solves each problem independently as effectively as possible. 
For the WTO, the recommended structure is geared towards social capital formation to ease 
bargaining, to promote compliance, and to make effective, but risky decision-making and judicial 
delegation designs acceptable. Contrary to punishment-based enforcement, compliance management 
that is based on legitimacy contains no direct trade-off between effective bargaining and compliance.  
In other issue areas, additional problems, different nature of problems, and different trends may lead to 
global governance structures which contain significant trade-offs, in particular concerning the design 
of punishment. In this case, different importance of bargaining compared to compliance requires 
adaptations in structure.  
Enforcement problems are most relevant in issue areas where even single violations cannot be 
tolerated. Either a single violation directly imposes unacceptable costs or a single violation triggers 
chain reactions that may lead to regime collapse. Both categories apply to the ban of weapons of mass 
destruction and, in particular, to the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. Especially strong 
enforcement is also needed where monitoring is problematic. If actors can expect to violate 
agreements without being discovered, the incentive to defect increases. Therefore, severe sanctions 
may be required for deterrence.  
Enforcement is less relevant than in the WTO in those institutions that primarily set standards, like the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the Codex Alimentarius Commission, a 
subsidiary of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Even where standards have distributional 
implications, they are often robust against deviations once thoroughly established, due to specific 
investments and network externalities. 
8.2 Additional problems 
Looking for further cooperation problems in addition to bargaining and compliance, the taxonomy of 
regimes developed by Young (1999a) is helpful. He discerns between regulatory, procedural, 
generative, and programmatic regimes in global governance. Regulatory regimes administer 
substantive rules. Procedural regimes guide the alteration or creation of substantive rules. Generative 
regimes engender and spread ideas. Programmatic regimes pool resources for joint projects such as 
transferring technology, providing medical services, and managing international wildlife areas. In 
most cases, international institutions fulfill the tasks of several regime types. Therefore, I prefer to 
speak of different regime tasks rather than regime types.  
In the present study, the WTO assumes solely regulatory, procedural, and generative tasks, while I 
                                                     
498 See Fearon (1998). 
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abstract from programmatic tasks that receive minor attention in the WTO. In other issue areas, 
programmatic tasks are more prevalent, particularly if implementation problems play a greater role 
than in the WTO. Governments may find themselves in situations where they are unable to implement 
agreements even at significant costs. Improving environmental standards in production processes, 
eradicating torture, and protecting wildlife from poaching may be beyond the reach of genuinely 
committed governments. This calls for an active role of global governance in assisting actors with 
implementation.  
The problems, and the decisive factors for solving these problems effectively, vary considerably 
between regime tasks. Therefore, the present findings cannot be transferred to international institutions 
in which programmatic tasks and corresponding managerial and financial problems loom large. Partly, 
programmatic tasks require different structures, and partly the structure specified in this study is just 
not relevant for managing projects. 
Generalization is also limited for institutions that place strongly different weights on regulatory, 
procedural, and generative tasks, such as research institutions that focus on the generation of ideas and 
knowledge.499 Again, the most advantageous structure is either different or the considered dimensions 
of structure are not pertinent.  
Within regulatory tasks, monitoring assumes greatly differing roles. In the WTO, companies detect 
WTO-illegal market access restrictions and have an incentive to inform their governments of these 
violations. In other issue areas, monitoring is problematic. Detecting actors who build banned weapons 
of mass destruction and providing proof for their secret programs is difficult. Complexity, not secrecy, 
spoils monitoring efforts for CO2 reductions.500 In other issue areas, violations are discovered by 
private agents, but they lack the incentive to forward their information. Companies may witness 
corruption but refrain from reporting to their governments or to the public, so that, for instance, 
violations of the Integrity Pact against corruption, prepared by Transparency International, may go 
without blame. 
If monitoring is a primary concern, higher precision may be needed to ease monitoring problems, as 
well as tougher punishment to deter violations. Furthermore, an analysis that centers on specific, 
lower-level, structural and content-related provisions appears more adequate in this case. 
8.3 Different nature of problems 
To what extent, and how exactly, problems differ in other issue areas, and what this implies for 
effective structures, introduces the greatest uncertainty for generalization. All I can do is selectively 
shed some light on how problems differ, in order to demonstrate that the differences are substantial 
and impossible to evaluate without thorough analysis. I do so along three examples that combine each 
a specific issue area with a limited set of aspects in which problems differ.  
                                                     
499 Haas, Keohane and Levy (1994) mention the promotion of knowledge creation in a context of rapidly 
outdated scientific knowledge as a task that sets environmental institutions apart from many other international 
institutions. 
500 See Zürn (2002, Ch. 7). 
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The power of different types of threats and the distribution of power among actors differ along issue 
areas. Compare, for instance, the WTO with environmental regimes that aim at protecting a global 
public good, such as the ozone layer. Exiting the WTO is unaffordable, in particular, if the WTO 
perseveres, excluding the exiting actor from most benefits. In environmental regimes, the costs of 
exiting an international institution are mostly limited to domestic audience, reputational, and systemic 
costs. Furthermore, the exiting actor benefits if the institution nevertheless continues to protect the 
common good, so that the exiting actor can free-ride.  
Another point is that mid-size powers and coalitions of small countries can exert more power via non-
participation threats in environmental issues. China and India as second-tier powers, for instance, were 
able to push through a compensation fund for developing countries that are phasing out CFCs because 
an agreement without their cooperation would have been ineffective.501 This means that more actors 
possess power-based vetoes in environmental regimes than in the WTO. 
Not only does the nature and availability of WTO relevant threats change, but additional threats arise 
if we move from the WTO to environmental protection. There, substantial resources are needed for 
global governance, like for the Global Environment Facility (GEF).502 Consequently, withholding 
financial contributions becomes a source of power – as indeed practiced by the U.S. towards the 
United Nations (UN). 
The significance of values and norms in the WTO is indirect via their influence on bargaining and 
enforcement. By contrast, in human right regimes, values and norms are at the very center of 
governance and learning is, correspondingly, at the forefront of analysis.503 Global governance in trade 
is about how to do business together while intruding as little as possible into the ways of life of the 
trading partner. The WTO is traditionally about free access to national markets and in the end about 
fair competition on a global market. Very the opposite, protecting human rights necessitates agreement 
on core values and norms. It is not about how companies but about how people should be treated, and 
cultural beliefs about the adequate treatment of people are far deeper.  
This difference is reflected in an emphasis on the logic of appropriateness in human rights affairs.504 
Where human right abuse is not a wide-spread social practice, like gender-related oppression, but is a 
rational strategy of a certain government, however, these governments are particularly resistant to 
deliberation. Furthermore, domestic audience costs, which should be high on normatively charged 
issues, can be fatally low if human-right abusing governments effectively control their domestic 
societies. 
The willingness of actors to accept restraints on their sovereignty and to tolerate risks of global 
governance is moderate in trade issues, albeit with issue specific variations.505 While this makes trade 
a good starting point for generalization, inferences to security issues require caution as sovereignty 
                                                     
501 See Young (1991). 
502 See Haas, Keohane and Levy (1994) and Simonis (2002). 
503 See Börzel and Risse (2002). 
504 See Wendt (2001). 
505 See Abbott and Snidal (2000). 
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costs are particularly high if national security is concerned.506 Thus, actors may reject the level of risk 
involved in the proposed governance structure. 
8.4 Different trends 
The trends that affect the WTO are significantly driven by globalization and related meta-trends, such 
as technological progress. Since these background trends are not WTO-specific, the resulting trends 
affect global governance in general. Besides, the values of exogenous determinants have been derived 
from consideration of linked objectives. Whatever the special thrust of an international institution, a 
similar set of linked objectives has to be considered.  
Even when drivers of trends are WTO specific, as it is the case especially with deep integration, other 
specific trends may take their place in other issue areas, producing comparable results. In security 
issues, for instance, global governance moves away from limiting numbers of ships, tanks, and 
missiles towards controlling technologies and exchanging intelligence.507 The results are similar to the 
move from shallow to deep integration; cooperation involves more complex, positive regulation and 
increasingly concerns domestic policies.  
8.5 Conclusion 
The above analysis suggest that we can generalize results from the WTO to other issue areas and 
international institutions but not without detailed analysis, since many divides between issue areas 
exist whose repercussions are difficult to assess. The endogenous and exogenous determinants, as well 
as the analytical part of this study, have been formulated with the intention that they can serve as a 
beneficial framework for future research on global governance in general. The reader who is interested 
in transferring insights to other issue areas can, thus, recognize the differences to her field of expertise 
and make necessary modifications herself.  
My assumption is that major parts of the present argument can pass with moderate alterations, so that 
the general results will hold true for many issue areas. In particular, I expect global governance to 
benefit from regionalization and from selective legalization. While judicial delegation and majority 
voting need to go together to control risk, I believe that the emphasis should be on judicial delegation. 
Judicial delegation makes better use of current levels of social capital and it better fosters the creation 
of additional social capital.  
Since current levels of social capital are insufficient to make extensive legalization effective and 
acceptable, those determinants of legalization should rank high that support decentralized, consensual 
cooperation. Court rulings replace decentralized decision-making only in case of disputes when 
decentralized decision-making is characterized less by deliberating than by power-based bargaining. In 
all other cases, judicial delegation is supportive of consensual and decentralized decision-making as it 
creates a veil of uncertainty, provides focal points, adapts imperfect agreements to changing 
circumstances, and assumes limited legislative functions if the consensual decision-making process is 
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deadlocked. By enhancing flexibility in these ways, judicial delegation diminishes path dependency 
and, thus, lowers the value at stake in negotiations compared to the costs of delay; this further 
contributes to bargaining effectiveness. In addition, judicial delegation attenuates the compliance 
problem which besets decentralized cooperation.  
Majority voting, by contrast, replaces consensual decision-making more broadly. Since the provision 
of social capital is low, majority voting additionally calls for an enforcement strategy based on 
sanctions. Yet, punishment-based enforcement tends towards centralization and increases risk, which 
is a critical restraint in the face of low social capital provision. 
Judicial delegation is better suited to social capital formation as well. Judicial delegation promotes 
equality in rule creation and application; it triggers legal discourse and increases determinacy through 
authoritative interpretations, and it provides reasoned condemnation of violations. In contrast, majority 
voting relieves actors from the necessity to deliberate, hindering the development of social capital. The 
inclination of majority voting towards centralized sanctions for enforcement also harms social capital 
formation. 
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9 Evaluation of the research design 
To evaluate the research design underlying this study, I firstly consider fundamental approaches to 
acquire institutional design knowledge. Favoring the quest for causal understanding over statistical 
inference, I then situate the present approach among other approaches aiming at causal understanding. 
Afterwards, I turn to shortcomings of the present study, suggesting avenues for future research. In the 
conclusion of this chapter, I propose that the present research design is appropriate to serve as basis for 
future studies of global governance structures. 
9.1 Competing approaches to gain institutional design knowledge 
Two possible avenues are available to learn which design is effective. One approach is to understand 
the mechanisms behind effectiveness; the other approach harnesses statistical inference. Under a 
statistical approach, we can relate observed design choices and observed effectiveness. This procedure 
aims at direct inferences on effectiveness. Alternatively, we can link observed design choices to 
specific problems. If we assume that actors tailor institutions effectively to the problems the 
institutions are supposed to solve, then we can indirectly infer from observed design choices on 
effectiveness.  
9.1.1   Direct inference from outcomes on the effectiveness of global 
governance structures 
Statistical inference from outcomes on the effectiveness of global governance structures is beset with a 
lot of problems. Defining design features in an adequately fine-grained manner leads to a high number 
of independent variables and entails ambiguous choices. Equally cumbersome is defining and 
measuring the dependent variable effectiveness.  
Firstly, the objectives of international institutions are manifold. Often, seemingly unitary objectives 
need to be split up into several more fine-grained objectives. If compliance rates with different treaty 
provisions diverge, for instance, aggregating the compliance rates into one variable ‘treaty 
compliance’ destroys valuable empirical information.508 
Secondly, objectives are normatively arbitrary. Within the example of enforcement, this implies, for 
instance, that different levels of compliance can be deemed satisfactory. Generally, many definitions 
of effectiveness become possible if we are to be concrete in terms of problems international 
institutions should solve.509  
Thirdly, operational definition is difficult even of those objectives that are supported by normative 
consensus.510 When objectives are ambiguous, determining whether states are in compliance becomes 
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509 See Young (1999a, Ch. 6) and Young and Levy (1999). 
510 See Helm and Sprinz (2000). 
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ambiguous as well.511 Even more problematic is selecting, defining, and measuring vague objectives, 
such as whether learning within international society is promoted by international institutions. 
Moreover, the relationship between observed design choices and effectiveness is intricate. Interaction 
effects among the independent variables constitute one obstacle. In addition, many interfering 
variables exist that distort the relationship at any point of time. This ‘noise’ is exacerbated by the long 
time frames that have to be adopted to observe effects of design choices.512  
One way to control interfering variables is to construct generic problems and possibly a scale to rank 
problems according to their difficulty. While direct inference could theoretically do without the 
definition of generic problems and a measure of how hard problems are to solve, sufficient 
explanatory power can hardly be achieved without these additional independent variables. 
Problematically, developing such definitions and scales is an elusive undertaking.513 
Dealing with interaction effects and noise requires large data sets. Yet, categorizing institutional 
features and outcomes is both laborious and ambiguous. Moreover, reality provides only a meager 
quantity of changes in institutional structure. Eichengreen (1998, 998) notes, “A time-series 
investigation, even one with a considerable historical time frame, is unlikely to uncover sufficient 
variation along the relevant dimensions to yield robust correlations between institutional inputs and 
policy outputs.” Furthermore, comparing values of dependent and independent variables across 
international institutions is particularly tricky. Hence, a widely accepted, sufficiently large data set is 
unlikely to emerge. 
Even if all these problems are surmounted, the value of the results may remain limited. Even when we 
are confident that a certain design feature generally contributes to the solution of a specific problem at 
hand, we do not know how this design feature affects the set of problems to be solved in an institution 
while interacting with the set of design choices necessary to form an institution. In other words, real-
world complexity is too high for statistical inference to produce reliable results, and if statistical 
inference could produce reliable results, they would be overly simplified for applying them in complex 
real-world settings. Note that this is not to dismiss empirical work. I only discard statistical inference 
on effectiveness without a thorough understanding of the underlying mechanisms which we presently 
lack. 
9.1.2   Indirect inference from frequency on the effectiveness of global 
governance structures 
An alternative statistical approach is indirect inference on the effectiveness of global governance 
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513 According to Young (1999a, Ch. 3), a scale to rank problem according to their ‘hardness’ is, at least for the 
time being, beyond our reach. 
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structures from the frequency of institutional responses to specific governance problems.514 This 
avoids the problems associated with defining and measuring objectives, as well as the difficulty to 
relate design features to effectiveness.  
However, this approach rests on substantive assumptions that are subject to doubt. If institutional 
designers are rational in the objective sense, then they design the best institution possible with a given 
set of information. Accordingly, we do not need further knowledge of institutional design and we 
cannot outsmart the already rational designers.515 If actors are not supposed to be objectively rational 
but allowed to err, the obvious thing we learn from observing the past is how past actors have 
designed institutions. But this alone tells us nothing for future design. In order to produce valuable 
design knowledge, the assumption is needed that designers err, but what is done often is likely to be 
effective and should always be done with regard to certain problems. Such an attempt can be criticized 
on several accounts.  
The correlation between frequency of observation and effectiveness is not clear. As argued above, 
institutions arise from rational design and evolution. Evolution, however, does not necessarily produce 
effective institutions. Functionalist evolution within institutions and selection among institutions 
further effectiveness, whereas the pursuit of individual, particularistic interests through institutions and 
path dependency are detrimental. Thus, it is not clear how strong the signal of the past is.  
In addition, we have to read the signal correctly in order to learn from this kind of inference. This 
means that we have to relate specific design features to specific problems. This engenders problems 
associated with definition, measurement, and causal significance similar to those presented in the 
context of direct inferences from effectiveness.516 In short, the signal of the past is not only ambiguous 
but also hard to read. 
Statistical inference is, thus, unlikely to yield reliable conclusions that are sufficiently specific to add 
value in institutional design. Moreover, a statistical approach contributes little to the creation of 
innovative institutional responses. Consequently, the need to prod into the mechanisms behind 
effectiveness in order to gain applicable knowledge for better institutional design is increasingly 
acknowledged.517 
                                                     
514 This approach has been pursued by a set of studies published in the special issue The Rational Design of 
International Institutions in International Organization 55 (4), 2001. For a defense of this rational design 
project, see Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001a) and Koremenos and Snidal (2003). 
515 See Wendt (2001) on the rejection of objective, teleological rationalism.  
516 Duffield (2003) criticizes the limited set of variables employed in The Rational Design of International 
Institutions. Among important, omitted independent variables, he lists interest and power, existing institutions, 
and ideas. Domestic politics are not considered, either, though they have considerable impact on outcomes – see 
for instance the account given by Ruggie (1992) of how domestic politics favored multilateralism after World 
War II. 
517 Young (1999a, 129) suggests, “Given the constraints on the use of inductive procedures, one way to proceed 
is to focus more attention on tracing the causal chains through which institutional arrangements impact the 
behavior of various actors and through such impacts affect the content of collective outcomes in international 
society.” Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood (1998) map out a research agenda that calls for understanding the 
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9.2 Competing approaches to gain causal understanding 
Among the studies striving for causal understanding, focused, stylized, and holistic studies can be 
loosely distinguished as three strands of research. The studies are assessed by their analytical and 
theoretical frameworks. The analytical framework is evaluated firstly by the number and nature of 
endogenous determinants that are included to model structures. Studies can either trace the effects of a 
narrow aspect of structure or they model structures broadly and capture interaction effects between 
endogenous determinants. The analytical framework is secondly assessed by how broadly exogenous 
determinants are incorporated to make the study contingent on real-world circumstances. Thirdly, I 
consider how broadly objectives are defined to measure effectiveness. The theoretical framework is 
assessed by the range of theories which are employed and by how rigorously the theories are applied.  
Focused studies typically analyze single endogenous determinants with highly refined analytical 
methods.518 High-quality focused studies observe the impact of their endogenous determinant on 
broadly defined objectives and look at interference from exogenous determinants. Occasionally, these 
studies even contemplate on the systemic effects of the considered structural features.519 However, the 
focus on a tightly delineated fraction of relevant endogenous determinants sets limits on the systemic 
understanding that can be achieved.  
During the 80s and 90s, scholars have conducted stylized studies that apply one methodology to a 
broadly modeled international regime. These studies, however, abstract from specific institutional 
features in defining the endogenous determinants. They also tend to ignore the institutional 
environment. Therefore, such studies give advice at a high level of generality rather than distinctive 
design recommendations. Furthermore, the studies display an awkward similarity that suggests that 
game-theoretic methodology and the corresponding assumptions conducive to this methodology trump 
reality.520  
Holistic studies on global governance incorporate many objectives of global governance, many 
endogenous and exogenous determinants that influence these objectives, and many theoretical 
channels by which the factors impact on the objectives. Yet, this holistic perspective comes at the cost 
of analytical rigor and often systematic structure. To some extent, this is an inherent trade-off between 
                                                                                                                                                                      
impact of legal structures on effectiveness with special regard to processes of negotiation and learning within 
international society. See also Wendt (2001). 
518 See for instance Koremenos (2001) on contract duration and scheduled renegotiations, Rosendorff and Milner 
(2001) on escape clauses, Nielson and Tierney (2003) on delegation, Trachtman and Moremen (2003) on private 
access to international jurisdiction, and Drezner (2000) on multilateral punishment.  
519 Trachtman (1999b, 334), for instance, recognizes the need to transcend narrow perspectives, “This Article 
seeks to begin to delineate the role of dispute resolution in the international trade law system.” In his article, he 
closely examines the interplay between precision and delegation. 
520 Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001a, 764) remark, “The study of regimes favored theoretical questions and 
moved the research agenda away from analyzing specific institutional arrangements.” Further criticism of such 
stylized regime theory comes from Goldstein et al. (2000), Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood (1998), and Young 
(1999a, Ch. 5 and 8). For an example of such a stylized study, see Oye (1986). 
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complexity and conciseness. Coglianese (2000), for instance, contemplates how effectiveness is 
determined by the fit of six institutional forms of increasing supranationalization with three global 
governance problems: problems with coordinating national policies, problems with protecting 
common resources and producing public goods, and problems with globally assuring human rights. 
This comprehensive approach necessitates very broad definitions of problems and institutional 
responses, as well as a loose line of argument in explaining effectiveness instead of explicit, detailed 
discussion of mechanisms. Such work provides a good overview to situate past and subsequent 
research, but it is far from most institutional design choices.521  
Table 8 displays what these three types of studies accomplish at their best and how my own work 
aspires to complement the existing approaches. A (+) in the columns of the analytical framework 
signifies that a certain type of study broadly includes and defines endogenous and exogenous 
determinants, as well as objectives. A (+) in the columns of the theoretical framework denotes that the 
range of theories employed by a certain type of study is broad and that the analytical rigor is high, 
respectively. A (+/-) stands for intermediate values, whereas as (-) stands for low values, that is, 
narrow definitions within the analytical framework, a narrow range of theories, and low analytical 
rigor. An ideal study, which would be represented as (+/+/+/+/+), would boast an interdisciplinary 
theoretical framework that is rigorously brought to bear on an analytical framework that is broad on all 
dimensions.  
Table 8: Approaches to causal understanding of effectiveness 
Research design Endogenous determinants
Exogenous 
determinants Objectives Range Rigor
Focused studies - + + + +
Stylized studies +/- - +/- - +
Holistic studies + + + + -
Own research design + + +/- + +/-
Analytical framework Theoretical framework
 
The present study rests on the assumption that an analysis of global governance which combines a 
comprehensive set of endogenous determinants, high sensitivity to real-world circumstances, 
moderately broad objectives, an interdisciplinary theoretical tool-kit, and considerable scientific rigor, 
can now be conducted. This assumption is based on scientific progress made in recent years that has 
sharpened our theoretical tools and deepened our substantive knowledge.  
Progress in general theories relevant to global governance has been made on several accounts. Related 
developments in economics – game theory, public choice, and new institutional economics – have 
                                                     
521 The report by the Commission on Global Governance (1995) is another example of holistic studies.  
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paved the way for economists to analyze aspects of institutions that before had been reserved for 
‘softer’ social sciences. This has enabled rationalist international relations theorists to move from an 
abstract regime theory towards incorporating more details of institutional design into their analysis. At 
the same time, sociology – and constructivism as the leading sociological theory of international 
relations – has made great strides in advancing to a more operational level. In addition, links between 
rationalist and constructivist approaches have developed. Furthermore, both approaches to 
international relations have forged linkages to the theory of law.522 These developments allow for an 
interdisciplinary approach in studies of global governance, while being strongly rooted in (mostly) 
well-advanced theories that enable rigorous analysis.  
From the perspective of substantive knowledge, the holistic studies on global governance provide 
orientation on how to frame problems and point to major interdependencies within global governance 
that have to be considered. The focused studies serve to underpin causal relationships in the present 
analysis. 
Though I can build on this groundwork, the breadth of the present study and the inclusion of 
constructivist theories make a formal model of maximal analytic rigor impossible. Instead, I refer to 
numerous studies incorporating formal models as basis for the causal mechanisms I rely on; these 
existing findings I attempt to connect to one another as concisely as possible. 
Despite the study’s breadth, important aspects of global governance are bracketed, which I consider 
my duty to highlight. First, I reconsider the specification of the objectives of global governance. I then 
review the treatment of the actors and the design of global governance. I do so in order to warrant 
appropriate application of the present findings and in order to point to avenues for future research.  
                                                     
522 Whereas in the past, economic and sociological influences furthered the decline of legal process as 
established paradigm of policy-oriented legal theory, Rubin (1996) reports that now different strands of policy-
oriented legal scholarship are converging in comparative, institutional microanalysis. 
 205
9.3 Objectives 
Figure 7 categorizes those objectives of global governance that have been excluded or overly 
simplified in this study. In the following, I first draw attention to autonomous governance and then to 
linked objectives. Afterwards, I turn to the robustness, the quality, the content, and the transaction 
costs of strongly trade-related global governance. Finally, I address issues at the intersection between 
global and autonomous governance, considering the following questions: How do global governance 
structures affect the scope of global governance which is politically optimal for governments? Can the 
recommended structure be implemented politically? And does the recommended structure foster 

























Figure 7: Objectives of global governance 
9.3.1   Autonomous governance 
In this study, effectiveness of national and regional autonomous governance is only taken into account 
in determining the effectiveness of global governance structures. The effectiveness of global 
governance compared to autonomous governance shapes actors’ behavior in the context of global 
governance.  
A comprehensive analysis of global governance should aspire to include objectives on all levels of 
governance. Therefore, the present study needs to be extended to the effects of legalization and 
regionalization on the effectiveness and legitimacy of autonomous (regional or nation-state) 
governance.523  
                                                     
523 See Alvarez (2000). 
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9.3.2   Linked objectives 
Linked objectives should be integrated more directly by modeling their respective requirements in 
detail. In particular, possible implications of global governance structures on divergence between more 
and less developed states should be examined.524 Furthermore, the effects of global governance 
structures on security, which has been entirely excluded from the present analysis, need to be 
integrated.525 
In addition to the linked objectives themselves, further international institutions, which pursue those 
linked objectives, should be kept in account of the analysis. Effectiveness, legitimacy, and risk are 
connected throughout international institutions. It appears convincing that actors view global 
governance as a whole and are willing to accept a certain degree of risk and lack of legitimacy for their 
entire global governance involvement. If international institutions augment their effectiveness by 
exploiting this common pool of actors’ patience through certain legalization designs, then the structure 
that is optimal for a single issue area is different from a structure that takes global governance at whole 
into account. In other words, externalities between international institutions need to be managed, in 
order to avoid free-riding. 
Externalities also exist with regard to regionalization. If actors within a region cooperate closely in one 
issue area this strengthens their cooperation in other issue areas. If regionalization generally 
contributes to global governance, the positive externalities on other issue areas need to be considered 
when deciding about economic regional integration.  
9.3.3   Robustness of global governance 
Global governance structures should be robust to internal tensions and external shocks. Risk, 
legitimacy, bargaining flexibility, and effectiveness in general are important variables for robustness 
that have been prepared in this study. Yet, an explicit account of robustness is missing. This is a 
shortcoming that should be cured as regionalization and legalization have important effects on 
robustness. For instance, institutions which build on generalized principles rather than on power-
relations are more stable in the face of power shifts.526  
Integrating robustness is especially important because a partial trade-off between robustness and 
effectiveness seems to exist. Young (1999a, 7) notes such a trade-off when he elaborates on the 
inclusion of civil society into a complex pattern of decentralized authority, “One of the strengths of 
this horizontal structure of governance is the capacity of individual regimes to survive serious failures 
in other components of this system of international order. The opposite side of the coin, however, is an 
underdeveloped capacity to sort out overlaps and intersections.” 
                                                     
524 See Martin and Simmons (1998) and Sachs (2001). 
525 See Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) on the influence of regional integration on intraregional conflict. 
526 See Ruggie (1992). 
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9.3.4   Quality of global governance policies 
The present study concludes that with more effective bargaining and enforcement and with less risk 
greater scope of global governance can be negotiated, which raises global welfare. However, not all 
global governance policies are equally effective in enhancing global welfare. The present study 
touches upon this issue in its dealing with risk. High levels of risk mean that global governance 
policies poorly fit the necessities of a number of actors. What is needed is an explicit discussion of the 
quality of global governance policies that embodies further links between global governance structures 
and the quality of global governance policies.527 In particular, the rule of law may promote effective 
policies. The rule of law restrains powerful actors, who push for self-serving policies and care little 
about overall effectiveness, while promoting deliberation, which tends towards creative solution 
finding. 
Measuring the quality of global governance directly, according to its content, rests on normative 
judgments about appropriate objectives and on disputed evaluations of the effectiveness of alternative 
policies. Alternatively, the quality of policies can be assessed based on more abstract criteria, which 
do not pinpoint concrete aims but are the prerequisites for diverse substantial benefits to accrue.  
One such objective, which refines bare scope of global governance, can be termed reliable stability. 
Implemented scope of global governance and the resulting degree of liberalization can diverge from 
agreed scope for several reasons. Actors can diverge from the agreed scope of global governance by 
resorting to exemptions. Actors can defect from agreements. Alternatively, punishment of defections 
can trigger a trade war and cooperation may break down. 
Divergence of implemented scope from agreed scope harms private agents, who have engaged in long-
term commitments based on agreed scope. Apart from this direct damage, divergence from agreed 
scope lowers welfare also indirectly as private agents trust agreed scope less in the future and make 
less long-term commitments.  
Even unstable but predictable scope impairs the economic benefits of global governance. If private 
agents have to engage in long-term investments in order to reap the benefits of global governance, then 
these investments are likely to be insufficient to fully benefit from temporarily extended scope of 
global governance. Thus, for a given average scope, global governance with low variance in scope is 
more beneficial than highly volatile global governance. Therefore, global governance has to be stable 
and predictable, particularly in order to best exploit the benefits of efficient allocation of capital. 
A further abstract characteristic for the quality of global governance in trade, which might be 
employed as an objective for designing structures, is efficiency of protection.528 Protection is efficient 
if it minimizes distortions for a given level of protection, which is dictated by political considerations. 
The question is how the WTO can channel inevitable protectionism into those instruments that impose 
                                                     
527 See Trachtman (1999b) for a discussion of the impact of precision and delegation on governance 
predictability, public choice distortions, the opportunity to gain experience prior to specification of norms, and 
on further criteria of governance quality related to transaction costs. 
528 Efficient protection is a concept originating in the theory of second best. See Sykes (2001). 
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the least costs on production processes, trigger the least expenses for rent-seeking, incur the lowest 
transaction costs, etc. 
Escaping negative and border-measure regulation, actors resorted to alternative, more costly barriers 
that were out of the reach of shallow integration. With increasing positive and domestic integration, 
the efficiency of barriers is likely to fall further as actors withdraw to ever more costly protectionist 
instruments. Whether structures can be designed to promote efficient protection is, thus, an intriguing 
question. 
Yet, already the static efficiency properties of alternative instruments are difficult to assess. This 
difficulty is exacerbated once dynamic considerations are included. These dynamic considerations are 
concerned with the political-economy consequences of the protectionist instruments. Structures should 
shun those instruments that are efficient from a static perspective but create political lobbies, who 
resist further liberalization in the future. Apart from the difficulties of assessing the efficiency 
properties of protectionist instruments, predicting the impact of WTO structures and policies on the 
instrument choice of actors is also burdensome. 
9.3.5   Content of global governance 
The choice of structures affects not only the quality but also the content of global governance policies. 
Design issues like voting rules, participation of NGOs, linkages between issue areas, and legal 
deference between institutions all leave their mark on content. Onuma (2003, 139), for instance, 
criticizes that law is “tacitly endorsing the present international order, which is state-centric, male-
centric and West-centric, with a huge gap between the North and the South.”  
Those who think that certain interests will be insufficiently heeded in global governance without 
structural changes aimed at the promotion of these interests should first attempt to make domestic 
politics more democratic, transparent, or otherwise committed to their values. Only if this proves 
insufficient, global governance structures should be modified with the promotion of substantive 
policies in mind – at the price of decreased effectiveness.  
Such a content-driven stance on structure appears particularly justified concerning judicial delegation. 
Ample judicial delegation, combined with inefficient bargaining processes, tends to favor negative 
integration. In this case, actors pass mostly negative integration rules, which are easier to negotiate. 
These rules are then applied and extended by courts. Allocation of competencies at the actor level and 
limitations of judicial delegation may be a necessary response to this imbalance as long as bargaining 
is not sufficiently effective to agree on substantive positive integration.529 
9.3.6   Transaction costs 
Global governance involves transaction costs for negotiating, interpreting, monitoring, enforcing, and 
implementing agreements. Assessing the effects of structures on transaction costs requires difficult 
computations about the initial set-up costs of structures and the costs arising from continuous 
governing within these structures. Calculation is additionally complicated by the multitude of effects 
                                                     
529 Scharpf (1999) researches this problem in the European Union. 
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which every structural determinant exerts on various aspects of global governance. Costs incurred in 
one place may be more than offset by savings in other places.  
The impact of judicial delegation on transaction costs, for instance, includes not only the establishment 
of a court but strongly depends on how judicial delegation impacts factors like the number, intensity, 
and shape of conflicts. Furthermore, complexity and uncertainty leave actors with the choice between 
inadequate rules, frequent renegotiations, and judicial delegation, which adapts rules and decisions to 
concrete circumstances, possibly including new information unavailable at the point of agreement. 
Investments into judicial delegation, thus, curb losses from inadequate policies and save bargaining 
costs. 
This shows how hard it is to come by with a calculation of transaction costs which includes the initial 
set-up, as well as the governing within the structures and which takes the interdependence between 
different aspects and determinants of global governance into account. Therefore, I generally restrain 
the analysis to the workings of structures as the basis for future work that includes transaction costs. 
Generally, legalization is thought to increase transaction costs of negotiating an agreement in the first 
place and to lower the costs of running the agreement afterwards.530 Regionalization should reduce 
transaction costs as they rise with increasing numbers of actors.531 
Since effective global governance structures are characterized by their ability to solve the cooperation 
problems and since transaction costs arise mostly from efforts to overcome these problems, we can 
expect effective structures to display low transaction costs. Therefore, including transaction costs 
should necessitate only minor modifications in the proposed global governance structure. 
9.3.7   Politically optimal scope of global governance 
The present study considers the domestic political economy to the extent that it plays a role in the 
cooperation problems. Domestic audience costs influence the toughness of bargaining strategies and 
the power of threats; politicians consider domestic audience costs when they comply with or violate 
agreements. However, I do not disaggregate domestic politics in order to answer how global 
governance structures affect the scope of global governance which is optimal from a domestic political 
perspective.  
Regionalization and legalization change the domestic political process, which engenders political 
positions for the international arena. Global governance structures that make actors more willing to 
extend scope enhance global welfare if scope that is politically optimal for governments falls short of 
socially optimal scope, which maximizes global welfare. This applies, in particular, if the domestic 
political process is biased in favor of protectionist forces.  
In integrated regions, interests do not only have to be aggregated domestically but also intraregionally. 
This invokes, first, the question of how private agents are affected in their ability to exert political 
influence in favor of or against liberalization. The key to an answer is relative effects on collective 
action problems in lobbying, on scale economies in lobbying, as well as on interests and economic 
                                                     
530 See Abbott and Snidal (2000) and Kahler (2000). 
531 See Kahler (1992) and Oye (1986) on the relationship between numbers and transaction costs. 
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strength of agents in the domestic realm.532 For instance, regionalization tends to weaken the strength 
of protectionist forces as import-competing industries are driven off the market. At the same time, 
regionalization lowers the interest of export industries in multilateral liberalization because the 
regional market already has an attractive size.  
Secondly, the question arises of how the interests of nation states are combined to form a single 
regional voice in trade negotiations. Here it is important to see whether extreme positions are rather 
softened or come to determine the stance of the whole region.533 It also has to be discerned whether 
protectionist or free-trade interests are more likely to be dominant in intraregional interest 
aggregation.534 
Legalization impacts politically optimal scope as well. Goldstein and Martin (2000), for instance, hold 
that increasing precision strengthens protectionist interests versus free-trade forces in trade 
negotiations. Both sites suffer from a collective action problem in mobilizing political pressure, 
exacerbated by the lack of information whose interests are at stake, and to which extent, in any given 
negotiation. Precision clarifies the distributional outcomes for the private agents and, thus, fosters 
political mobilization. As export interests are likely to be better organized for low levels of precision, 
increasing precision strengthens protectionists more than free-traders.  Generalized claims on the 
effects of legalization on the domestic political economy are difficult, though, as these effects are 
highly sensitive to variations in domestic legal frameworks.535 
No doubt, the impact on the politically optimal scope of global governance through political-economy 
channels is an important issue for the selection of global governance structures. Yet, this brief 
illustration indicates that the analysis is highly complex, with ambiguous answers, and with a focus 
different from that of this study. Therefore, separate analysis is preferable. 
9.3.8   Political implementation of global governance structures 
Whether recommended structures can be implemented politically can be answered from a unitary actor 
perspective or by disaggregating domestic politics. If we take actors as units of analysis and look at the 
international level, then effectiveness, legitimacy, and risk are the main drivers of political feasibility. 
Actors can be expected to implement structures that are effective and legitimate and involve low risk. 
The support global governance structures enjoy in the domestic realm depends partly on those factors 
that are relevant to unitary actors and partly on whether structures serve the interests of influential 
domestic groups.  
The present study does not contemplate on these specific domestic aspects. Political feasibility from a 
unitary actor perspective is analyzed incompletely, in particular in two regards. First, I do not consider 
that certain types of positive and a large share of negative integration intensify regulatory competition 
between actors. This competition can have unwanted effects as it can induce a ‘race to the bottom’ or 
                                                     
532 See supra note 63. See also Magee (2002). 
533 Leigh-Phippard (1999) expects less outlier in multilateral negotiations through coalition formation. 
534 Meunier (2000) expects intraregional coalition formation to produce more protectionist stances. 
535 See Finnemore and Toope (2001). 
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at least apply downward pressure on standards and taxes imposed by autonomous governance, with 
adverse repercussions on domestic equity and legitimacy.536 On the other hand, regulatory competition 
creates benefits such as increased governance process efficiency. Accordingly, the influence of 
regulatory competition in governance on the effectiveness and legitimacy of autonomous governance 
is complex and unclear. In order to avoid an inextricably onerous discussion at the fringes of this 
study, I do not consider deviations of actual autonomous governance, arising under competition 
induced by global governance, from optimal autonomous governance without this competition. 
The second neglected factor of political feasibility of recommended structures matters if global 
governance is perceived more broadly as a threat to national identity. Identity is strained if actors are 
under pressure to significantly adopt foreign cultural influences. Actors can also suffer from identity 
loss in the process of forming a collective identity as the boundaries between Self and Other blur 
away.537 Perceived threats to identity stand in a mutually reinforcing relationship with perceived risk. 
Deviations invoke the perception that sovereignty is threatened. The perception of threatened 
sovereignty, in turn, moves the discourse about risk towards a critical evaluation of global governance. 
Moreover, an analysis that focuses on political feasibility could pay attention to interesting interaction 
effects between legalization and regionalization. Asymmetrical power leads a strong country to prefer 
a low level of legalization.538 As treaties are as legalistic as the country with the least interest in 
legalization wishes (absent side-payments or coercion), regionalization will make legalization easier to 
attain if it works towards more symmetric powers. 
Future work on the gap between socially and politically optimal structures is particularly important in 
the face of institutional path dependence. Institutional design traps can solidify, so that actors are stuck 
with inefficient institutions. Path dependence arises for two reasons. First, current institutional design 
affects future optimal design, both through the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. 
Intertemporal effects are transmitted, for instance, through changes in the environment to which design 
responds, through development of specific assets and capabilities, and through institutional influence 
on ideational properties that serve to define objectives. Secondly, institutional design affects the 
process of institutional change.  
In global governance, the peril that design traps cannot be surmounted is particularly real. Even if 
shocks infuse strong momentum to claims for institutional change, reformatory attempts are often 
stifled by opposition of leading states and domestic political constraints.539 Civil society may promote 
change. But as states partially loose control over the content of global governance to civil society, they 
hold on to their control over structure.540 Therefore, strategies for dynamic development of structures 
need to be developed that shun design traps throughout the tricky process of implementing a 
promising structure. 
                                                     
536 See Rodrik (2000). 
537 See Wendt (1999, Ch. 7). 
538 See McCall Smith (2000). 
539 See Diehl, Ku and Zamora (2003). 
540 See Diehl, Ku and Zamora (2003). 
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9.3.9   Implementation capacities  
In the treatment of enforcement problems, I have considered implementation problems only indirectly 
as they intensify the need to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary defections, whereas I have 
excluded how global governance affects the capacity of actors to implement global governance 
policies.  
Consideration of this issue holds two implications for the choice of structures. Evidently, global 
governance structures should be assessed by their contribution to implementation capacities. In this 
regard, we can expect regionalization to empower weak actors. Less obvious is a second repercussion. 
The stronger the role that international institutions adopt in implementation assistance is, the greater 
risk becomes. Poor actors become dependent on the skills and resources of international institutions, 
whereas rich actors need to cede resources to international institutions. 
9.4 Actors of global governance 
The present treatment of integrated regions and civil society, as well as the constitutive effects of 
international interaction that change actors’ properties, need elaboration. Integrated regions should be 
modeled more carefully, interaction between states and civil society should be developed more 
extensively, effects from the international level on domestic institutions should be incorporated, and 
learning processes should be scrutinized in more detail. 
9.4.1   Integrated regions  
In Chapter 4 about ideational properties and learning, I have briefly argued that integrated regions 
should generally and in the long run be capable to agree on a joint position for international 
negotiations and are, thus, an effective approach to reducing the number of actors involved in global 
governance. A more in-depth analysis of regionalization with regard to global governance would allow 
modeling the behavior of integrated regions more accurately.  
Many of the effects on integrated regions’ behavior are political-economy effects; the necessity to 
consider such effects has already been noted above. In addition, regionalization changes how global 
governance affects actors from a unitary actor perspective. For instance, regionalization reduces 
uncertainty. Actors within an integrated region are heterogeneous to a certain degree and, as a 
consequence, differently affected by global governance. Actors who loose significantly can expect to 
be compensated by side-payments or favorable consideration of their thrusts in future regional 
negotiations. Furthermore, adversely affected actors feel less disadvantaged by global governance if 
they share a collective identity with other members of the integrated region that are favorably affected. 
Finally, unexpected, adverse effects become less threatening if members of integrated regions are able 
to use their regions as leverage in global governance to alter especially costly rules.  
Researching how the intraregional effects of regionalization influence global governance will allow 
formulating additional criteria for benign regionalization. Intraregional voting mechanism, for 
instance, determine the behavior of integrated regions in international negotiations.541 It may be 
                                                     
541 See Meunier (2000).  
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possible to find operational and politically acceptable criteria for admitting integrated regions beyond 
the current requirements to cover substantially all the trade among members, not to raise the level of 
protectionism towards non-members, and to notify the regional agreement to the WTO.542 
9.4.2   Civil society 
Figure 8 gives an overview of the relationship between civil society, on the one hand, and nation 
states and integrated regions as actors of global governance, on the other. Numbers denote the arrows 
for easier reference with the text. Governance by government and governance with government are 
merged in this figure as I do not discern between these two concepts but assumes actor-based global 













Figure 8: Civil society in global governance 
Properties and roles of civil society should be more fully developed along several lines. The link 
between international institutions and the evolution of transnational civil society is omitted in the 
present study. Yet, international institutions give civil society access to the international stage and 
facilitate cooperation among national NGOs across borders (1).543 A further aspect that should be 
modeled in more detail is how civil society influences actor-based global governance. This would 
improve upon the arguments derived from civil society involvement in this study that affect 
governance directly (2) or indirectly, through civil society’s impact on learning (3). Moreover, proper 
treatment of civil society implies consideration of the effects of governance without government on 
actor-based global governance. In particular, self-regulation may lighten the burden which rests on 
actor-based governance (4). Finally, how actor-based global governance influences governance 
                                                     
542 WTO Art. XXIV. 
543 See Bohman (2002). 
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without government should be examined. For instance, judicial delegation may provide adjudication if 
dispute settlement under governance without government fails (5).  
Legalization may provide several benefits in these regards. It may foster civil society engagement (1), 
provide an avenue to productively integrate civil society into state-dominated global governance (2 
and 3), and develop interfaces with transnational governance (4 and 5). 
9.4.3   Constitutive effects 
Learning processes for those ideational properties which are considered in the present study need to be 
more comprehensively developed.544 International organizations are not only venues of 
communicative interaction, as pretended in the present study, but they are also agents of constructivist 
change.545 Even more importantly, the determinants of learning should be analyzed in detail for all 
ideational properties in the way this study has dissected legitimacy. To see the potential for such 
additional analysis, let us take, for instance, the influence of regionalization on collective identity 
formation. On the one hand, regionalization may serve as a ‘school’ for legalization where actors learn 
to live with an identity that is not based on nationality but on common values and shared objectives. 
On the other hand, we may worry that regional identities hamper the development of global identities 
if we look at the EU where larger countries have less supranational identities.546 By decreasing the 
number of actors, regionalization could furthermore enhance competitiveness to the detriment of 
collective identity formation.  
In addition to better modeling processes of change for the considered ideational properties, further 
constitutive effects on actors need to be integrated that are absent in the present study. Most notably, 
global governance influences actors’ domestic political institutions.547 If global governance structures 
can be designed to promote legitimate autonomous governance, this will feed back positively into 
legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance.548 Furthermore, global governance structures affect 
the vertical allocation of power within states. Regionalization and advancing global economic 
integration strengthen sub-national, territorial actors, such as cities or local regions, in comparison 
with nation states.  
                                                     
544 See Cederman and Daase (2003) for a systematic review of the possibility to endogenize actors. 
545 See Barnett and Finnemore (1999). Haas, Keohane and Levy (1994, 409) consider as the most important tasks 
which leaders of international institutions have to fulfill to “create and manipulate dynamic processes by which 
governments change conceptions of their interests; and to mobilize and coordinate complex policy networks 
involving governments, NGOs, subunits of governments, and industry groups, as well as a variety of 
international organizations having different priorities and political styles.” 
546 See Hooghe (1999). 
547 See Pevehouse (2002) on the influence of international institutions and particularly regional organizations on 
regime change towards liberal democracy. Zleptnig (2002) points to the influence of a procedural review of 
deliberative conditions in the domestic realm on domestic deliberations of trade issues. 
548 Keohane and Nye (2001) emphasize the domestic democratic process as the prime source of legitimacy for 
international institutions. Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff (2002) find that democratization furthers the 
conclusion of trade agreements.  
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9.5 Design of global governance 
In this section, I review my definition of legalization, consider the possibility to add scope as a further 
endogenous determinant of global governance design, and point to direct effects of legalization, which 
have been omitted in the present analysis. 
9.5.1   Legalization 
The definition of legalization by the design of decision-making, judicial delegation, precision, 
exemptions, and punishment is limited in the number of endogenous determinants, which I consider, 
and in the characteristics that shape each determinant.  
An additional determinant that sounds interesting in the future is executive delegation.549 I abstract 
from decision-making by the executive organs of the WTO because the Secretariat has little decision-
making power today550 and – for reasons of delegation risk and of lacking legitimacy and enforcement 
capacity – its decision-making power is likely to increase only slowly.551  
Decision-making provides a good example for additional characteristics that could be incorporated to 
define the determinants of legalization more comprehensively. For instance, I do not account for the 
subtle difference whether consensus requires the explicit consent of all actors or whether a decision 
can be passed as long as no formal objection is filed. Neither do I integrate agenda setting rights and 
decision-making modes where voting power is weighted by population, economic strength, or 
financial contributions to international organizations.  
Even more fine-grained distinction among possible institutional features would allow further 
promotion of deliberations. Frequent meetings, broad discussions that are not directly linked to 
bargaining, involvement of experts, powerful mandates for negotiators, and resource transfer to 
empower all actors to contribute meaningfully are candidates for pro-deliberative, institutional fine-
tuning.552 
                                                     
549 In particular, delegating authority to a neutral agenda-setting body within the WTO can serve to reduce the 
number of policy proposals or endow few proposals with particular clout. See Scharpf (1999) and Pollack (1997) 
for the significance of agenda setting through the Commission in the EU.  
550 See Raby (2001), Shaffer (2001) and Steinberg (2002). A light bureaucracy is also typical for other 
international institutions and even considered a characteristic for international regimes. See Young (1999a, Ch. 
1).  
551 See Bronckers (1999). 
552 Schmalz-Bruns (2002) develops ideas how structures can create an ideal deliberative space in the EU. He 
suggests a parliament that regulates the access to and the process of deliberations ex ante and a court that 
controls access and process ex post in disputed cases.  
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9.5.2   Scope as endogenous determinant 
In addition to more comprehensive modeling of legalization, scope could supplement legalization as 
an endogenous characteristic of international institutions.553 In combination with legalization, optimal 
scope is particularly interesting from a dynamic perspective.  
Questions about the adequate speed of scope enlargement could be analyzed in a framework similar to 
the one developed in this study. Such a dynamic-scope study could include the following elements. 
Learning takes time. Scope extension increases heterogeneity and, thus, disagreement. Learning is 
most effective for intermediate degrees of disagreement. Too little scope can create tensions as 
unilateralism prevails and as linkages to non-regulated issues sabotage global governance 
effectiveness. With too much scope, risk becomes intolerable and legitimacy suffers as actors feel 
overly constrained by the WTO.  
Moreover, the trade-off between precision of specific obligations, guidelines for substantive 
obligations, precision of structural provisions, and scope could be integrated into a static or dynamic 
model. For a given level of bargaining effectiveness, actors have to decide how to ‘spend’ their 
potential for agreement to clarify concrete obligations, to develop guidelines for obligations, to draft 
structural rules about governance processes, or to enlarge the scope of global governance. 
9.5.3   Direct effects of legalization 
The present study ignores those channels by which legalization directly influences the effectiveness of 
global governance, in addition to the indirect influence through the cooperation problems. 
Exemptions, for instance, directly lower the scope of global governance as actors evade obligations. 
Another example for direct effect is precision and judicial delegation which improve the determinacy 
of the contractual obligations. Since actors use their discretion in a self-serving way, which detracts 
from scope and predictable stability of global governance, precision and judicial delegation directly 
contribute to effectiveness. Abbott and Snidal (2000, 427) note on this issue, “One way legalization 
enhances credibility is by constraining self-serving auto-interpretation. Precision of individual 
commitments, coherence between individual commitments and broader legal principles, and accepted 
modes of legal discourse and argument all help limit such opportunistic behavior. Granting 
interpretive authority to courts or other legal institutions further constrains auto-interpretation.”  
                                                     
553 In my model, scope follows automatically from the precision and bargaining effectiveness implied in the 
choice of structure. However, it is possible to refine the model, so that endogenizing scope does not over-
determine the model. 
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9.6 Conclusion 
Above, I have mentioned several aspects concerning the objectives, the actors, and the design of 
global governance, which deserve further elaboration. At question is whether I have chosen the right 
degree of complexity and whether I have made the right choices with my assumptions for a given 
degree of complexity.  
As to the latter, let me only stress the significance of one choice: making risk, which is often ignored 
or limited to a footnote, a central concern. This invigorates a power-conscious approach to global 
governance that adapts the spirit of the anxious realist worldview to an increasingly institutionalized 
world. The problem is no longer that rational actors refrain from cooperation because they fear 
violence outside institutions; instead, actors fear being subjugated by institutional power. This does 
not only reflect the risk-oriented perspective of realism, but certain realist assumptions about 
cooperation can be salvaged. For instance, the proposition espoused by Grieco (1988) that high exit 
costs aggravate cooperation holds true in the present account of risk, whereas liberal institutionalism 
sees only the positive effect of high exit costs in reducing enforcement problems. Generally, power 
needs to become more ingrained in mainstream analysis that aims to improve international institutions. 
Whether the present specific framework is considered a successful engagement in interdisciplinary 
theorizing or not, the analysis should have revealed that analytical complexity is necessary. From my 
point of view, it is untenable to look at a narrow section of global governance, simplify it further, 
solve the artificially created problem with highly refined methods, and then draw strong conclusions. 
Such a procedure could be justified only if the objective is to produce input for more comprehensive 
analysis. Recall the special issue about The Rational Design of International Institutions in 
International Organization whose authors propose several conjectures by which rational designers are 
supposedly led. If legitimacy is influenced by institutional structure and if legitimacy is a central factor 
for effectiveness, then the effects of structure on legitimacy should be a main concern of rational 
designers. Yet, the special issue ignores legitimacy. This is an example of how theoretical monogamy 
undermines results.554  
Even with an interdisciplinary toolbox that captures numerous causal mechanisms we can go seriously 
wrong if we delineate our field of research overly narrow. Interaction effects accumulate, in particular, 
in risk. The true costs of risk-aggravating legalization along one determinant can be only assessed in 
the context of other determinants in which legalization correspondingly has to be scaled back. 
Accordingly, the risk-reducing properties of regionalization can only be appreciated if the 
corresponding gains from more legalization are taken into account.  
Furthermore, interaction effects have important ramifications for institutional reforms. If we optimize 
                                                     
554 The rationalist focus common in research is mirrored in the practice of the WTO. Esty (2002, 15) critically 
summarizes, “As the scope and depth of common values expands, so does the sense of community, which makes 
the public more willing to accept further economic integration … what is lacking at the WTO is any recognition 
of the need for more politics – more dialogue and debate, and engagement with civil society – as a way of 
building the political foundations needed to support the economic structure that is being erected.” 
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single design aspects, we can tailor them to the existing institutional structure. In this case, they 
improve upon an inefficient design but may lead away from optimal design. Path dependency may 
lock-in such developments, so that the optimal design may become even harder to reach. 
Alternatively, if we design single determinants in accordance with the optimal design of the entire 
global governance structure, their incompatibility with the current structure may produce poor 
performance and frustrate further reforms. 
Keeping interaction effects in mind is especially important for the interdisciplinary researcher who is 
tempted to scale down the field of study, in order to compensate for the increased complexity 
stemming from methodical and theoretical richness. Yet, global governance is a complex phenomenon 
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